Browse regulations

Mandates compliance with ASTM F2670-22 safety standard for infant bath tubs, covering stability, slip resistance, structural integrity, and other requirements to prevent infant injury and drowning during bathing.

Infants cannot protect themselves from drowning or trauma; market forces alone fail as parents cannot assess safety pre-purchase and tort law compensates only after irreversible harm. This regulation efficiently adopts an existing industry consensus standard, establishing a mandatory baseline that prevents cost-cutting on safety while avoiding more burdensome federal rulemaking. Deletion would directly endanger children and externalize catastrophic injury costs onto families and society.

Mandates compliance with ASTM F2167-22, a private voluntary safety standard for infant bouncer seats, incorporating it by reference as a federal consumer product safety requirement.

Infants cannot protect themselves from dangerous products; this regulation leverages private expertise efficiently to prevent avoidable injuries and deaths. Without it, manufacturers would have no binding safety requirements, creating a race to the bottom that would harm children and impose greater costs on families and healthcare system from preventable injuries.

Federal safety standard for sling carriers (baby wraps). Mandates compliance with ASTM F2907-22 standard plus additional requirement that warning labels stay in contact with fabric around entire perimeter. Enforced by Consumer Product Safety Commission.

Federal regulation of infant slings violates Tenth Amendment federalism; product safety is a state/local concern or should be handled by private standards and liability. Imposes significant compliance costs on small manufacturers (30% higher per employee) for a niche product, raising barriers to entry. Creates regulatory complexity without addressing the fundamental issue: parents must follow proper usage. Market mechanisms—certifications, consumer reviews, tort liability—more efficiently incentivize safety while preserving innovation and affordability. The unseen cost is reduced competition and higher prices for families.

The Common Rule establishes a comprehensive framework for protecting human subjects in federally-funded or regulated research. It requires Institutional Review Board (IRB) oversight, informed consent procedures, and institutional assurances. The regulation defines human subjects research, establishes exemption categories for low-risk studies, mandates ethical review based on Belmont Report principles, and provides mechanisms for waivers and alternative procedures. It applies to all federal departments and agencies that adopt the policy, covering research conducted domestically and abroad, while preserving state, local, and tribal laws that provide additional protections.

This regulation prevents the most egregious violations of human dignity and autonomy—exploitation, coercion, and non-consensual experimentation—that historically occurred without federal oversight. The modest compliance costs are necessary to maintain a civil society where research subjects are protected, public trust in science is preserved, and the pursuit of knowledge does not trample individual rights. While some burden exists, the unseen costs of repeal would be catastrophic: a return to unethical experimentation on vulnerable populations, loss of informed consent standards, and erosion of ethical norms that protect every American as both a citizen and a potential research participant.

The FTC Guide interprets Section 5 of the FTC Act for fuel economy advertising, defining deceptive practices and mandating specific disclosures, including EPA estimates, to prevent consumer misrepresentation.

The guide imposes unnecessary compliance costs, especially on small businesses, and stifles advertising innovation through arbitrary prescriptive requirements (font sizes, prominence). It duplicates existing anti-fraud laws and centralizes reliance on EPA estimates, reducing competition in testing and potentially misleading consumers. This contributes to the hidden tax of regulation without clear benefit.

This regulation establishes the procedural requirements for foreign governments to formally represent to the U.S. Trade Representative that U.S. standards-related activities violate obligations under the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). It defines who may make representations, where to submit them, mandatory content requirements (including clear identification of alleged violations and evidence of significant trade effect), and submission details (10 copies).

This minimal-procedure regulation enables structured diplomatic resolution of trade disputes over technical standards, preventing escalation while imposing negligible administrative cost. Deleting it would force foreign governments to pursue unilateral measures or public criticism rather than formal engagement, harming American trade relationships and likely prompting retaliatory actions against U.S. exporters. The requirement to show significant trade effect ensures only material concerns are addressed, and the process allows the U.S. to defend legitimate health/safety standards while addressing genuine protectionist concerns through negotiation rather than conflict.

This regulation provides an alternative compliance pathway for exporters reporting under the Trade Act of 1974 by allowing them to follow Commerce Department export control regulations instead. It also defines 'nonmarket economy country' by reference to Commerce's country groups (Q, W, Y, Z), which are used to restrict technology exports to certain countries.

Export controls represent a fundamental violation of free enterprise and property rights, preventing voluntary exchange between willing parties based on bureaucratic classification. The regulatory burden creates compliance costs that distort market incentives, protect domestic industries from competition, and prevent price signals from efficiently allocating technology. These controls often achieve the opposite of their stated goals by driving trade underground, reducing innovation through restricted knowledge flows, and insulating domestic firms from competitive pressure that would otherwise improve quality and lower costs. The 'nonmarket economy' designation is an arbitrary political classification that substitutes central planning for market determination of which transactions create value.

This federal regulation (the Common Rule) establishes a uniform system for protecting human subjects in research conducted, supported, or regulated by any federal department or agency. It requires institutions to provide written assurance of compliance, obtain IRB approval, secure informed consent, and follow detailed procedures, with specific exemption categories for low-risk research. The rule applies domestically and internationally, includes extensive transition provisions, and allows agency waivers and foreign procedure substitutions consistent with Belmont Report principles.

