Browse regulations

The regulation designates 20,242.05 acres of Pueblo Indian lands across six New Mexico Pueblos as benefiting from irrigation works constructed by the Middle Rio Grande Conservancy District, based on contracts executed in 1928-1938. It represents a historical allocation of costs for irrigation infrastructure.

This nearly century-old land designation adds to the 185,000-page CFR without serving any current purpose. Keeping it imposes hidden administrative costs, creates legal uncertainty, and risks obsolete rules inadvertently affecting modern property and water rights. Any necessary determinations can be made through current processes or archival records, making its continued existence an unnecessary burden on the rule of law.

Regulation implementing the Tribal Transportation Program (TTP), distributing federal funds to tribes for roads, bridges, transit, and other transportation infrastructure. It operationalizes tribal self-determination by allowing tribes to contract with DOI/DOT to administer programs under the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act, with detailed rules on eligibility, planning, funding formulas, and consultation requirements.

Eliminating this regulation would reduce the $2 trillion annual regulatory burden on Americans. Keeping it imposes massive hidden taxes ($14k+ per household), favors centralized federal control over local tribal decision-making, and creates dependency on Washington rather than tribal self-reliance through their own taxation or private enterprise. The compliance costs fall disproportionately on smaller tribal governments, distort incentives to maximize federal funding over genuine needs, and violate constitutional federalism by federalizing what should be state and tribal responsibilities. Even if tribes face infrastructure challenges, federal redistribution crowds out market-based solutions and local accountability.

This regulation requires federal (Secretary of Interior) approval for Indian tribes to select legal counsel and set attorney fees, applies to both IRA-organized and non-organized tribes, and imposes admission and oath requirements for attorneys practicing before the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

This paternalistic regulation violates tribal sovereignty and free contract principles by making tribes seek federal permission for legal representation. The approval process creates regulatory barriers that increase costs, delay access to counsel, and enable arbitrary bureaucratic discretion. Unseen effects include reduced attorney competition, higher legal fees due to uncertainty, and perpetuation of a colonial-era wardship relationship that undermines tribal self-determination.

This regulation governs federal grant distribution to Tribal colleges and universities under the Tribally Controlled Colleges and Universities Assistance Act and Navajo Community College Act. It defines eligibility criteria, application processes, funding formulas based on Indian Student Counts, reporting requirements, and compliance conditions for institutions receiving federal assistance.

Federal involvement in education violates constitutional federalism—education is a state and local matter under the Tenth Amendment. This regulation creates dependency, distorts market incentives, and imposes crushing bureaucratic burdens that raise barriers to entry. The compliance costs and centralized control undermine Tribal sovereignty and self-determination while crowding out private, market-driven educational alternatives. The unseen costs—reduced innovation, mission creep, and perpetual dependency—far outweigh any benefits. Federal trust responsibility could be fulfilled through block grants without this labyrinthine control apparatus.

This regulation establishes a hiring preference for individuals of Native American descent (including recognized tribal members, descendants meeting specific criteria, those with ≥1/2 Indian blood, and Eskimos/Alaska Natives) for all positions in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Preference applies to hiring, promotion, reassignment, etc., and requires proof of eligibility. Preference eligibles may receive Schedule A excepted appointments or competitive appointments if on Civil Service Register.

Racially discriminatory hiring violates equal protection and individual liberty; imposes bureaucratic verification costs; undermines merit-based civil service; creates perverse incentives for ancestry documentation and potential fraud; and perpetuates collectivist categorization contrary to free market principles.

This regulation preempts state and local zoning, land-use, and property laws from applying to Indian trust lands held by the U.S. for tribes or individuals, but grants the Secretary of the Interior discretion to waive this preemption and apply state regulations if deemed in the 'best interest of the Indian owner(s).'

Deletion would subject Indian trust lands to state and local regulations without tribal consent, undermining tribal sovereignty, economic self-determination, and the federal trust responsibility. While the Secretary's waiver discretion concentrates excessive power, the alternative—automatic state jurisdiction—poses a far greater threat to liberty and tribal self-governance by allowing external governments to control tribal land use and development.

This regulation terminated HUD's mortgage coinsurance program effective November 12, 1990, while providing wind-down procedures for pre-termination commitments, including precommitment review requirements, extension limits, and assignment procedures involving GNMA for defaulting lenders.

This regulation is entirely obsolete - it governs a program terminated over 34 years ago. Any legitimate commitments would have been resolved or expired long ago, making these procedural rules a regulatory relic that adds complexity without any current effect. Keeping it serves no practical purpose while contributing to the expansive Code of Federal Regulations.

This regulation governs the wind-down of HUD's terminated mortgage coinsurance program (ended November 12, 1990). It establishes grandfathering rules for pre-termination commitments, precommitment review procedures for pending applications, extension limits for existing commitments, and default assignment procedures involving GNMA. The program itself has been defunct for over 30 years; these are merely transitional provisions for wrapping up legacy obligations.

This regulation is obsolete—it administers a program terminated in 1990. Any remaining commitments are exceedingly rare or nonexistent. Maintaining defunct regulations creates unnecessary clutter, imposes administrative costs for keeping dead letters on the books, and exemplifies the accretion of unenforceable or irrelevant rules that make the CFR incomprehensible. Federal involvement in mortgage coinsurance itself represents improper intrusion into housing finance markets that should be private or state-regulated. Delete it.

