Browse regulations

Establishes a multi-tiered appeals process for insured credit unions to challenge material supervisory determinations by NCUA staff, including reconsideration, Director review, Supervisory Review Committee appeal, and Board appeal, with anti-retaliation provisions and publication of decisions.

This regulation creates a costly, multi-layered bureaucracy that prolongs uncertainty and encourages regulatory gaming. The publication requirement spawns de facto agency precedent, expanding NCUA authority. These unseen costs burden both the agency and credit unions, while traditional judicial review under the APA provides sufficient oversight without this procedural morass.

Establishes procedures for the Farm Credit Administration to handle classified national security information, including designation of an Information Security Officer, declassification request processes, document handling and storage requirements, employee training, nondisclosure agreements, and coordination with other agencies and FOIA, all pursuant to Executive Order 13292.

Redundant internal procedures mandated by Executive Order; codification in the CFR adds unnecessary regulatory volume and administrative costs without enhancing public rights or oversight. The FCA can implement these requirements via internal directives.

Applies federal ethics and financial disclosure rules to Farm Credit Administration employees, an independent agency regulating agricultural credit institutions.

Deletion would remove critical safeguards against corruption and conflicts of interest in a regulatory body overseeing billions in agricultural credit, risking biased decisions that harm farmers and taxpayers. These clear, uniform standards are essential for maintaining integrity and are difficult to replicate without creating loopholes.

This regulation (12 CFR 382) requires certain large systemically important financial institutions (covered FSIs) to modify their Qualified Financial Contracts (QFCs) to limit counterparties' ability to terminate, net, or exercise default rights when the institution or its affiliates enter receivership, insolvency, or resolution proceedings. It prohibits default rights triggered by affiliate failures, restricts transfer prohibitions on credit enhancements, and establishes staged compliance deadlines based on counterparty type.

This regulation represents dangerous federal overreach into private contracts, forcibly rewriting thousands of existing financial agreements to benefit systemically risky banks at the expense of counterparties' contractual rights. It creates moral hazard by shielding too-big-to-fail institutions from market discipline, while imposing enormous compliance costs and legal complexity on the financial system. The 'contagion' justification ignores that artificially preventing contract termination merely masks risk rather than eliminating it, while concentration of risk in fewer large institutions—precisely what Dodd-Frank perpetuates—creates greater systemic fragility. These restrictions on freedom of contract should be repealed; if resolution is needed, market pricing of risk and bankruptcy law—not bureaucratic stay regimes—should govern.

This FDIC regulation mandates daily electronic recordkeeping requirements for qualified financial contracts (QFCs) at insured depository institutions deemed to be in 'troubled condition.' It differentiates between 'full scope' entities ($50B+ assets) and 'limited scope' entities, requiring detailed position-level, counterparty, collateral, and legal agreement data. Compliance is required within 270 days (or 60 days for 'accelerated' troubled institutions), with exemptions available at FDIC discretion.

Deletion would increase systemic risk during bank resolutions. Without standardized, accessible QFC records, the FDIC's ability to swiftly transfer or unwind complex derivatives portfolios in a failure scenario would be severely impaired, potentially triggering broader market panic, freezing credit markets, and imposing much larger costs on taxpayers through emergency bailouts or deposit insurance fund depletion. The regulation is narrowly targeted only at troubled institutions, minimizing burden on healthy banks while ensuring public accountability for institutions already under government supervision.

Regulation T governs margin requirements for securities transactions, regulating credit extensions by brokers and dealers. It mandates initial and maintenance margins, defines various account types and exceptions, sets margin call procedures, and includes provisions for good faith margin, arbitrage, prime broker arrangements, and nonpurpose credit. Issued by the Federal Reserve under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, it aims to control leverage in securities markets.

This regulation violates freedom of contract by imposing mandatory margin requirements on private transactions. It artificially constrains credit availability, creates high compliance costs (disproportionately affecting small firms), and distorts capital allocation. Market forces and self-regulatory organizations can adequately manage leverage risks without federal mandates. The unseen consequences include reduced market liquidity, higher transaction costs, and barriers to entry. The 1930s-era justification of preventing crashes is empirically dubious and ignores unintended consequences of credit restrictions.

Mandates U.S. GAAP for federal savings associations' accounting and disclosures, unless OCC requires otherwise.

Redundant: GAAP is already the industry standard and the OCC can enforce it through other means. Keeping it adds unnecessary compliance burden and reinforces a one-size-fits-all approach, limiting flexibility and innovation.

Regulation authorizes Federal savings associations to provide financial services electronically (e.g., ATMs, internet, telephones) and to market related capacities to third parties, while requiring management to identify and mitigate risks, establish internal controls, and implement security measures adequate to prevent unauthorized access, financial fraud, and comply with part 168.

The regulation imposes uniform risk management and security requirements that increase compliance costs, especially for small institutions, and stifles innovation by mandating specific controls. These objectives are already achieved through market discipline, existing supervisory oversight, and other federal laws, making this rule an unnecessary burden that distorts resource allocation and raises barriers to entry.

