Browse regulations

The regulation establishes procedures for the Copyright Claims Board (CCB), a three-member tribunal within the Copyright Office created by the CASE Act to resolve small copyright claims (under $30,000) through an alternative, streamlined administrative process outside federal courts. It governs claim initiation, service of notices, electronic filing requirements, discovery procedures, and optional waiver provisions. The Board is not bound by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or Evidence, and participation requires waiving rights to Article III court adjudication and jury trial unless the respondent opts out within 60 days of service.

This regulation expands the administrative state by creating a government-run tribunal that bypasses constitutional Article III courts, undermining the separation of powers and the right to jury trial. While proponents claim it increases access to justice for small claims, it substitutes an unaccountable bureaucratic process for traditional courts, adds compliance burdens (service agent designations, eCCB registration, per certifications), and risks regulatory capture within the Copyright Office. The voluntary opt-out provision merely means those who fail to act lose constitutional rights—a coercive trap for the unwary. Copyright enforcement can be efficiently handled through existing state courts, federal small-claims procedures, or private arbitration without creating a new federal bureaucracy. The unseen costs include further erosion of the rule of law, distorted incentives to forum-shop, and the creation of yet another permanent agency whose mission will inevitably expand beyond its original scope.

These regulations establish procedural rules for the Copyright Claims Board (CCB), a voluntary alternative forum to federal court for resolving certain copyright disputes. The rules govern filing procedures, character limits for submissions (tiers), discovery protocols, deadlines, and other administrative processes. The CCB provides a simplified, lower-cost option for copyright claimants and respondents.

Deleting these procedural regulations would force parties back into expensive federal court, increasing litigation costs for ordinary Americans and small businesses that cannot afford traditional copyright litigation. The CCB's voluntary structure respects individual choice while reducing the burden on the federal judiciary. These rules provide essential predictability and accessibility that would be difficult to achieve through ad hoc arrangements or private arbitration alone.

Requires federal acquisition of land or easements downstream of dam spillways to protect public from spillway discharge hazards, with detailed engineering criteria for determining hazardous conditions and required real estate interests.

Violates property rights and federalism; the federal government lacks constitutional authority to control private land use downstream of dams, representing an unconstitutional taking; state/local regulation of floodplains is proper and respects individual choice about risk.

This DoD regulation establishes internal procedures for responding to civil litigation requests and subpoenas for official information or testimony from DoD personnel. It requires all requests to be processed through chief legal advisors, permits only under specific conditions, and protects classified, privileged, and sensitive information from disclosure.

This is an internal management procedure for a military department that does not regulate the public. It protects national security information, prevents harassment of personnel through discovery, maintains proper legal chain of command, and ensures consistent handling of discovery requests across a massive organization. Deleting it would create chaos, risk classified leaks, and expose individual service members to legal harassment. The restrictions are reasonable and necessary for a functioning defense establishment.

Part 599 implements sanctions against persons involved in illicit drug trafficking under Executive Order 14059. It blocks all property and interests in property of designated persons within U.S. jurisdiction, prohibits U.S. persons from engaging in virtually any transactions with blocked persons, requires financial institutions to block and maintain funds in interest-bearing accounts, and establishes extensive licensing and compliance frameworks administered by OFAC.

International drug trafficking is properly a matter for federal criminal law enforcement and diplomacy, not economic sanctions that ensnare innocent third parties and impose massive compliance costs on the financial sector. This regulation weaponizes the banking system to enforce foreign policy, creating severe economic distortions: property is frozen without due process, legitimate transactions are chilled, and U.S. financial institutions bear compliance burdens ultimately passed to consumers. The broad definitions and retroactive validation provisions violate rule of law principles. Sanctions rarely achieve their objectives against black market operators while harming American liberty and prosperity.

This regulation implements economic sanctions against significant transnational criminal organizations (TCOs) and those who assist them, blocking their property and interests within US jurisdiction and prohibiting transactions with them under Executive Order 13581.

The regulation targets legitimate threats to national security and public safety through a relatively narrow, targeted scheme that imposes minimal compliance burdens on ordinary Americans and small businesses compared to the massive domestic regulatory state. While sanctions have potential for over-breadth, the benefits of disrupting criminal financial networks outweigh these manageable risks. Deleting it would remove a key tool for combating transnational crime, leaving Americans worse off by enabling easier operation of dangerous criminal syndicates.

This regulation implements Ukraine/Russia-related sanctions, blocking property and prohibiting transactions with designated individuals and entities that undermine Ukrainian sovereignty, operate in key Russian economic sectors, or engage in corruption/human rights abuses. It also restricts U.S. investment and trade with Crimea and imposes secondary sanctions on foreign financial institutions facilitating prohibited activities.

Deleting these sanctions would remove a critical non-military tool to deter Russian aggression in Ukraine, likely emboldening further expansionism that could escalate to wider European conflict involving NATO, thereby posing far greater risks to American security and prosperity than the minimal compliance costs imposed on financial institutions and businesses engaged in international trade.

OFAC regulation implementing blocking sanctions against individuals and entities threatening peace, security, or democratic processes in the Western Balkans under E.O.s 13219, 13304, and 14033. Freezes all U.S.-based assets of designated persons, prohibits virtually all transactions with them, and imposes strict handling requirements on blocked funds.

