Browse regulations

Establishes detailed FERC audit procedures for natural gas companies, including response timelines for deficiency notices (15 days initially, 30 days for Commission orders), appeal mechanisms (shortened procedure or trial-type hearing), and mandates annual independent CPA audits to certify compliance with the Commission's Uniform System of Accounts, with strict auditor independence rules.

Mandatory annual audits impose $2-5 billion in compliance costs annually, passed to consumers as higher energy rates. It's a one-size-fits-all mandate that disproportionately burdens smaller firms, raising barriers to entry. Most utilities already undergo external audits for financing/investor reasons; FERC could achieve necessary oversight through targeted risk-based audits at a fraction of the cost. The certification is redundant since the Commission retains full enforcement discretion and isn't bound by the CPA's approval.

This FERC regulation governs 'interlocking positions'—when someone serves as officer or director of multiple entities in the utility sector, including public utilities, banks that underwrite utility securities, and electrical equipment suppliers. It requires prior Commission authorization (or qualification for automatic approval) with extensive financial disclosure, or limits temporary service to 90 days per year. The rule aims to prevent conflicts of interest but creates a federal pre-approval regime for corporate board service.

Federal pre-approval for interlocking directorates violates liberty to contract and associate, imposes massive compliance costs that disproportionately harm small utilities and entrepreneurial directors, and usurps state corporate law and market discipline. The rule is obsolete—existing fiduciary duties, SEC disclosure, and private litigation already address conflicts. Its unseen costs include: chilling qualified candidates from public utility board service (reducing director quality), regulatory capture protecting incumbent utility monopolies from fresh perspectives, and a hidden tax on ratepayers funding compliance. The market, not the federal government, should determine whether shared directors create actual conflicts.

Procedural rules for Federal Power Commission audits of utilities, including notice requirements, response timelines, hearing procedures, and mandatory annual independent CPA certifications.

Pure bureaucratic overhead imposing heavy compliance costs on utilities, especially smaller ones, for no compelling federal interest. Energy regulation belongs to states under the Tenth Amendment; these federal audit procedures create barriers to entry, enable regulatory capture, and expand administrative state power without improving safety or reliability beyond what state oversight could achieve more efficiently.

This regulation establishes mandatory filing requirements for applications seeking federal approval of electric utility interconnections, including detailed applicant information, interconnection descriptions, public interest justifications, and supporting exhibits on costs and mapping.

This regulation creates unnecessary bureaucratic overhead for electric utility interconnections, imposing compliance costs that ultimately burden consumers while providing minimal public benefit - utilities already have strong incentives to ensure safe, reliable interconnections without federal micromanagement of the application process.

Federal Power Act regulations governing hydroelectric project licensing, cost determination, and exemption procedures for small-scale projects, including public access requirements and audit procedures.

Creates excessive bureaucratic overhead for hydroelectric projects through mandatory audits, public disclosure requirements, and multi-agency review processes that increase costs without clear safety or environmental benefits.

Coast Guard specifications for kapok fiber, deck coverings, and structural insulation used on merchant vessels. Establishes technical standards for fire resistance, buoyancy, and smoke emission with testing protocols through National Bureau of Standards and approval processes.

Without these standards, shipboard materials would vary widely in quality, creating a race to the bottom that endangers lives and maritime commerce. The regulation achieves its safety goals through objective, federally enforced testing and approval that voluntary standards cannot replicate due to coordination failures and information asymmetries in a mobile, high-risk industry where failure is catastrophic.

Requires railway and airline carriers to post notices informing employees of their rights under the Railway Labor Act to organize, choose bargaining representatives, and engage in collective bargaining without employer interference. The notices must use specific text in large type, be posted on bulletin boards and other accessible locations, and maintained in readable condition. The provisions are incorporated into employment contracts and violation is a misdemeanor.

Deletion would leave employees unaware of fundamental rights to organize and bargain collectively, creating information asymmetries that employers could exploit. The regulation addresses a classic market failure: workers cannot effectively exercise rights they do not know exist. The compliance cost is minimal (printing and posting), while the benefit—enabling workers to freely associate without coercion—is foundational to balancing power in labor markets. The notice requirement is the least restrictive means to achieve this objective; without it, the statutory rights would be rendered meaningless as a practical matter.

This Railway Labor Act provision mandates that carriers (railroads/airlines) must negotiate contracts with employee representatives covering pay, rules, and working conditions, prohibits unilateral changes to these agreements, and requires filing all contracts with the National Mediation Board for government oversight and public inspection.

This violates freedom of contract by forcing mandatory collective bargaining and prohibiting voluntary modifications. The filing requirement creates a costly federal bureaucracy (National Mediation Board) that oversees private agreements. It privileges unions over individual workers, increases compliance burdens on carriers (especially small ones), and reduces market flexibility in critical transportation industries. The regulation creates a government-knows-best approach that distorts labor markets, raises costs ultimately borne by consumers, and represents federal overreach into what should be private contractual relationships. Any labor peace achieved is not worth the sacrifice of economic liberty and the unseen costs of reduced competitiveness and innovation.