Regulation 12 CFR Part 47 mandates that the largest federally chartered banks (those with over $700B in assets or subsidiaries of global systemically important banking organizations) must include specific provisions in their qualified financial contracts (QFCs). These provisions restrict counterparties' default rights and ensure contract transferability when the bank enters resolution under federal bankruptcy-like regimes (FDIA or Dodd-Frank Title II). The rule aims to prevent widespread contract termination that could destabilize the financial system during the resolution of a failing systemically important bank.

This regulation violates freedom of contract by forcing private parties to surrender their default rights and transfer restrictions. It creates severe moral hazard by protecting counterparties of largest banks from the full consequences of their lending decisions, reducing market discipline and encouraging excessive risk-taking at taxpayer expense. The regulation treats the symptom of 'too big to fail' while reinforcing the disease—implicit guarantees that these institutions will not be allowed to fail normally. The compliance burden further distorts markets by imposing uniform terms that cannot reflect individual risk assessments. True financial stability requires allowing contracts to be freely negotiated and enforced, not mandating terms that socialize losses.

The Common Rule governs ethical review of research involving human subjects across all federally-funded or regulated research. It requires Institutional Review Boards (IRBs), informed consent procedures, and institutional assurances. It defines 'human subject' broadly to include identifiable private information and biospecimens, with detailed exemption categories for low-risk research.

While preventing unethical human experimentation is legitimate, this federal one-size-fits-all mandate represents unconstitutional federal overreach into areas reserved to states under the Tenth Amendment. The $2+ trillion annual regulatory burden explicitly extends to private research institutions through the 'otherwise subject to regulation' clause, creating massive compliance costs that stifle innovation, particularly for small research entities. The administrative apparatus creates a captured regulatory class that prioritizes process over protection while diverting resources from actual research. The same ends—ethical research—can be achieved through state laws, professional standards, market forces, and tort liability without violating federalism or imposing a hidden tax on scientific advancement and medical progress.

The Distance Learning and Telemedicine (DLT) Loan and Grant Program provides federal financial assistance (grants, loans, or combinations) to rural areas for acquiring equipment and infrastructure for distance learning and telemedicine services. Administered by USDA's Rural Utilities Service, it prioritizes economically distressed rural areas, requires a 15% matching contribution, and explicitly excludes funding for salaries, operating expenses, land/building purchases, and EMR systems.

This program federalizes what should be state, local, and private sector responsibilities. The matching requirement and complex application process favor larger, well-connected institutions over small rural providers, creating barriers to entry. Federal subsidy distorts market incentives, potentially funding projects that would occur anyway through private investment, while creating dependency and bureaucratic oversight costs. The program duplicates market-driven expansion of telecommunications and telehealth services that private capital would provide more efficiently.

Sets technical requirements and certification (via NTEP) for grain weighing equipment used in official FGIS services and certain commercial weighing, incorporating NIST Handbook 44 and 105-1 standards.

The regulation imposes costly compliance burdens on manufacturers and grain handlers, raising prices for farmers and consumers. It stifles innovation through prescriptive standards, creates barriers to entry for small firms, and federalizes a function better left to states or the private sector, violating federalism principles. Unseen consequences include reduced competition, higher costs for weighing services, and dependency on a centralized approval process.

Limits record retention to two years after the program year for agricultural producers receiving federal assistance, balancing accountability with reasonable paperwork burden.

Deletion would create uncertainty and likely invite longer or indefinite retention mandates, raising compliance costs—especially for small farms. This 2-year cap provides clear, limited oversight that would be hard to sustain without an explicit constraint on bureaucratic reach.

Implements Title IX by prohibiting sex discrimination in any education program receiving federal financial assistance, requiring self-evaluations, grievance procedures, Title IX coordinators, and non-discrimination notifications, with exemptions for religious, military, and certain social organizations.

The regulation imposes massive compliance costs on educational institutions, particularly small ones, distorts resource allocation, infringes on institutional autonomy and freedom of association, and leads to enforcement actions that violate due process. Federal overreach into education violates Tenth Amendment principles, and state laws and private enforcement can adequately address discrimination without the bureaucratic burden.

Federal regulation (Common Rule) governing all research involving human subjects conducted, supported, or regulated by federal agencies. Requires institutional review board (IRB) approval, informed consent, and defines exemptions for low-risk studies. Based on Belmont Report principles of respect, beneficence, and justice.

Imposes massive compliance costs—especially on small universities, nonprofits, and startups—creating entry barriers and stifling innovation. Federal overreach violates Tenth Amendment by preempting state and institutional autonomy in research ethics. Unseen effects include reduced research productivity, higher costs for medical advancements passed to consumers, and risk-averse IRB culture that sometimes impedes beneficial studies. Protections can be achieved via state laws, tort liability, and professional codes without bureaucratic burden.