Deleting this would eliminate a crucial non-military tool to pressure foreign actors who threaten regional stability and U.S. interests in Europe. The targeted sanctions regime achieves through financial isolation what would otherwise require military options or inaction. Compliance costs burden only those dealing with designated individuals, not the American public or small businesses.

Regulation implements U.S. sanctions against Russia under E.O. 14024 by blocking property and prohibiting transactions with designated persons, requiring U.S. persons to hold blocked funds in interest-bearing accounts, and establishing licensing and enforcement mechanisms through OFAC.

Imposes heavy compliance costs on U.S. financial institutions and businesses; violates property rights and free enterprise by blocking assets and restricting voluntary transactions; expands unchecked executive power via emergency declarations beyond congressional intent; unintended consequences include harming Russian civilians, distorting markets, and damaging U.S. economic interests; foreign policy tools belong to Congress, not bureaucratic rulemaking.

Prohibits US persons from purchasing or selling publicly traded securities of designated Chinese military companies, with divestment grace periods. Enforced by OFAC under national emergency authorities, with civil and criminal penalties. Part of broader sanctions regime targeting China's Military-Civil Fusion.

Restricts Americans' fundamental right to voluntary exchange, imposing significant compliance costs on investors and financial institutions. Creates dangerous precedent for executive capital controls under vague national security justifications, bypassing Congress and distorting capital allocation. The unseen cost is erosion of economic liberty and rule of law, setting stage for further intervention.

Blocks property and interests in property of foreign persons engaged in cyber-enabled activities threatening US national security, foreign policy, or economic health, including those undermining cybersecurity on behalf of Russia (CAATSA). Prohibits all transactions with blocked persons, requires holding funds in blocked interest-bearing accounts, and voids any transfers violating these prohibitions.

Deleting these sanctions would allow foreign cyber attackers, trade secret thieves, and Russian entities undermining US elections to maintain access to US financial systems and continue harmful operations. This targeted blocking of specific malicious actors' assets is a proportionate and essential national security tool that primarily burdens foreign adversaries, not American citizens or businesses. Alternative means of deterring state-sponsored cyber aggression would be less effective and more costly.

Blocks property and prohibits transactions with the Government of Libya, individuals designated under E.O. 13566 and 13726 for human rights abuses or threatening stability, and their associates, requiring U.S. persons to hold blocked funds in interest-bearing accounts and implementing licensing procedures.

Broad sanctions with vague standards impose heavy compliance costs on U.S. financial institutions, chill legitimate international commerce, often fail to change target regime behavior while harming foreign civilians, and represent an unconstitutional extension of federal regulatory power into voluntary cross-border transactions with significant unseen economic distortions.

This regulation implements economic sanctions blocking property of individuals and entities determined to be responsible for threatening peace, security, or stability in the Central African Republic, or engaging in human rights abuses, arms trafficking, or obstruction of humanitarian assistance. It prohibits U.S. persons from dealing with blocked property, requires blocked funds to be held in interest-bearing accounts, and establishes licensing and compliance mechanisms administered by OFAC.

Deleting this regulation would eliminate a targeted, non-military tool for holding accountable individuals perpetrating atrocities and destabilizing activities in the Central African Republic. As a foreign policy instrument authorized under IEEPA, it imposes minimal compliance costs only on financial institutions and businesses with international exposure—not the general public—while advancing U.S. national security and humanitarian objectives. The regulation is constitutionally sound, precisely targeted to specific bad actors, and does not distort domestic markets or burden small businesses. Americans would be worse off without this proportional means of pressuring those who commit human rights violations, use child soldiers, or fuel conflict through illicit arms and resource trade.

This regulation implements economic sanctions against Ethiopia under Executive Order 14046, blocking property and prohibiting transactions with sanctioned persons to address the declared national emergency. It defines extensive terminology, establishes blocking requirements, licensing procedures, and compliance obligations for U.S. persons and financial institutions.

Economic sanctions violate free enterprise principles by prohibiting voluntary international trade, harming U.S. businesses and consumers while failing to achieve foreign policy objectives. They represent executive overreach under IEEPA, impose compliance costs on financial institutions, and typically inflict disproportionate humanitarian harm on civilian populations rather than targeted regimes—all while expanding arbitrary federal power beyond constitutional limits.

This regulation establishes the rules and criteria for multiemployer pension plans to apply for Special Financial Assistance (SFA) from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) under ERISA section 4262. It defines eligibility requirements (critical/declining status, insolvency, etc.), determines the calculation methodology for assistance amounts using specific actuarial assumptions, and imposes rules to prevent plans from artificially increasing benefits or decreasing contributions after a certain date to game the system.

This federal bailout program creates massive moral hazard, encouraging pension plans to underfund knowing taxpayers will rescue them. It transfers private sector failure onto taxpayers who had no role in the decisions, distorts labor markets by favoring bailed-out plans, and represents unconstitutional federal overreach into what should be private contractual arrangements. The unseen costs—systematic underfunding, unfair competition with prudent plans, and expansion of the administrative state—far outweigh any short-term protection of benefits that ultimately should be the responsibility of plan sponsors and participants, not the public.