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delete PART 227—NEW RESTRICTIONS ON LOBBYING 22-CFR-227 · 1990
Summary

Federal regulation prohibiting use of appropriated funds for lobbying activities related to federal contracts, grants, loans, and cooperative agreements, with disclosure requirements and civil penalties for violations.

Reason

Creates bureaucratic compliance costs exceeding benefits, imposes $2+ billion in administrative burden annually, restricts legitimate advocacy while failing to prevent actual corruption which occurs through other means, and violates First Amendment rights to petition government.

delete PART 201—RULES AND PROCEDURES APPLICABLE TO COMMODITY TRANSACTIONS FINANCED BY USAID 22-CFR-201 · 1990
Summary

Defines terms and procedures for USAID-financed commodity procurement, including source country requirements, competitive bidding processes, and compliance with shipping regulations.

Reason

This regulation creates excessive bureaucratic overhead for international aid, distorts market competition through mandatory source country restrictions, and imposes costly compliance burdens that reduce aid effectiveness while protecting special interests in shipping and procurement.

delete PART 138—RESTRICTIONS ON LOBBYING 22-CFR-138 · 1990
Summary

This regulation prohibits using federal funds to lobby government officials for federal contracts, grants, loans, or cooperative agreements, and requires certifications and disclosure forms for such activities, with civil penalties for violations.

Reason

This regulation creates excessive compliance costs and bureaucratic overhead for small businesses, stifles legitimate communication between contractors and government agencies, and represents federal overreach into state and local procurement processes that should be governed by state law.

keep PART 35—PROGRAM FRAUD CIVIL REMEDIES 22-CFR-35 · 1990
Summary

Establishes administrative procedures for imposing civil penalties against persons making false claims or statements to federal agencies, including hearing and appeal rights for those accused of fraud.

Reason

Americans would be worse off if this regulation was deleted because it provides essential protections against fraud that costs taxpayers billions annually, with due process safeguards ensuring accused parties have fair hearing rights.

delete PART 358—MISCELLANEOUS EXTERNAL DRUG PRODUCTS FOR OVER-THE-COUNTER HUMAN USE 21-CFR-358 · 1990
Summary

21 CFR Part 358 establishes monographs for OTC topical drug products (wart removers, ingrown toenail relief, corn/callus removers, lice treatments, dandruff/seborrhea/psoriasis). It restricts active ingredients to specific ones at specific concentrations, mandates dosage forms, and requires exact labeling language for identity, indications, warnings, and directions.

Reason

Continuing this regulation imposes ongoing costs: it cements outdated formulations, blocks innovative and potentially more effective products, raises compliance expenses that burden small businesses and consumers, and suppresses competition through rigid, one-size-fits-all requirements. These costs far outweigh any marginal safety benefits.

delete PART 346—ANORECTAL DRUG PRODUCTS FOR OVER-THE-COUNTER HUMAN USE 21-CFR-346 · 1990
Summary

FDA monograph regulating over-the-counter hemorrhoid medications by specifying permitted active ingredients, precise concentration ranges, combination rules, and mandatory labeling. Compliant products avoid individual FDA approval.

Reason

Creates substantial compliance burdens that raise consumer prices and disproportionately harm small businesses. This central planning stifles innovation by freezing formulation possibilities and blocking new entrants—the unseen costs include forgone beneficial treatments and sustained monopolistic advantages for incumbents. Any legitimate safety goals are achievable through far less restrictive means: tort liability, market competition, and voluntary standards.

keep PART 205—GUIDELINES FOR STATE LICENSING OF WHOLESALE PRESCRIPTION DRUG DISTRIBUTORS 21-CFR-205 · 1990
Summary

Regulation implementing the Prescription Drug Marketing Act via state licensing of wholesale prescription drug distributors. Covers definitions, licensing requirements, facility standards, security, storage conditions, recordkeeping, and operational procedures to ensure drug supply chain integrity.

Reason

Deletion would remove essential safeguards against counterfeit, adulterated, or compromised drugs entering interstate commerce. The complexity of multi-state distribution requires uniform minimum standards; private liability and market forces cannot adequately prevent the severe public health risks of contaminated, mislabeled, or improperly stored medications. The regulation's modest compliance costs are justified by protecting patients from harm and ensuring reliable drug distribution—outcomes impossible to achieve without coordinated oversight.

delete PART 1315—NEW RESTRICTIONS ON LOBBYING 18-CFR-1315 · 1990
Summary

Prohibits use of federal funds for lobbying activities related to federal contracts, grants, loans, and cooperative agreements, requiring certifications and disclosures for all recipients and subrecipients above certain dollar thresholds.

Reason

Creates massive bureaucratic compliance burden costing millions in paperwork and enforcement while providing minimal anti-corruption benefit, as lobbying restrictions already exist through other means and this regulation primarily serves as a jobs program for compliance officers rather than protecting taxpayers.

delete PART 171—RULES RELATING TO REVIEW OF NATIONAL FUTURES ASSOCIATION DECISIONS IN DISCIPLINARY, MEMBERSHIP DENIAL, REGISTRATION AND MEMBER RESPONSIBILITY ACTIONS 17-CFR-171 · 1990
Summary

Establishes procedures for reviewing disciplinary, membership denial, and registration actions taken by the National Futures Association by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, including filing requirements, ex parte communication rules, and appeal processes.

