Browse regulations

Regulation creating preferential federal procurement and property transfer benefits for businesses in presidentially-declared disaster areas and U.S. territories. It defines 'local' business criteria, allows exclusive set-asides of emergency response contracts, provides double credit toward small business goals for such contracts, and enables surplus federal property transfers to eligible small businesses under favorable terms.

Keeping this regulation imposes substantial hidden costs on taxpayers and the economy. It forces agencies to contract with higher-cost, potentially less-qualified local businesses instead of optimal providers, directly raising disaster response costs. The surplus property program transfers valuable federal assets below market rate, effectively subsidizing favored businesses. Administrative burdens to verify locality and prevent fraud create additional taxpayer costs. Most critically, it violates equal protection and free market principles by creating geographic preferences, distorting competition, and encouraging regulatory capture as businesses lobby for inclusion. The unseen cost is reduced economic efficiency and innovation.

Requires large financial companies and central counterparties to report daily detailed data on repurchase agreement transactions to the Treasury's Office of Financial Research for systemic risk monitoring and reference rate calculation.

Compliance imposes hidden costs that burden firms and consumers; the data enables further regulatory distortions, moral hazard, and bureaucratic mission creep. The unseen effect is entrenching surveillance over markets while failing to address government-caused instability.

Regulation establishes a comprehensive, multi-phase validation and approval process that Enterprises (Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac) must follow to approve credit score models for mortgage purchase decisions. Includes solicitation requirements, application fees, extensive testing for accuracy/reliability/integrity, fair lending assessments, enterprise business impact analyses, and dual-layer approval (Enterprise + FHFA).

This regulation imposes massive compliance costs and barriers to entry that benefit incumbent credit score developers while stifling innovation. The 180-240+ day approval timeline, application fees, and requirements to demonstrate 'industry use' advantage established players who can afford the process, excluding smaller developers and new models. The federal government should not be gatekeeping credit scoring algorithms for private mortgage markets—the Enterprises, as market participants, can and should evaluate models themselves based on their own business needs and risk tolerances. The 'fair lending' certification requirement effectively forces developers to use the government's preferred methodology, creating a one-size-fits-all standard that discourages alternative approaches that might actually improve credit access. This is regulatory capture disguised as consumer protection.

FHFA regulation requiring Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Enterprises) to align their mortgage-backed securities programs to ensure fungibility in the TBA market. Defines strict conditional prepayment rate (CPR) divergence thresholds (2 points for cohort, 5 for fastest quartile) and requires consulting, reporting, and FHFA approval for changes affecting covered programs. Gives FHFA authority to require terminations or implementations to address misalignment.

This regulation entrenches the government-sponsored enterprise duopoly and represents central planning of financial markets. The alignment requirements force coordination between the Enterprises, preventing competitive innovation and maintaining a system that socializes risk and distorts mortgage finance. Rather than regulating GSE alignment, the Enterprises themselves should be wound down to restore free market competition. The compliance burden is unjustified given the underlying problem is government sponsorship of private entities.

Dodd-Frank 'living will' regulation requiring large banks and financial institutions ($250B+ assets) to submit detailed resolution plans to the Federal Reserve and FDIC outlining bankruptcy strategies to avoid systemic risk and taxpayer bailouts. Establishes different filing frequencies based on systemic importance: biennial filers (global systemically important BHCs, supervised nonbank financial companies), triennial full filers (Category II/III banking organizations, designated nonbanks), and triennial reduced filers (other covered companies). Plans must identify 'critical operations' that could threaten U.S. financial stability and include detailed capital, liquidity, and recapitalization information.

This regulation imposes massive hidden costs ($14,000+ per household) while violating limited government principles. It perpetuates 'too big to fail' moral hazard, stifles competition through disproportionate compliance burdens on medium-sized banks, and represents unconstitutional federal overreach into what should be state-regulated banking under the Tenth Amendment. The seen effect is expanded bureaucratic power; unseen consequences include regulatory capture, bank complacency, and the false security of government-managed failures—all undermining free-market discipline that would naturally impose prudent risk management.

FDIC regulation requiring banks with 2M+ deposit accounts to implement specific IT systems capable of calculating deposit insurance coverage within 24 hours of failure, maintain extensive detailed records on all account holders and beneficial owners, generate standardized data files in prescribed formats, and submit to annual certifications and FDIC testing.

Imposes enormous compliance costs on large banks that inevitably pass to consumers through higher fees and reduced services, mandates invasive federal access to granular private banking data, and uses prescriptive technical requirements that destroy innovation and flexibility—all for a failure scenario with extremely low probability. The FDIC could achieve its legitimate resolution objectives through far less costly alternatives like requiring large banks to maintain adequate liquidity buffers, developing resolution plans under existing Dodd-Frank living will requirements, or using its examination authority to assess readiness without micromanaging private IT architecture. This represents classic regulatory overreach that assumes central planners can design optimal systems better than the market participants themselves.

This subpart provides information about FDIC reporting forms and establishes requirements for covered depository institutions to file reduced reports, along with computer-security incident notification requirements for banking organizations and bank service providers. It covers Call Reports (FFIEC forms), Summary of Deposits, notifications about bank services, and definitions for who must comply with various reporting requirements.

