Browse regulations

Organizational description of U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service structure: headquarters addresses in Washington, DC and Falls Church, VA; eight regional offices with geographic jurisdictions and physical addresses. No substantive rules, prohibitions, or compliance requirements.

This is purely informational administrative detail that belongs on a website or agency publication, not the Code of Federal Regulations. Keeping it contributes to the 185,000-page labyrinth without adding any binding rules or protections. Deleting it would simplify the regulatory framework and reduce bloat at zero cost, as contact information and jurisdictional boundaries can be accessed through normal public channels.

Regulation requires the Board to make USPS surface transportation contracts with carriers publicly inspectable upon request, and mandates USPS to submit requested contracts promptly via fax, messenger, or fastest mail.

Deletion would eliminate transparency into federal spending, enabling corruption and waste in USPS contracting. The formal inspection mechanism is essential for accountability and cannot be replicated through informal means; without it, the public and watchdogs would be blind to contract terms, pricing, and potential sweetheart deals, undermining both fiscal responsibility and competitive fairness.

Mandates extensive weekly and monthly reporting by Class I railroads on performance metrics (train speeds, dwell times, car inventory, holding patterns, grain and coal shipments), Chicago gateway operations, and annual reports on infrastructure projects exceeding $75 million. Requires methodology explanations and makes all reported data publicly available via STB website.

The regulation imposes substantial compliance costs—estimated in the hundreds of millions annually—that railroads pass to shippers and consumers. It crowds out private information markets: if performance data were valuable, railroads would voluntarily disclose it to attract business. Heavy weekly reporting creates perverse incentives (Goodhart's law), distorting operations to game metrics rather than optimize service. It embodies Hayek's knowledge problem—regulators cannot effectively comprehend complex railroad systems through simplified reports, yet the data enables mission creep and regulatory capture. Hidden costs include chilling innovation (railroads avoid experiments complicating reporting) and entrenching federal overreach into a sector that would self-coordinate through market forces. The marginal transparency benefits could be achieved through less burdensome means, making this a clear case of regulatory waste violating limited government principles.

Class I railroads must submit a Monthly Report of Number of Railroad Employees (Form C) to the Surface Transportation Board's Office of Economics each month by month-end, in paper or electronic format.

Imposes a compliance burden for data already collected by other agencies (e.g., Labor Department); eliminating it reduces the regulatory labyrinth without materially impairing STB oversight.

Requires railroads and common carriers to file detailed annual financial and operational reports with the Surface Transportation Board, including extensive data on Positive Train Control implementation and costs, with filing deadlines each March 31.

This regulation imposes massive compliance burdens on railroads—especially small carriers—requiring voluminous data collection that distorts business decisions and raises barriers to entry. The detailed financial reporting serves little purpose in today's largely deregulated railroad industry and represents an outdated federal grab of information that could be obtained through less intrusive means. The unseen costs include diverted resources from actual operations and maintenance, while providing minimal public benefit beyond enabling bureaucratic oversight of private enterprise.

Regulation establishes procedures for the Surface Transportation Board to prescribe alternative rail service when an incumbent carrier's service deteriorates. Affected parties can petition for relief, demonstrating service inadequacy, failed negotiations, and a commitment from an alternative carrier to provide service without harming existing customers. Incumbents can later petition to terminate relief. The process includes strict filing deadlines and service requirements.

This regulation imposes significant compliance burdens and administrative overhead on railroads and shippers, while creating regulatory uncertainty that distorts market incentives. Government-mandated service requirements and forced access arrangements interfere with freedom of contract and property rights, potentially chilling investment in rail infrastructure. Even addressing legitimate monopoly concerns, this top-down mandate is a blunt instrument that fails to account for the unseen costs: reduced supply, higher prices, and misallocated resources. Market-driven solutions and removal of artificial barriers to competition would better serve shippers without expanding bureaucratic power.

Regulation specifies how interest rates and compound interest must be calculated for reparations in board investigation and complaint proceedings, mandating use of the Wall Street Journal's U.S. Prime Rate with an exponential compounding method rather than simple interest.

This micro-management of mathematical calculations exemplifies regulatory overreach. The government needs no fee schedule prescribing exponential vs. simple interest—these are matters for courts applying general principles of equity or for parties to negotiate in contracts. Mandating a specific publication (WSJ Prime Rate) creates arbitrary dependency and eliminates flexibility for different market conditions. The unseen cost is accumulated complexity in the CFR that businesses must navigate, plus the chilling effect on contractual freedom to agree on different terms. If a regulatory board must award reparations, judges are eminently capable of determining appropriate interest without a rulebook.