The regulation imposes massive compliance costs that stifle research innovation, particularly burdening small institutions and startups with disproportionate per-employee expenses exceeding 30%. Its complexity violates rule of law principles, enables agency mission creep through expansive discretion, and federalizes a domain where state laws, professional associations, tort liability, and institutional self-regulation could provide adequate protection more efficiently. Unseen costs include delayed breakthroughs, distorted incentives favoring paperwork over discovery, and regulatory capture that protects incumbents while raising barriers to competition in the research marketplace.

This regulation, known as the Common Rule, establishes federal policy for protecting human subjects in research conducted, supported, or regulated by federal agencies. It requires institutions to obtain IRB approval, ensure informed consent, and comply with the Belmont Report principles, with exemptions for low-risk categories and provisions for waivers and foreign research.

Deleting this regulation would remove uniform ethical safeguards, risking a return to inconsistent protections and potential abuses like historical violations (e.g., Tuskegee). The IRB system provides necessary independent oversight that voluntary measures cannot reliably ensure across diverse institutions, especially for vulnerable populations and multi-site studies, thereby protecting public trust in scientific research.

This regulation establishes a process for obtaining FAA certification that a proposed airport or air navigation facility project is 'reasonably necessary' for air commerce or national defense before federal funds are expended. It requires detailed applications with technical descriptions, necessity data, and compliance with airspace plans, with approvals potentially coming from Regional Airports Division Managers.

This represents federal overreach into local infrastructure decisions, imposing compliance costs and creating barriers through a subjective 'reasonably necessary' standard that invites regulatory capture and distorts market signals. Federal funding for airports can be better administered through simpler conditional grants or block grants, respecting state and local sovereignty while preventing mission creep and bureaucratic central planning of aviation infrastructure.

The Regional Innovation Program provides competitive grants through the Economic Development Administration to foster regional innovation clusters. Eligible recipients include states, localities, nonprofits, higher education institutions, public-private partnerships, and consortia. Grants fund feasibility studies, planning, technical assistance, cluster development, and equipment purchases (with a 50% maximum federal investment rate requiring matching funds). The program aims to support technology commercialization and entrepreneurship at the regional level.

This program violates core principles of limited government and free markets by having federal bureaucrats pick winning regions and industries to fund. It distorts market signals, creates dependency on government handouts, and imposes extensive compliance burdens on recipients. The matching requirement disproportionately harms poorer regions and small businesses unable to secure local funding, while benefits tend to flow to established players with resources to navigate the grant system. Innovation should emerge organically through voluntary market exchange, not through centralized planning and resource allocation by political agents with no skin in the game. The unseen costs include misallocation of capital, reduced private investment in regions excluded from the political process, and a larger administrative state that must be funded by taxpayers.

Regulation establishes procedures for Freedom of Information Act requests to the Financial Stability Oversight Council, covering request requirements, processing timelines, fees, expedited processing, handling of classified and protected business information, and appeals.

Imposes administrative costs that entrench the Financial Stability Oversight Council, an unconstitutional agency that distorts markets through systemic risk designations. Creates illusion of accountability while expanding administrative state.

FHFA regulation establishes Office of Minority and Women Inclusion (OMWI) and mandates affirmative action in employment and contracting, requiring targeted outreach, recruitment, and set-asides for minorities and women, plus technical assistance and monitoring of these preferences.

The $2 trillion+ annual regulatory compliance burden includes these diversity mandates that distort merit-based hiring and contracting, impose administrative costs on FHFA and businesses, and create racial/gender preferences that violate equal protection principles. Unseen effects include stigmatization of beneficiaries, reduced incentives for excellence, increased litigation risk, and bureaucratic complexity that favors incumbents and harms small businesses. The regulation's affirmative steps exceed mere equal opportunity, imposing group-based classifications that the Constitution's colorblind ideal rejects, and its costs outweigh any marginal diversity benefits achievable through race-neutral means.

This regulation establishes FHFA's procedures for processing Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, including requirements for requesters, fee structures, exemptions from disclosure, multi-track processing, appeals process, and protections for confidential commercial information. It implements the federal FOIA statute for this specific agency.

Deleting this regulation would jeopardize government transparency and accountability. Without clear, standardized procedures, FHFA could arbitrarily deny or delay FOIA requests, undermining citizens' ability to monitor agency actions. The regulation creates predictable rules that protect both requesters and the agency while ensuring compliance with FOIA's mandate. The administrative costs are necessary to maintain the transparency essential to liberty.

This regulation targets high-cost, short-term credit products (payday, title, and balloon loans) by prohibiting more than two consecutive failed payment withdrawals, mandating pre-transaction disclosures, and setting conditional exemptions for small lenders and credit union alternative loans. Covered loans are defined by repayment structure or APR>36% with leveraged payment mechanisms.

Keeping this regulation imposes high compliance costs that are passed to consumers as increased borrowing costs and reduced credit access, disproportionately burdens small lenders, and preempts state-level consumer protection regimes. Unseen effects include driving borrowers to unregulated or illegal lenders, eliminating flexible repayment arrangements, and concentrating the market in favor of large incumbents who can absorb regulatory burdens.