Browse regulations

Establishes procedures for public comments regarding Federal Prison Industries (UNICOR) business operations, directing correspondence to the COO or Board Chairman and requiring appropriate responses. Excludes inmate complaints which follow separate Bureau of Prisons procedures.

This regulation imposes administrative overhead to maintain a largely symbolic comment process for UNICOR, a government corporation that competes with private enterprise using subsidized prison labor. The process excludes the most affected party (inmates) and creates a false appearance of accountability that may perpetuate UNICOR's existence. Americans would be better served by abolishing UNICOR entirely rather than maintaining bureaucratic procedures that legitimize this market-distorting program.

This regulation establishes the administrative framework for the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund, defining eligibility (physical injury or death during attacks/immediate aftermath), claim procedures, and compensation methodology for victims and their families.

It represents an unconstitutional expansion of federal power into compensation for private harms, imposing significant administrative costs on taxpayers, creating moral hazard, and setting a precedent for ever-growing entitlement programs that undermine limited government and free enterprise.

This regulation designates specific categories of federal officers and employees to be protected under federal criminal statutes (18 U.S.C. 1114, 1117, etc.) that prohibit killing, kidnapping, assaulting, or threatening them while performing official duties, as well as protecting their immediate family members. The covered categories span dozens of federal agencies and roles including inspectors, investigators, law enforcement personnel, certain administrative staff, and others whose work involves physical danger or investigative functions.

Hyper-specific designation of protected employee categories unnecessarily expands federal criminal jurisdiction beyond what is needed to protect truly dangerous federal functions, undermining state authority and the principle of general law. This rule invites agencies to seek inclusion for low-risk staff, contributing to over-criminalization and regulatory bloat.

Regulation codifies categories of federal law enforcement officers and specific agencies whose officers are authorized to request search warrants under Rule 41, Fed. R. Crim. P., requiring typically U.S. Attorney concurrence.

Deletion would create uncertainty about warrant authority, risking suppression of evidence and release of dangerous criminals. The CFR publication provides transparent, stable notice essential to due process and rule of law, ensuring only authorized officers obtain warrants and protecting investigations from technical challenges—outcomes difficult to achieve through internal memos subject to change without public input.

DOJ policy encouraging government attorneys to consent to referrals to magistrate judges for civil cases and to designate them as special masters, based on factors like complexity, amount in controversy, and expedition. Also addresses criminal trials and appeal rights.

Promotes efficient case resolution, reducing court backlog and taxpayer costs. Deletion would hinder docket management and likely increase delays and expenses in federal courts.

Internal DOJ regulations covering conflicts of interest in criminal matters, enforcement of post-employment restrictions, limited personal use of government property, victims' rights complaint procedure, and mandatory reporting/cooperation with Inspector General and Office of Professional Responsibility.

Deletion would erode public trust in DOJ impartiality, enable corruption through conflicts of interest and improper post-employment lobbying, and eliminate accountability for victims' rights violations and misconduct. These low-cost internal governance rules achieve essential oversight outcomes through formal processes that would be impossible to replicate consistently without codification, and they primarily burden the agency itself rather than the public or private enterprise.

The regulation implements 8 U.S.C. 1324b, prohibiting unfair immigration-related employment practices: discrimination based on national origin or citizenship status, intimidation/retaliation, and unfair documentary practices (requesting excessive documents or refusing valid ones with discriminatory intent). It defines terms, exceptions (employers with ≤3 employees), filing procedures, investigation powers for the Special Counsel, and enforcement via administrative complaints before OCAHO.

The regulation duplicates Title VII's national origin protections and imposes significant compliance burdens and complexity on employers, especially small businesses. It creates a separate federal enforcement bureaucracy and vague 'documentary practice' rules that encourage overly cautious hiring, potentially harming legal immigrants. State laws already address citizenship status discrimination, making this federal overreach with high unseen costs and unclear marginal benefit.

Prohibits introducing or removing any item from federal prisons without warden's consent.

This is a fundamental security measure for federal correctional facilities. Deleting it would compromise prison safety, enabling contraband smuggling and escape attempts. The regulation serves a legitimate core government function with minimal external costs to the public.

Regulation 26 CFR 701.9006-1 establishes the administrative process for transferring taxpayer-designated funds via the presidential election campaign checkoff into three separate accounts (Conventions, Nominees, Primaries) within the Presidential Election Campaign Fund, detailing monthly transfers, consultation requirements with the FEC, and timing restrictions on deposits.

This regulation implements forced wealth redistribution for political purposes, compelling taxpayers to subsidize campaigns they may oppose. It distorts the political marketplace by creating artificial advantages for candidates who navigate the complex matching fund system, while raising barriers to entry for grassroots challengers. The stated goal of reducing private money's influence has demonstrably failed—total election spending has exploded—yet the regulatory complexity and compelled speech remain. Small, liberty-oriented reforms should start with eliminating this coercive apparatus that transfers money from earners to politicians.

