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delete PART 286—GENERAL RULES AND REGULATIONS PURSUANT TO SECTION 11(a) OF THE INTER-AMERICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK ACT 17-CFR-286 · 1960
Summary

This regulation requires the Inter-American Development Bank to file periodic financial reports and disclosure documents with the SEC for its primary obligations sold in the US, including quarterly reports, annual reports, and detailed offering information for debt issuances.

Reason

This is a redundant reporting requirement for a multilateral development bank that already has international oversight and reporting obligations. The costs of compliance for specialized SEC filings provide no additional benefit to American citizens while creating unnecessary regulatory burden on an institution whose primary purpose is development financing, not US securities trading.

keep PART 202—INFORMAL AND OTHER PROCEDURES 17-CFR-202 · 1960
Summary

Sets out filing procedures, fee payment rules, and informal guidance for SEC registration, enforcement, and related disclosures under federal securities laws.

Reason

Its deletion would remove core investor protection and market transparency mechanisms, leaving investors vulnerable and making enforcement difficult to replace, ultimately harming ordinary Americans who rely on these safeguards.

delete PART 200—ORGANIZATION; CONDUCT AND ETHICS; AND INFORMATION AND REQUESTS 17-CFR-200 · 1960
Summary

The SEC regulates securities markets through mandatory disclosure requirements, registration of offerings, oversight of exchanges and brokers, enforcement of antifraud provisions, and supervision of investment companies and advisors. It administers multiple federal securities laws including the Securities Act of 1933, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and Investment Company Act of 1940.

Reason

Federal securities regulation represents unconstitutional federal overreach into what should be state-level contract law and market regulation. The $2 trillion compliance cost creates barriers to capital formation, protects incumbent firms through regulatory capture, and distorts market signals. Private certification systems and state-level oversight would better serve investors while preserving economic liberty.

keep PART 100—SEAL 15-CFR-100 · 1960
Summary

This regulation prescribes the exact design specifications for the official seal of the U.S. Census Bureau, including the shield, open book, lamp of knowledge, quills, wreath, outer band with department and bureau names, stars, and decorative rims.

Reason

This regulation imposes zero compliance costs on Americans, restricts no economic activity, and serves a legitimate administrative function in defining an official government emblem. Deleting it would create confusion with no corresponding benefit, making Americans worse off through potential misidentification and administrative disorder.

keep PART 140—FINANCIAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS AND INDEMNITY AGREEMENTS 10-CFR-140 · 1960
Summary

This NRC regulation (10 CFR Part 140) establishes mandatory financial protection requirements for nuclear reactor operators, plutonium processing plants, and uranium enrichment facilities. It requires licensees to maintain liability insurance in amounts varying by facility type and size, provides for federal indemnification under the Price-Anderson Act for catastrophic incidents, specifies fee schedules based on reactor capacity, and sets reporting and proof-of-financial-protection requirements. The regulation creates a framework where private insurance covers initial losses, with government backing for extraordinary nuclear occurrences beyond private capacity.

Reason

Deletion would eliminate the mandatory financial responsibility framework ensuring victims of nuclear incidents receive prompt compensation. Private markets alone would be unwilling to cover catastrophic nuclear risks at affordable rates, potentially forcing the industry to collapse or operate without adequate victim compensation mechanisms. The fee structure and insurance requirements internalize risk costs to operators, while the federal backstop addresses genuine market failure for tail risks whose societal costs exceed private capacity. The regulation balances accountability with economic viability in a high-stakes domain where failure imposes irreversible harms.

delete PART 989—RAISINS PRODUCED FROM GRAPES GROWN IN CALIFORNIA 7-CFR-989 · 1960
Summary

Establishes a Raisin Administrative Committee to regulate the California raisin industry through quality standards, marketing policies, and trade practices, with producer and handler representation and research promotion programs.

Reason

Creates a government-mandated cartel that distorts market prices, restricts competition, and imposes compliance costs on producers and handlers - all while claiming to 'stabilize' prices that would naturally fluctuate based on supply and demand.

delete PART 948—IRISH POTATOES GROWN IN COLORADO 7-CFR-948 · 1960
Summary

This regulation establishes a comprehensive federal marketing order for Irish potatoes grown in Colorado, administering area committees (composed of industry insiders) that recommend grade/size restrictions, cull regulations, and inspection requirements. The Secretary of Agriculture can limit potato handling based on committee recommendations, and handlers must pay assessments to fund committee operations.

Reason

This 1937-era marketing order violates core free-market principles: it centrally plans potato distribution, creates regulatory capture (industry insiders regulate themselves), imposes hidden taxes via assessments, and distorts market signals that would otherwise coordinate supply/demand. The inspection and reporting requirements burden small businesses disproportionately. Constitutionally, intrastate potato marketing is a Tenth Amendment power never delegated to the federal government. The knowledge problem renders any central planning of potato grades, sizes, and flows inherently inefficient—the market would better determine quality and allocate supply through price mechanisms and voluntary contracts. This New Deal relic should be entirely repealed.

delete PART 906—ORANGES AND GRAPEFRUIT GROWN IN LOWER RIO GRANDE VALLEY IN TEXAS 7-CFR-906 · 1960
Summary

Federal marketing order regulating grapefruit and oranges from Texas's Rio Grande Valley, establishing a grower/handler committee with authority to restrict shipments, mandate inspections, levy assessments, and control quality/size/maturity standards to 'effectuate orderly marketing conditions.'

