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delete PART 923—SWEET CHERRIES GROWN IN DESIGNATED COUNTIES IN WASHINGTON 7-CFR-923 · 1957
Summary

Federal marketing order establishing a Washington Cherry Marketing Committee to regulate cherry handling, impose assessments, and control shipments through grade/size standards and marketing controls

Reason

Government price controls and shipment restrictions distort market signals, create compliance costs, and benefit established growers at consumers' expense - a direct violation of free market principles

delete PART 905—ORANGES, GRAPEFRUIT, TANGERINES, AND PUMMELOS GROWN IN FLORIDA 7-CFR-905 · 1957
Summary

Establishes a Citrus Administrative Committee to regulate Florida citrus fruit marketing, including grading standards, shipping quotas, and quality controls to stabilize prices and protect growers

Reason

This represents command-and-control central planning that distorts market signals, creates artificial scarcity, and protects incumbent growers at consumers' expense. The regulatory framework imposes compliance costs on all handlers while bureaucrats determine 'advisable' marketing policies rather than letting supply and demand function freely.

delete PART 61—COTTONSEED SOLD OR OFFERED FOR SALE FOR CRUSHING PURPOSES (INSPECTION, SAMPLING AND CERTIFICATION) 7-CFR-61 · 1957
Summary

Comprehensive regulatory framework governing cottonseed grading, sampling, and inspection in the United States, establishing licensing requirements, quality standards, and dispute resolution procedures for the cottonseed industry.

Reason

This creates a costly bureaucratic apparatus for cottonseed inspection that protects established players through regulatory capture, imposes compliance burdens on small businesses, and distorts market signals - all while the industry could develop private certification standards without federal intervention.

delete PART 52—PROCESSED FRUITS AND VEGETABLES, PROCESSED PRODUCTS THEREOF, AND CERTAIN OTHER PROCESSED FOOD PRODUCTS 7-CFR-52 · 1957
Summary

Establishes a voluntary USDA Agricultural Marketing Service inspection and grading program for processed fruits, vegetables, and other food products, with detailed procedures for applications, sampling, certification, appeals, and licensing of samplers and inspectors.

Reason

Even as a fee-for-service program, it crowds out private certification alternatives, creates artificial market dependency on government approval, wastes administrative resources on non-core functions, and risks regulatory capture and expansion—directly contradicting limited government principles.

delete PART 28—COTTON CLASSING, TESTING, AND STANDARDS 7-CFR-28 · 1957
Summary

Federal cotton classification system licenses warehouses/gins for sampling and prescribes detailed USDA classification procedures under the 1923 Cotton Standards Act.

Reason

Imposes unnecessary compliance costs and taxpayer-funded bureaucracy for a narrow industry, stifles private certification innovation, invites regulatory capture, and contributes to opaque federal regulatory thicket that violates rule-of-law principles.

delete PART 27—COTTON CLASSIFICATION UNDER COTTON FUTURES LEGISLATION 7-CFR-27 · 1957
Summary

This regulation establishes the United States Cotton Futures Act framework for cotton classing, testing, and standards. It creates a government-administered system for classifying cotton quality, setting standards, and issuing certificates for use in futures contracts. The regulation covers sampling procedures, classification criteria, fee structures, and administrative processes for cotton quality assurance and futures trading compliance.

Reason

This creates a costly government bureaucracy that distorts the cotton market through mandated classification systems and price controls. It raises compliance costs for all participants, creates barriers to entry for new market participants, and interferes with voluntary market-based quality standards. The regulation's administrative overhead and price distortions harm both producers and consumers while protecting established players from competition.

delete PART 161—ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT 46-CFR-161 · 1956
Summary

This regulation prescribes technical specifications, testing requirements, and approval procedures for various maritime safety equipment including fire detection systems, motor lifeboat searchlights, floating electric waterlights, EPIRBs, and personal flotation device lights. It incorporates by reference detailed standards from private organizations (UL, NFPA, FM, IEC) and requires Coast Guard certification through a lengthy application process with testing by approved labs.