IRS regulations implementing the 'self-dealing' prohibition for private foundations under IRC §4941 and §4943. Defines prohibited transactions with 'disqualified persons' (insiders), provides limited exceptions (e.g., scholarships), and imposes complex ownership reduction requirements forcing foundations to divest business holdings from 75%+ combined ownership to 50% within 10-15 years.

This regulation imposes prohibitive compliance costs and severe economic distortions. The blanket ban on all compensation to disqualified persons—even for legitimate, fairly-compensated services—prevents foundations from accessing expertise and reduces philanthropic efficiency. The forced divestiture rule (75%→50%) destroys value by requiring fire sales of productive business holdings regardless of actual wrongdoing, diverting philanthropic capital from its intended purpose. The labyrinthine rules on 'indirect' transactions create legal uncertainty that discourages all foundation engagement with business enterprises, reducing capital formation. The unseen cost is billions in lost philanthropic economic activity and reduced foundation capacity to serve charitable purposes, all to prevent abuses that could be addressed with simple, bright-line conflict-of-interest rules.

Temporary regulatory provision maintaining existing Foundation Excise Tax Regulations (§53.4941(e)-1) as controlling until permanent regulations under sections 4975(f)(4) and (5) are issued. Bypasses normal notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures due to claimed need for immediate guidance.

Temporary measure that bypasses democratic notice-and-comment procedures sets dangerous precedent for unchecked rulemaking, undermining transparency and public participation. Its self-repealing nature makes continued existence unnecessary while normalizing anti-democratic bureaucratic procedures with zero offsetting public benefit.

This regulation implements 'backup withholding' for interest and dividend payments when the IRS determines a taxpayer has underreported such income. It requires payors (banks, brokers) to withhold 20% of reportable payments after IRS notification, following a 120-day notice period of at least four notices to the taxpayer. The taxpayer can request IRS review to stop withholding by showing no underreporting, correcting it, proving undue hardship, or establishing a bona fide dispute. The regulation expired December 31, 1996.

The regulation is explicitly obsolete, with an effective date ending in 1996. Even when active, it imposed heavy compliance costs on financial institutions to monitor and withhold funds based on IRS administrative determinations, bypassed normal tax enforcement due process, and created a 20% penalty withholding regime that harmed potentially innocent taxpayers—disproportionately affecting small payors and those with irregular income. Its administrative mechanism encouraged agencies to expand extra-statutory withholding authority without clear congressional authorization.

This Treasury regulation (26 CFR § 31.3121(a)(2)-1 and parallel railroad provision) defines when sickness or accident disability payments constitute "wages" subject to Social Security/Railroad Retirement taxes. It excludes workers' comp, payments after 6 months of no work, employee contributions, and medical care. It imposes complex third-party withholding/employer-status rules for insurers, with transitional rules for 1981-1982 and safe-harbor notification procedures.

Obsolete transitional rules from 1981-1982 create unnecessary complexity without current justification. The third-party "deemed employer" regime imposes substantial compliance burdens on insurers and employers with minimal revenue impact. The rule favors large players who can navigate the intricate agency/notification requirements while disadvantaging small businesses. The fundamental tax treatment could be simplified to: disability payments are wages unless they are (1) workers' comp, (2) entirely employee-funded, or (3) medical expense reimbursements. Current complexity appears to be bureaucratic accretion, not necessary for tax administration.

Designates a specific roadless area on the Wind River Indian Reservation and prohibits construction of motorized transportation routes (roads, highways, truck trails) within it, with exceptions only for fire protection, commercial use for Indians' benefit, or actual Indian needs. The Superintendent is held accountable for maintaining the roadless condition, and elimination requires a written showing of actual and controlling need.

The regulation permanently restricts land use on tribal land, foreclosing potential economic development and imposing a federal bureaucracy that cannot adapt to changing community needs. The unseen costs—lost opportunities for roads enabling commerce, emergency access, and resource use—outweigh any preservation benefits, violating principles of local sovereignty and free enterprise.

Federal regulation governing oil and gas leasing on the Osage Mineral Estate, requiring Superintendent approval for leases, assignments, and operations; establishing bond requirements, minimum royalty rates, reporting mandates, and environmental assessments; granting the Osage Tribal Council consent authority but ultimately subject to federal oversight through the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

This regulatory scheme imposes heavy compliance costs and bureaucratic delays that distort market outcomes, reduce lease value for the Osage Tribe, and violate tribal sovereignty. The Superintendent's approval requirements for routine transactions, mandated bonds, government-set royalty minimums, and extensive reporting create barriers to entry and reflect paternalistic federal control over tribal resource management. The Osage Nation, as owner of the mineral estate in fee simple, should be free to negotiate leases and manage its resources through its own tribal governance without federal micromanagement.