Reason

No public health or safety justification exists; this is regulatory capture enabling incumbent citrus growers to restrict supply, raise consumer prices, and erect barriers to entry through government-backed control of commerce. The $100+ billion annual cost of federal agricultural marketing orders cannot be justified for what amounts to price-fishing cartels that violate free exchange and Tenth Amendment limits on federal power.

delete PART 900—GENERAL REGULATIONS 7-CFR-900 · 1960
Summary

Procedural rules governing USDA hearings for agricultural marketing orders and agreements under the 1937 Act. Covers notice requirements, hearing conduct, evidence rules, judicial disqualification, filing procedures, and ex parte communication restrictions for proceedings that impose production controls and marketing restrictions on agricultural commodities.

Reason

This regulation facilitates the unconstitutional federalization of agriculture and enables market-distorting production controls that raise consumer prices, restrict supply, and protect incumbents from competition. The hidden compliance costs and bureaucratic burden outweigh any benefits, which could be achieved through voluntary industry standards. The entire marketing order framework violates Tenth Amendment principles and represents regulatory capture where the industry controls its own regulation through the USDA.

keep PART 5—SECRECY OF CERTAIN INVENTIONS AND LICENSES TO EXPORT AND FILE APPLICATIONS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES 37-CFR-5 · 1959
Summary

This regulation governs national security restrictions on patent applications, including secrecy orders, licensing requirements for foreign filings, and coordination with export control laws. It requires government approval to file patent applications abroad for certain U.S. inventions, prohibits publication/allowance of classified inventions, and establishes procedures for petitions to modify or rescind secrecy orders.

Reason

This serves the legitimate, core function of national defense by preventing hostile actors from accessing technology that could threaten U.S. security. Unlike most regulations that restrict voluntary private transactions for public-interest justifications, this directly protects against military/espionage threats. The unseen costs—delays, compliance burdens, restricted commerce—are justified given the catastrophic risks of weapons technology or critical infrastructure know-how falling to adversaries. The process includes appeal mechanisms and narrow scope (only inventions requiring defense agency review under 35 U.S.C. 181).

delete PART 1—RULES OF PRACTICE IN PATENT CASES 37-CFR-1 · 1959
Summary

Establishes mailing addresses and procedures for correspondence with the USPTO, including signature requirements, filing deadlines, and electronic submission rules for patent and trademark matters.

Reason

This regulation imposes unnecessary bureaucratic complexity on patent communications, creating compliance costs for inventors and businesses without providing commensurate benefits. The detailed address requirements and signature rules represent regulatory overreach that could be replaced by simpler, more flexible procedures.

delete PART 25—NATIONAL MILITARY PARKS; LICENSED GUIDE SERVICE REGULATIONS 36-CFR-25 · 1959
Summary

This regulation establishes a federal licensing system for guide services at national military parks, requiring guides to pass examinations, adhere to conduct standards, wear official badges, and charge approved rates. It creates a government-controlled monopoly on battlefield interpretation services.

Reason

This regulation creates an unnecessary federal licensing monopoly that restricts free enterprise and limits visitor access to historical information. Private guides could provide battlefield tours without government intervention, allowing market competition to determine quality and pricing while reducing regulatory compliance costs for small businesses.

delete PART 20—ISLE ROYALE NATIONAL PARK; COMMERCIAL FISHING 36-CFR-20 · 1959
Summary

Regulation governing commercial fishing permits in Isle Royale National Park, limiting permits to those who fished there during 1937-1939. It requires annual fees, personal residence during fishing season, Michigan licenses, compliance with state laws, exclusive commercial use, maintenance of government structures, and net restrictions. Caps total permittees at historical levels established 85+ years ago.

Reason

Creates a government-enforced monopoly by freezing permit numbers at 1930s levels, artificially restricting competition and raising consumer prices. The regulation serves only to protect incumbent fishermen from new entrants, violating free enterprise principles. Michigan's state regulations already address legitimate fishery management concerns; the federal layer merely entrenches regulatory capture and imposes unnecessary bureaucratic barriers to entry. Repeal would expand economic opportunity and allow market forces to determine fishing activity.

delete PART 10—DISPOSAL OF CERTAIN WILD ANIMALS 36-CFR-10 · 1959
Summary

This regulation allows the Secretary of the Interior to dispose of surplus live elk, buffaloes, and bears from Yellowstone and Wind Cave National Parks to federal, state, local authorities, and private individuals for preserves, zoos, and parks. No charges for animals, but receivers must cover capture, crating, transport, and veterinary costs. Requires applications, suitable facilities, state concurrence for private releases, and prohibits slaughter or unprotected hunting releases.

Reason

This is a narrow administrative regulation governing surplus wildlife management that creates no significant regulatory burden or market distortion. The costs of keeping it are minimal - it simply provides a mechanism for responsible wildlife redistribution. While federal involvement in wildlife management could be debated, this specific regulation's impact is negligible compared to other federal regulations, and deleting it would not meaningfully advance liberty or reduce government overreach.

keep PART 8—LABOR STANDARDS APPLICABLE TO EMPLOYEES OF NATIONAL PARK SERVICE CONCESSIONERS 36-CFR-8 · 1959
Summary

This regulation establishes labor standards for concession employees in national parks, requiring compliance with federal and state labor laws, record-keeping, and dispute resolution procedures to ensure fair treatment of workers in park concessions.

Reason

Americans would be worse off if this regulation was deleted because concession employees in national parks would lose protections for minimum wages, safe working conditions, and fair labor practices that they would otherwise have in similar jobs outside the parks. The regulation ensures that workers in these isolated locations receive the same labor protections as employees elsewhere in their state.