This regulation governs the termination and wind-down of HUD's mortgage coinsurance program effective November 12, 1990. It includes transition rules for pre-termination commitments, precommitment review procedures for pending applications, extension limits for existing commitments, GNMA assignment rights when lenders default, provisions for converting coinsured mortgages to full insurance, and electronic remittance requirements. Largely procedural and sunset in nature, dealing with legacy issues from a terminated program.

These are obsolete transitional rules from a program terminated 35 years ago. Maintaining them imposes unnecessary administrative burden on HUD and creates regulatory clutter with no current benefit. Any residual legacy issues could be addressed through simple statutory guidance or agency discretion, eliminating compliance costs and reducing the accretion of dead-weight regulations that obscure the law.

Terminates HUD's authority to coinsure mortgages under Part 204 as of Dec 29, 1994, while grandfathered existing coinsured loans and pre-termination borrower approvals.

Obsolete: the program ended over 30 years ago; any grandfathered loans are long resolved. Keeping it unnecessarily bloats the CFR, increasing compliance confusion and hidden costs. The underlying coinsurance program itself was a harmful market distortion that created moral hazard and federal overreach.

This regulation implements 23 U.S.C. 164, coercing states to enact specific 'repeat intoxicated driver laws' with mandatory minimum penalties (license suspension ≥1 year, ignition interlock requirements, mandatory jail/community service sentences) by threatening to withhold 2.5% of federal highway apportionment. States may instead certify that 75% of offenders receive imprisonment. Reserved funds are reallocated to alcohol-impaired driving programs or highway safety activities.

This represents unconstitutional federal coercion of state criminal justice policy using highway funding as leverage, violating Tenth Amendment police powers reserved to states. The one-size-fits-all mandates eliminate state experimentation, impose uniform mandatory minimums that restrict judicial discretion, and create unseen costs: prison overcrowding, disproportionate sentencing, and ignition interlock burdens on low-income offenders. The federal government has no legitimate enumerated power to dictate state DUI sentencing structures. States should be free to calibrate penalties and rehabilitation based on local conditions and constitutional constraints.

The regulation implements 23 U.S.C. 154 by withholding 2.5% of federal highway funds from states that fail to enact and enforce open container laws prohibiting possession and consumption of alcoholic beverages in the passenger area of motor vehicles on public highways. It defines terms, sets compliance requirements, outlines fund reservation and transfer procedures, and specifies enforcement and notification processes.

The regulation coercively uses highway funding to commandeer state police powers, violating Tenth Amendment federalism principles. It imposes unnecessary administrative overhead on FHWA, NHTSA, and state DOTs to monitor compliance, while conditioning essential infrastructure funds on unrelated policy adoption. The unseen cost is the erosion of state sovereignty and the distortion of state policy choices driven by funding threats rather than local democratic deliberation.

This regulation mandates that each state develop, implement, and evaluate a Highway Safety Improvement Program (HSIP) using federal funding (90% federal share). It requires comprehensive data collection (MIRE fundamental elements), a Strategic Highway Safety Plan, Railway-Highway Crossing Program, and annual reporting to the Federal Highway Administration (FHWA). States must follow specific federal planning processes, data standards, and evaluation methodologies, with funding conditioned on compliance.

This regulation imposes unconstitutional federal overreach into state police powers reserved by the Tenth Amendment. The compliance burden—data systems, planning staff, and extensive reporting—constitutes a massive hidden tax on state resources. Centralized planning stifles state innovation and local accountability, locking jurisdictions into one-size-fits-all federal methodologies rather than allowing competitive experimentation. Federal funding strings create dependency and distort state priorities toward bureaucratic compliance rather than actual safety outcomes. The expansive administrative apparatus invites regulatory capture by engineering and construction interests. Safety can be—and historically was—better achieved through decentralized state and local control, where officials remain directly accountable to citizens and free to adopt tailored, cost-effective solutions.

Federal regulation requires state DOTs to evaluate roads/highways/bridges that required emergency repairs multiple times since 1997, considering alternatives to reduce federal spending, protect safety/environment, and meet transportation needs. Mandates periodic updates and integration into project planning.

Imposes significant compliance costs on states, infringes on state sovereignty under the Tenth Amendment, creates a knowledge problem by substituting federal process for local discretion, and risks distorting infrastructure investment without proven net benefit.

This federal regulation mandates that State DOTs develop and implement complex, federally-certified asset management plans for National Highway System pavements and bridges. It requires specific processes including performance gap analysis, life-cycle planning, risk management, financial planning, and investment strategies. The FHWA certifies state processes, conducts annual consistency reviews, and imposes penalties (reduced federal funding) for non-compliance. States must submit plans for certification by 2018-2019, with updates every 4 years.

This represents unconstitutional federal commandeering of state executive functions under the Tenth Amendment. Transportation infrastructure is a traditional state responsibility, yet this regulation dictates detailed management processes to state agencies, coerces compliance through funding penalties, and removes decision-making from local officials with superior knowledge of regional conditions. The compliance burden consumes state resources without proven benefits, violates principles of federalism, and exemplifies the bureaucratic overreach that von Mises, Hayek, and Friedman opposed. States have strong natural incentives to maintain highways efficiently without federal mandates dictating their internal management procedures. The regulation imposes significant unseen costs through reduced state flexibility, ossified bureaucratic processes, and one-size-fits-all requirements that cannot account for diverse local conditions, geographies, and priorities across 50 states.