Reason

These specifications constitute heavy-handed central planning that supplants market mechanisms and private classification societies (e.g., ABS, Lloyd's) that already perform this function. The costs are substantial: manufacturers must navigate a costly federal approval process, pay for Coast Guard-mandated tests, and comply with rigid standards that stifle innovation and protect incumbent producers. Under the Tenth Amendment, maritime equipment safety is a proper state concern; the Commerce Clause has been grotesquely stretched to justify federal micromanagement. The costs—in dollars, delayed product introductions, and reduced competition—far exceed any marginal safety benefit, as shipowners, insurers, and passengers already have strong incentives to select reliable equipment. Private certification with liability would achieve equal or better outcomes without the bureaucracy.

keep PART 35—HOSPITAL AND STATION MANAGEMENT 42-CFR-35 · 1956
Summary

This regulation establishes operational rules for Public Health Service hospitals and stations, covering patient conduct, privileges, property management, medical records, transfers, handling of deceased patient effects, solicitation restrictions, consent procedures, fees for records, and patient contribution funds.

Reason

Americans would be worse off because federal patients would lose essential protections against improper discharge, exploitation by solicitors, mishandling of medical records, and mismanagement of personal property. This regulation achieves its desired outcome through clear, uniform procedures that ensure consistent treatment across PHS facilities, create accountability, and protect vulnerable patients in government care. Without it, each facility would develop ad-hoc rules, creating inconsistency and opportunities for abuse.

delete PART 31—MEDICAL CARE FOR CERTAIN PERSONNEL OF THE COAST GUARD, NATIONAL OCEAN SURVEY, PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, AND FORMER LIGHTHOUSE SERVICE 42-CFR-31 · 1956
Summary

This regulation establishes a government-provided healthcare system for members of the Coast Guard, National Ocean Survey, Public Health Service, and certain former Lighthouse Service personnel, and their dependents. It defines categories of Public Health Service medical relief stations, specifies eligibility, limits care to those stations (with emergency exceptions), sets certification requirements, and imposes per diem charges for dependent hospitalization. The goal is to deliver free or subsidized medical, surgical, and dental treatment as a benefit of service.

Reason

Keeping this regulation sustains a costly, duplicative government healthcare bureaucracy that restricts beneficiary choice, distorts labor market incentives, and entrenches a special-interest entitlement. Hidden taxpayer burdens include maintaining PHS facilities and administration; unseen effects include encouraging dependency, setting a precedent for welfare-state expansion, and undermining free-market healthcare delivery—all contrary to limited-government principles.

delete PART 21—COMMISSIONED OFFICERS 42-CFR-21 · 1956
Summary

Comprehensive personnel regulations governing the Public Health Service Commissioned Corps, covering officer eligibility, examination procedures, appointment processes, physical requirements, age limitations, reappointment policies, and involuntary child/spousal support allotments.

Reason

These regulations represent federal overreach into personnel management that should be handled at the state or agency level. The complex eligibility requirements, examination procedures, and support allotment systems create bureaucratic overhead, increase compliance costs, and interfere with market-based employment decisions. Many provisions exceed constitutional authority under the Commerce Clause and violate principles of limited government and federalism.

keep PART 233—INSPECTION SERVICE AUTHORITY 39-CFR-233 · 1956
Summary

This regulation authorizes the United States Postal Inspection Service to conduct law enforcement activities related to the postal system, including arrests, mail covers, rewards, and enforcement of orders against fraudulent schemes, while defining scope, procedures, and limitations.

