Browse regulations

Adopts California's Technical Bulletin 117-2013 as the federal flammability standard for upholstered furniture, requiring smolder resistance testing and certification labels, while preempting state and local flammability regulations (with exceptions for non-fire health risks).

Federalizing a California state standard exceeds constitutional authority—flammability regulation properly belongs to states under the Tenth Amendment. The compliance burden falls disproportionately on small manufacturers and upholsterers, raising prices and destroying livelihoods without demonstrable net benefit. This represents regulatory mission creep: the Consumer Product Safety Commission creates de facto national law with no congressional authorization, violating federalism and imposing unseen economic costs that outweigh the safety gains, which could be achieved more efficiently through state competition and market forces.

Establishes a consumer product safety standard for infant sleep products (inclined and flat surfaces) for infants up to 5 months not already covered by other CPSC standards. Adopts ASTM F3118-17a with modifications, principally requiring that sleep surface angle not exceed 10 degrees from horizontal to prevent fall, asphyxiation, and suffocation hazards.

Infants cannot protect themselves from known hazards; market failure due to information asymmetry and externalized costs of injuries/deaths necessitates federal standards. Deleting this would result in preventable infant fatalities, impose greater costs on society through healthcare and human tragedy, and create a race to the bottom where ethical manufacturers are disadvantaged by unsafe competitors. The 10-degree rule addresses a specific, well-documented danger that states are unlikely to regulate uniformly.

Mandates consumer product safety for children's folding chairs and stools by incorporating ASTM F2613-21, a voluntary consensus standard.

Imposes hidden compliance costs that burden small businesses and consumers, expands federal power into local product safety matters violating federalism, and preempts market-driven safety solutions and state-level regulation, with negligible added benefit beyond widely adopted voluntary standards.

This regulation requires motor vehicle dealers to provide a 'risk-based pricing notice' to consumers who receive credit on materially less favorable terms than the best terms offered, based on consumer reports. It establishes methods for identifying these consumers (credit score proxy, tiered pricing) and mandates specific disclosure content including credit scores, factors affecting them, and rights to dispute reports.

This federal disclosure mandate imposes significant compliance costs on thousands of motor vehicle dealers—particularly small businesses—while providing marginal benefits. Consumers already receive adverse action notices when denied credit; this forces additional notices when terms are merely suboptimal, creating paperwork burdens that ultimately raise vehicle financing costs for all Americans. The regulation federalizes what states could handle through existing consumer protection laws, violates Tenth Amendment federalism principles, and assumes individuals cannot understand credit pricing without government-mandated handouts. The unseen costs—increased dealer compliance overhead, higher interest rates to offset liability risks, and stigmatization of borrowers with lower scores—outweigh any transparency gains.

The regulation defines 'Made in the United States' and prohibits such labeling unless final assembly, all significant processing, and all or virtually all components are U.S.-sourced. It applies to mail order promotions, treats violations as unfair/deceptive practices under the FTC Act, allows state laws that provide greater protection, and provides an exemption process.

The rule imposes compliance costs and supply chain distortions, particularly on small businesses, while its vague standard creates legal uncertainty and chilling effects on commercial speech. Consumers can rely on existing fraud laws and voluntary certifications, making this heavy-handed mandate an unnecessary hidden tax.

Establishes a federally overseen Concrete Masonry Products Board funded by mandatory assessments ($0.01-$0.05 per unit) to conduct generic promotion, research, and education for the industry. Manufacturers must pay regardless of whether they benefit from the Board's activities.

This is corporate welfare disguised as industry promotion. The mandatory assessment is a hidden tax on consumers and an unconstitutional federal overreach into a local economic matter. It creates a classic regulatory capture structure where industry insiders control spending that benefits incumbents, while imposing disproportionate compliance costs on small manufacturers—exactly the barrier-to-entry effect Friedman warned about. The market can solve any legitimate collective-action problems through voluntary trade associations funded by willing members. No natural right or market failure justifies forcing producers to subsidize competitors' advertising or politically-driven research.

The regulation authorizes the Secretary of Commerce to review, prohibit, or impose mitigation on information and communications technology and services (ICTS) transactions involving persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to foreign adversaries. It covers a broad range of ICTS, including hardware, software, cloud services, and connected applications, and establishes a case-by-case review process based on 'undue or unacceptable risk' to national security. The Secretary has subpoena power, can require information from any party, and may deviate from procedures in emergencies. The rule defines six foreign adversaries (China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Maduro regime) and outlines extensive criteria for risk assessment and mitigation, while noting it does not affect other federal authorities.

The regulation imposes substantial compliance costs on ICTS businesses, expands bureaucratic discretion with subjective risk criteria, duplicates existing national security reviews (CFIUS, IEEPA), and distorts market signals through unpredictable, case-by-case prohibitions. Unseen effects include chilling innovation, raising barriers to entry, and enabling protectionist misuse under the guise of national security, while the knowledge problem prevents accurate centralized risk assessment. These costs outweigh uncertain benefits, and national security concerns can be addressed more efficiently through targeted intelligence, military, and existing legal tools without expanding the regulatory labyrinth.

Federal regulation requiring aviation maintenance technician schools to obtain certificates, meet facility/equipment standards, follow FAA-approved curricula, employ qualified instructors, maintain a 25:1 student-instructor ratio, achieve 70% test pass rates, and undergo accreditation or quality control oversight.