While reporting requirements impose compliance costs, the FDIC's ability to monitor bank conditions and receive timely cybersecurity incident notifications serves a critical function in maintaining financial stability and protecting depositors—a core government responsibility that cannot be efficiently replicated through market mechanisms. The information asymmetry between banks and regulators would otherwise enable excessive risk-taking that could jeopardize the deposit insurance fund and create systemic risks affecting all Americans.

Establishes debt collection procedures for the Federal Reserve Board, covering administrative offset, salary offset, wage garnishment, interest/penalties, and due process protections for debtors.

Provides essential due process protections (notice, independent hearing, 15% offset cap) for individuals/entities from which the Board collects debts. Deleting would harm debtors by removing safeguards with minimal reduction in overall regulatory burden.

Regulation requiring large bank holding companies and nonbank financial firms supervised by the Federal Reserve to submit periodic resolution plans ('living wills') detailing how they would be wound down under the Bankruptcy Code to mitigate systemic risk. It defines critical operations, core business lines, material entities, and sets filing frequencies based on systemic importance.

The regulation imposes substantial compliance costs, expands federal regulatory discretion over corporate planning, creates moral hazard by suggesting orderly failure resolution is predictable, and distorts market discipline. Its presumed benefits are speculative, while its real burdens perpetuate the 'too big to fail' dynamic and increase complexity without demonstrable improvement in financial stability.

Establishes procedures for Federal savings associations to elect 'covered' status, allowing them to operate like national banks while retaining some savings association governance rules. Includes notice requirements, divestiture of nonconforming assets, and termination/reelection processes.

Imposes unnecessary compliance costs and bureaucratic complexity that favor large incumbents over small competitors, while entrenching a permission-based regulatory system that violates knowable law principles and enables regulatory capture through selective approval processes.

Regulation provides reduced reporting requirements for small depository institutions (<$5B assets, no foreign offices, non-complex) by permitting simplified quarterly Call Reports (FFIEC 051), while granting OCC discretion to require full reporting if institution engages in complex or higher-risk activities.

Deleting this would impose disproportionate compliance costs on small banks, reducing their competitiveness, raising consumer prices, and harming community lending. The regulation appropriately balances regulatory oversight with targeted relief for low-risk institutions—a nuanced approach that would be difficult to achieve through alternative means.

Federal Election Commission regulations requiring candidates to designate principal and authorized campaign committees, report all contributions and expenditures (including pre-candidacy activities), and maintain detailed records. Creates comprehensive registration, reporting, and disclosure requirements for federal election campaigns.

Imposes significant compliance costs that burden political speech, particularly disadvantaging grassroots candidates and small campaigns. Extends federal regulatory reach into voluntary political association through mandatory disclosure, chilling free expression. Favors wealthy incumbents who can afford administrative overhead while creating barriers to entry. Represents federal overreach into political activity better left to state regulation or voluntary transparency. The unseen costs include reduced political participation, protection of established candidates, and normalization of government surveillance of political activities.

Part 1003 establishes procedural rules for informal adjudications before DOE's Office of Hearings and Appeals (OHA). It governs petitions for relief from DOE final dispositions, including requests for adjustments under 42 U.S.C. 7194. Key mechanisms: filing/serving requirements, discovery via subpoenas, standards for dismissal, relief granted only for 'serious hardship, gross inequity' or 'arbitrary/capricious' actions, and a 180-day decision timeline. The rules create a standardized process for OHA to review and potentially modify or rescind DOE actions affecting private parties.

Without this review mechanism, aggrieved citizens and businesses would have no accessible forum to challenge arbitrary or capricious DOE actions short of costly federal litigation. The OHA provides essential due process and serves as a critical check on agency power—allowing relief only when DOE has acted unlawfully or created severe inequities. Eliminating it would concentrate power entirely within DOE, remove any independent scrutiny of final orders, and force all disputes into court, dramatically raising barriers to justice and accountability. The modest procedural framework is necessary to ensure rule of law within the administrative state.

Establishes whistleblower protection procedures for employees of DOE contractors alleging retaliation for reporting safety dangers, legal violations, gross mismanagement, or refusing dangerous work. Creates a comprehensive administrative process with multi-level appeals through the Office of Hearings and Appeals.

Duplicative federal bureaucracy imposing substantial compliance costs on contractors, undermining at-will employment and freedom of contract. Whistleblower protections duplicate state tort law and existing federal frameworks like OSHA, while distorting labor markets and creating perverse incentives. The regulatory burden exceeds any marginal safety benefit and represents unconstitutional federal overreach into private employment relationships.

This regulation establishes requirements for animals imported for breeding purposes to qualify for duty-free entry under the Tariff Act of 1930. It defines terms, specifies recognized breed registries and their books of record, mandates pedigree certificate submissions, requires inspector examinations, and prescribes application procedures using specific government forms. The rule creates a pre-approval system where only animals registered in specifically recognized registry associations are eligible for certification.

This regulation creates a costly, complex bureaucracy to administer a tariff preference that could be achieved through simpler means. It entrenches regulatory capture by naming specific registry associations and prescribing exact technical specifications for record-keeping (16mm non-perforated safety film, reduction ratios) that stifle innovation. The pre-approval system favors established breeders and associations, raising barriers to entry for small operations. The legitimate goal—preventing fraudulent duty-free claims—can be accomplished more efficiently through post-entry audits and requiring standard documentation without pre-approving specific registries. The regulation is an outdated intervention into what should be private breeding decisions, imposing $14,000+ per household equivalent hidden costs through compliance burdens for a narrow industry that could self-regulate.