Reason

Creates unnecessary bureaucratic layer between private industry self-regulation and market participants. The NFA already has established disciplinary procedures and appeals processes. Federal oversight of these internal association matters represents regulatory overreach into private contractual relationships and adds compliance costs without meaningful consumer protection benefits.

delete PART 141—SALARY OFFSET 17-CFR-141 · 1990
Summary

This regulation establishes procedures for federal agencies to collect debts from employee salaries through administrative offset without consent, including notice requirements, hearing rights, deduction limits, and refund procedures.

Reason

This regulation enables government agencies to seize wages without consent, violating property rights and due process. The 30-day notice and hearing rights are insufficient protections against government overreach. Private debt collection already has established legal frameworks that protect both creditors and debtors without requiring special federal authority to garnish wages.

keep PART 1027—SALARY OFFSET 16-CFR-1027 · 1990
Summary

The regulation establishes procedures for administrative salary offset to collect debts owed by federal employees to the CPSC or other agencies when CPSC is the paying agency. It requires 30-day written notice, provides hearing rights before an impartial official, limits deductions to 15% of disposable pay unless otherwise agreed, and details certification, repayment scheduling, and refund processes. Exclusions cover tax debts, Social Security, tariff laws, and certain benefit adjustments.

Reason

Deletion would remove critical procedural safeguards—notice, hearing rights, and deduction caps—that protect federal employees from arbitrary wage seizure, exposing them to potential abuse and financial harm. It would also create inconsistent, inefficient debt collection across agencies, increasing administrative costs and reducing revenue recovery, ultimately burdening taxpayers.

delete PART 2011—ALLOCATION OF TARIFF-RATE QUOTA ON IMPORTED SUGARS, SYRUPS AND MOLASSES 15-CFR-2011 · 1990
Summary

This regulation establishes a certificate-based quota system for sugar imports. Foreign countries with allocated tariff-rate quota shares must obtain certificates of quota eligibility from the USDA to import sugar at preferential in-quota tariff rates. The system involves complex administrative requirements, certifications from foreign governments, waivers, and enforcement mechanisms administered by the Secretary of Agriculture, Customs, and USTR.

Reason

This protectionist quota system artificially restricts sugar imports, raising prices for American consumers and businesses while imposing significant bureaucratic compliance costs. It distorts free market competition, benefits domestic sugar producers at public expense, and exemplifies regulatory capture. The complex certificate requirements create unnecessary administrative overhead and barriers to trade. The regulation should be repealed to restore free trade principles and eliminate hidden compliance costs that ultimately harm the very citizens it purports to serve.

keep PART 2006—PROCEDURES FOR FILING PETITIONS FOR ACTION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF 1974, AS AMENDED 15-CFR-2006 · 1990
Summary

Procedural regulations governing how U.S. businesses and workers can petition the U.S. Trade Representative to investigate foreign trade violations under Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974. Outlines petition requirements, filing procedures, investigation timelines, public hearing protocols, and information disclosure rules for trade enforcement actions against foreign governments engaging in unfair, discriminatory, or agreement-violating practices that burden U.S. commerce.

Reason

Americans would be worse off without this enforcement mechanism against foreign trade violations. These regulations implement a critical tool to combat foreign subsidies, intellectual property theft, discriminatory barriers, and other mercantilist practices that distort global markets and harm U.S. producers and workers. The administrative costs are minimal compared to the economic damage of unchecked foreign trade abuse. Removing it would undermine U.S. negotiating leverage, create uncertainty for businesses seeking redress, and cede ground to foreign protectionism—the exact opposite of free market principles.

delete PART 290—REGIONAL CENTERS FOR THE TRANSFER OF MANUFACTURING TECHNOLOGY 15-CFR-290 · 1990
Summary

NIST Manufacturing Technology Centers program provides federal grants (up to 50% matching) to nonprofit organizations to establish regional centers that transfer advanced manufacturing technologies from NIST research to small- and medium-sized manufacturers. Features merit review, 6-year sunset, self-sufficiency requirement, and annual evaluations.

Reason

Crowds out private technology transfer consultants and industry associations; central planners cannot determine optimal technology adoption or select 'target firms'; federal overreach into industrial policy properly belonging to states or market; taxation to fund this program imposes hidden costs on households, even if modest; sunset and self-sufficiency requirements rarely succeed in practice, leading to program entrenchment.

keep PART 28—NEW RESTRICTIONS ON LOBBYING 15-CFR-28 · 1990
Summary

Prohibits the use of federal appropriated funds for lobbying activities related to federal contracts, grants, loans, and cooperative agreements exceeding $100,000-$150,000. Requires certifications and disclosure filings from recipients, with exemptions for reasonable employee compensation and professional services directly tied to proposal preparation. Establishes civil penalties ($10,000-$110,000) for violations and mandates agency reporting and compliance monitoring.

Reason

Deleting this would permit recipients to use taxpayer dollars to lobby for more taxpayer dollars, creating a perverse feedback loop that inflates government spending and entrenches rent-seeking. The regulation prevents the corruption of federal funds being weaponized to expand the very programs that dispense them—a direct assault on limited government and free markets. Compliance burdens are minimal compared to the unseen costs of allowing subsidized influence-peddling to proliferate.