High compliance costs and barriers to entry reduce competition, raise tuition, and stifle innovation in training methods. Safety is ultimately ensured by the FAA mechanic certification exam and market reputation, not prescriptive school requirements. This regulatory burden benefits incumbent schools at the expense of students and consumers, while federal overreach into education violates Tenth Amendment principles.

Regulation mandates remote identification for most drones operating in U.S. airspace, requiring either built-in standard remote ID (broadcasting location, identifier, and status) or an external broadcast module. It sets detailed technical specifications, declaration-of-compliance processes, and FAA-recognized identification areas for limited exemptions. The rule aims to enhance airspace safety and security by enabling real-time tracking of drones and their operators.

Imposes massive compliance costs on manufacturers and operators, especially small businesses and hobbyists, stifling innovation and market entry. Mandatory real-time location broadcasting creates a surveillance infrastructure that invades privacy. The blanket requirement fails to target actual risks, wasting resources and discouraging beneficial uses such as delivery, inspection, and photography. Federal overreach into a rapidly evolving industry contradicts principles of limited government and free enterprise, while the hidden tax of regulatory compliance burdens every American household.

This regulation requires Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Enterprises) to develop detailed resolution plans for FHFA to facilitate their orderly resolution via receivership if they fail. The plans must identify 'core business lines' to continue under a new 'limited-life regulated entity' and demonstrate strategies to minimize disruption to housing markets while ensuring investors bear losses according to statutory priority. Enterprises must submit plans every two years, update for material changes, and obtain board approval. FHFA reviews plans for credibility and can deem deficiencies as failures to meet prudential standards.

This regulation codifies and perpetuates the too-big-to-fail doctrine for government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). It institutionalizes government planning for private entity failure rather than allowing market discipline to operate. The elaborate resolution planning creates moral hazard, reduces market discipline, and legitimizes state backstopping of GSEs—exactly antithetical to free-market principles. The correct solution is to wind down these distortive GSEs entirely, not to perfect their government rescue. The hidden costs include entrenching regulatory capture, raising barriers to entry in housing finance, and diverting resources from productive uses to bureaucratic compliance—all while claiming to foster market discipline.

This FDIC regulation imposes extensive reporting, governance, and operational requirements on 'Covered Companies' that control industrial banks after April 1, 2021. It mandates written agreements with FDIC commitments including annual reports, FDIC examinations, record maintenance, independent audits, board representation limits, capital maintenance, and tax allocation agreements, plus restrictions on business changes and executive appointments.

This regulation creates a costly federal supervisory regime over state-chartered industrial banks' parent companies, imposing disproportionate compliance burdens that raise barriers to entry and protect banking incumbents. The FDIC already possesses authority to address safety and soundness concerns through existing powers; this prescriptive part represents regulatory overreach that stifles innovation and competition in financial services while distorting market incentives. The unseen costs include reduced access to banking services, higher consumer costs, and the erosion of constitutional federalism by federalizing what should remain state-level oversight.

Regulation requiring FDIC-supervised institutions to include equal housing statements in advertisements, display Equal Housing Lender posters in branches, collect applicant monitoring information per Regulation B, maintain Home Mortgage Disclosure Act loan registers per Regulation C, and ensure controlled entities comply with these requirements to enforce Fair Housing Act and Equal Credit Opportunity Act.

This regulation prevents fraudulent and deceptive advertising in residential lending—a legitimate government function. The requirements are narrowly tailored to ensure transparency, empower consumers to report discrimination, and enable monitoring of systemic bias. Repealing it would remove a critical enforcement mechanism against housing discrimination, allowing deceptive practices to flourish unchecked. The compliance burden is modest compared to the social cost of unaddressed discrimination in a fundamental market like housing.

The FDIC clarifies that supervisory guidance does not have force of law and cannot be the basis for enforcement actions, while outlining expectations for how guidance should be used to provide transparency and consistency in bank supervision. It limits the use of 'bright-line' thresholds and restricts examiners from criticizing institutions for non-compliance with guidance.

Deleting this clarification would enable the FDIC to resume using guidance as a backdoor regulatory weapon, creating uncertainty and forcing banks to comply with non-binding 'suggestions' under implicit threat. It achieves its purpose—constraining agency overreach and protecting regulated entities from de facto rulemaking without proper notice-and-comment—in a way that would be difficult to replicate without explicit policy limits on enforcement discretion. The regulation reduces, rather than increases, the hidden tax of regulatory compliance by preventing agencies from imposing mandatory requirements through unofficial channels.

Regulation implements FOIA for the Federal Open Market Committee, establishing procedures for public access to records, request processing, exemptions, fees, and appeals while protecting confidential information.

Deleting this regulation would undermine FOIA compliance at the FOMC, leading to arbitrary decision-making, reduced transparency, and potential legal violations; Americans rely on this framework to access information about monetary policy that affects their economic lives, and the structured balance between disclosure and confidentiality would be difficult to maintain without codified procedures.

This OCC regulation mandates that national banks, federal savings associations, and their service providers report 'notification incidents' (material cybersecurity events that disrupt operations or threaten financial stability) to the OCC within 36 hours. The rule aims to ensure regulators have timely awareness of security incidents that could affect banking operations or broader financial stability.

The 36-hour mandatory reporting deadline imposes significant compliance costs, particularly on smaller banks that lack dedicated security teams. It risks incentivizing rushed, low-quality notifications over thorough incident assessment, and creates perverse incentives to over-report minor issues to avoid missing deadlines. Regulators already have full examination authority to obtain information about material incidents—a principles-based requirement for adequate incident response planning, without arbitrary timelines, would achieve the same goal with far less bureaucratic burden and unintended consequences.