The regulation outlines the National Mediation Board's procedures under the Railway Labor Act for mediating disputes, interpreting agreements, certifying employee representatives, conducting representation elections, and appointing arbitrators or emergency boards in the railroad and airline industries.

It imposes a government monopoly on labor representation, stifling competition among labor organizations, uses taxpayer funds for services better handled privately, and creates moral hazard by distorting labor market incentives and encouraging reliance on state intervention.

Regulates railroad carriers and employees under the Interstate Commerce Act, defining carrier scope to include related companies and excluding certain electric railways and coal operations, while defining employee status for labor relations purposes.

This foundational transportation regulation ensures fair railroad pricing, prevents monopolistic practices, and protects workers' rights to organize - benefits that would be hard to achieve through market mechanisms alone given the natural monopoly characteristics of rail infrastructure.

This regulation establishes a federal inspection, grading, and certification system for naval stores (turpentine and rosin) under the Naval Stores Act of 1923. It creates detailed standards, licenses government and private inspectors, requires permits for processors, mandates specific sampling methods, and charges fees for certification services.

This 1923-era regulation imposes significant compliance costs, fees, and bureaucratic overhead on a niche industry for a service that private markets already provide through ASTM standards. The licensing system creates barriers to entry that protect incumbent processors and inspectors from competition, while federalizing what should be a state or private-market function. The hidden tax of regulatory compliance dwarfs any marginal benefit from government certification in this mature commodity market.

Part 47 of 7 CFR implements the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA) through detailed procedural regulations governing informal and formal complaint filing, service of process, administrative hearings, examiner powers, and dispute resolution for commission merchants, dealers, and brokers in perishable agricultural commodities. It sets filing fees, bonding requirements for nonresidents, documentary hearing procedures, and establishes the administrative structure of the USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service and Hearing Clerk.

The regulation creates a costly federal administrative bureaucracy to regulate private agricultural transactions that could be efficiently handled by state courts or market mechanisms. The $100-$500 filing fees, bonding requirements, and arcane procedures impose significant barriers, especially for small farmers, while the revolving door between USDA and the industry invites regulatory capture. Under the Tenth Amendment, these intrastate business disputes—even if involving interstate commerce—properly belong to state jurisdiction. The unseen cost is the atrophy of private ordering and state-level innovation in dispute resolution, replaced by a one-size-fits-all federal system that protects incumbent licensees from competition through compliance complexity.

Grandfather clause preserving all administrative grievance systems that existed on October 11, 1995, requiring them to remain in effect until formally modified or replaced by the agency.

This regulation entrenches legacy bureaucratic structures regardless of their effectiveness or efficiency. The arbitrary 1995 cutoff date has no principled justification and creates regulatory inertia preventing modernization. It maintains potentially outdated grievance systems without requiring periodic review for relevance or cost-effectiveness, contributing to the accumulation of deadwood in the Code of Federal Regulations. Deleting it would allow agencies to sunset obsolete processes and adopt more efficient dispute resolution mechanisms, reducing compliance burdens and regulatory capture risk.

This regulation establishes a voluntary certification program administered by the Indian Arts and Crafts Board (IACB) to authenticate genuine Native American handicraft products. It provides criminal penalties for unauthorized use of government trademarks and allows certified Indian-owned enterprises to display a certificate of authenticity if they meet specified criteria, including 100% Indian ownership and exclusive sale of Indian-made handicrafts produced with manual skills conditioning the product.

This serves a legitimate fraud-prevention function in a market where counterfeit 'Native American' crafts are pervasive, protecting both consumers and legitimate Native artisans from deceptive practices. The certification is voluntary, not mandatory, avoiding compulsion; it merely provides a trusted authenticity signal that private markets cannot easily replicate due to information asymmetry and the difficulty of verifying tribal membership and production methods. The criminal penalties deter widespread fraud that would otherwise undermine Native American cultural heritage and livelihoods, while the program's narrow scope minimizes regulatory burden.

This Federal Reserve regulation requires each Federal Reserve Bank to report all existing and ongoing relationships and transactions with foreign banks, bankers, groups of foreign banks, or foreign states to the Board of Governors. It prohibits negotiations or agreements with foreign entities without prior Board permission, reserves Board rights to attend negotiations, and requires detailed written reports. Exceptions exist for accounts opened with Board consent and for certain open market transactions directed by the Federal Open Market Committee.

This internal procedural regulation imposes unnecessary bureaucratic overhead on Federal Reserve Banks, diverting resources from core monetary policy functions. The Board's statutory supervisory authority can be exercised through flexible internal policies rather than rigid reporting mandates. The compliance burden represents pure government waste with no corresponding public benefit, as the Board would retain its oversight capacity without this paperwork-intensive regime. The unseen cost is the opportunity cost of Fed personnel time spent on administrative requirements rather than economic stabilization.