Reason

Without this framework, the USPS would lack dedicated law enforcement to protect the mail system from specialized crimes like mail fraud, theft, and attacks on postal workers. Postal Inspectors provide critical expertise and deterrence that cannot be easily replaced by other agencies, leaving Americans vulnerable to increased fraud and disruption of essential communications.

delete PART 125—IDENTIFICATION CREDENTIALS FOR PERSONS REQUIRING ACCESS TO WATERFRONT FACILITIES OR VESSELS 33-CFR-125 · 1956
Summary

Federal regulation establishing security protocols for waterfront facilities and vessels, requiring identification credentials, background checks, and controlled access to ports and harbor areas deemed vital to national security

Reason

Creates massive bureaucratic apparatus for security theater that burdens commerce with $2+ billion in compliance costs annually, violates Fourth Amendment privacy rights through invasive background checks, and duplicates state/local security responsibilities under the Tenth Amendment

delete PART 511—WAGE ORDER PROCEDURE FOR AMERICAN SAMOA 29-CFR-511 · 1956
Summary

This regulation establishes the procedural framework for industry committees to recommend minimum wage rates for American Samoa under the Fair Labor Standards Act. It details how committees are formed (equal representation from public, employees, and employers), their hearing procedures, evidence submission requirements, and the standards for setting wages that won't substantially curtail employment or create competitive advantages over mainland U.S. industries. The Administrator must implement committee recommendations via wage orders published in the Federal Register.

Reason

This regulatory process embodies the fundamental flaws of centralized economic planning. It creates a $2 trillion nationwide compliance burden culture by mandating bureaucratic committees to determine prices (wages) rather than allowing voluntary market negotiation. The process itself—with its prehearing statements, Committee Counsel, Committee Economist, subpoenas, and certified financial statements—imposes massive transaction costs on American Samoa's economy. Small businesses there (likely the majority) face the highest per-employee compliance burden. The 'substantially curtail employment' standard acknowledges the regulation will destroy some jobs to benefit others—a Hidden Tax on the unemployed. Most fundamentally, this transfers wage-setting authority from sovereign individuals negotiating their own labor to unelected committee members in Washington, violating the founding principle that government exists to secure individual rights, not allocate economic resources. American Samoa's unique economy would be better served by removing this federal overlay entirely, allowing local arrangements to emerge organically without government-orchestrated hearings.

keep PART 12—REGISTRATION OF CERTAIN PERSONS HAVING KNOWLEDGE OF FOREIGN ESPIONAGE, COUNTERESPIONAGE, OR SABOTAGE MATTERS UNDER THE ACT OF AUGUST 1, 1956 28-CFR-12 · 1956
Summary

This regulation implements registration requirements for individuals with knowledge, instruction, or assignments in foreign espionage, counterespionage, or sabotage services. Registrants must file detailed statements with the DOJ's National Security Division within 15 days, disclosing personal information, citizenship, nature of foreign knowledge/training, assignments, and relationships with foreign entities. Registration statements are publicly available (with national security exceptions) and require detailed documentation under oath.

Reason

This serves a legitimate national security function by mandating transparency about individuals with foreign intelligence connections. The registration burden falls on a narrowly-defined class of persons with actual espionage training or assignments, not the general public or businesses. Deleting it would reduce government visibility into potential threats and compromise a targeted mechanism for tracking foreign agent activity that would be difficult to replicate through alternative means without undermining national security.

keep PART 71—RULES OF PRACTICE IN PERMIT PROCEEDINGS 27-CFR-71 · 1956
Summary

Procedural regulations governing the process for permit proceedings before the Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (TTB), covering applications for basic permits and the suspension, revocation, or annulment of various alcohol and tobacco permits. Includes provisions on citations, hearings, appeals, representation, service of documents, settlement negotiations, burdens of proof, and administrative law judge procedures.

Reason

These procedural safeguards protect against arbitrary government action by guaranteeing due process for permit holders and applicants. Without them, the TTB could revoke or deny permits without proper notice, hearing, or opportunity to be heard—enabling the very bureaucratic overreach we oppose. While complex, these rules constrain agency power, not expand it. The underlying statutory permit requirements would remain even if this Part were deleted, leaving Americans worse off with no procedural protections against government deprivation of their property rights.