Mandates the Association of American Railroads to quarterly file the Rail Cost Adjustment Factor (RCAF) and annually file weighted average state tax rates with the Surface Transportation Board to support rate regulation. The Board verifies data, publishes notices, and uses these metrics as benchmarks for determining 'reasonableness' of rail rates under simplified standards, with public comment periods.

The regulation imposes compliance costs to sustain a rate-control regime that distorts market pricing, entrenches regulatory capture, and infringes on contractual freedom. Its unseen consequences include reduced railroad investment, higher shipping costs, suppressed competition, and the misallocation of resources that would occur under any central pricing authority. The data collection merely enables an illegitimate function that should be abolished; the underlying problems of monopoly abuse are better addressed through antitrust enforcement, not price controls.

Establishes procedures for Surface Transportation Board investigations, including preliminary fact-finding, board-initiated investigations with subpoena power, formal proceedings, confidentiality rules, and party rights.

The regulation enables nonpublic investigations with broad subpoena power, imposing heavy compliance costs on businesses and stifling innovation while violating Tenth Amendment federalism by federalizing transportation oversight, adding to the $2 trillion hidden tax burden exceeding $14,000 per household.

This regulation mandates that Class I and II motor common carriers of general freight must use a specific national weight formula from a 1977-1978 study when calculating platform handling times for expense distribution in accounting proceedings, as part of the Board's Uniform System of Accounts.

It's an obsolete mandate based on a 1977-78 study, forcing carriers to use an outdated formula that doesn't reflect current conditions, adding compliance costs without clear public benefit, and limiting carriers' flexibility to use appropriate modern methodologies.

This regulation mandates that any party directed by the Surface Transportation Board to take or cease an action must notify the Board in writing by a verified affidavit before the compliance deadline, simultaneously serving all parties. If the order involves rate or schedule changes, the notification must include tariff or schedule numbers and proper filings.

Deletion would let parties hide noncompliance, crippling the Board's ability to enforce orders that safeguard competition, fair rates, and safety. The rule provides a simple, uniform, and low‑cost method to verify adherence—something that would be far more cumbersome and uncertain without a standardized procedure.

Establishes a procedure for parties to petition a Board for relief not provided by existing rules, requiring statement of jurisdiction, claim, and demand.

Open-ended petition process invites mission creep and rent-seeking; enables arbitrary government intervention that distorts markets, creates cronyism, and expands regulatory state beyond constitutional limits. Downstream costs of discretionary relief—including unequal treatment and barriers to entry—far outweigh any benefits.

Defines rail and highway trailer/container-on-flatcar (TOFC/COFC) services and exempts them from federal economic regulation under 49 U.S.C. subtitle IV; also permits motor/water carriers to use such services with tariff disclosure requirements.

Deletion would subject intermodal freight to restrictive economic regulation, raising transportation costs and reducing efficiency. The exemption achieves needed deregulation through clear statutory rule, enabling market-driven competition and avoiding the knowledge problem inherent in regulatory control.

This regulation sets forth procedures for railroads to temporarily reroute traffic when they are unable to transport it due to unforeseen circumstances, requiring notifications to government bodies and industry associations, obtaining concurrence from receiving carriers, and preserving original route rates and revenue divisions.

The regulation imposes significant bureaucratic overhead requiring notifications to multiple regulatory bodies and industry associations, creating compliance costs that burden rail operators and ultimately consumers. It substitutes government procedure for market-driven solutions, forcing railroads through needless reporting hoops for temporary operational disruptions that could be efficiently handled through existing commercial contracts and relationships. The extension process requiring written explanations to regulators exemplifies unnecessary state intervention in what should be private business decisions.

This regulation establishes a transitional framework for railroad freight car hire rates, grandfathering 'fixed rate cars' (built before 1993) with government-prescribed rates for 10 years while allowing 'market rate cars' to negotiate freely. It includes procedures for voluntary conversion of fixed rate cars to market rate treatment and dispute resolution mechanisms. Effective January 1, 1994.

The regulation is functionally obsolete—its core mechanism (10-year fixed rate period) ended in 2003, after which all cars should have become market rate. Continuing this regulatory relic on the books adds unnecessary complexity, invites potential reinterpretation, and represents the regulatory accretion that blurs rule of law. Rail car hire should be governed solely by ordinary contract law and the broader deregulatory framework of the Staggers Act, not by a zombie provision prescribing 1990 rates for equipment that may still be in service.