Browse regulations

DOJ-specific acquisition regulation clauses governing contract administration, technical direction, non-disclosure, commercial item modifications, workplace safety policies, and protest procedures. These modify standard FAR provisions with DOJ-unique requirements.

Imposes significant compliance complexity and costs, particularly through patent indemnification shifting risk to taxpayers and extensive commercial supplier agreement restrictions. Creates unique bureaucratic barriers that serve no compelling public interest, disproportionately burden small businesses, and represent regulatory overreach into normal commercial contracting.

Defines 'approving authority' as the Attorney General for the relevant CFR part.

Deleting this definition would introduce ambiguity about decision-making authority, leading to legal uncertainty, increased litigation costs, and potential arbitrary enforcement. The definition promotes rule of law by ensuring clarity at negligible cost.

Requires contracting officers to discontinue and report suspected fraud in termination settlements, mandates legal review, and higher-level approval for all such settlements.

Imposes mandatory legal review and additional bureaucratic layers on every termination settlement, creating compliance costs and delays that fall hardest on small contractors; redundant with existing fraud reporting laws and internal controls; removal would reduce government overhead and promote fair competition.

Defines the Head of the Contracting Activity (HCA) or designee as the agency head for specific FAR provisions (48.102(a) and 48.201(a)(6)), establishing procurement authority within federal agencies.

Deletion would create uncertainty in federal procurement authority, leading to contract disputes, delays, and inefficient spending that burden taxpayers. This minimal designation achieves necessary clarity simply and cannot be replaced without equivalent or greater complexity.

Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) provisions mandating standardized procedures for government inspection/acceptance documentation (FAR 46.401/46.501) and requiring above-the-contracting-officer approval for warranties in acquisitions.

Unnecessary centralization of procurement decisions that burden businesses, especially small firms, with compliance costs while adding no value beyond what market discipline and targeted contracting can achieve. These rules presume bureaucratic wisdom over decentralized decision-making, contributing to the $2 trillion regulatory burden and raising barriers to entry for competitors seeking government contracts. The knowledge problem guarantees FAR writers cannot design optimal procedures for every procurement scenario.

Regulation establishes record-keeping and reporting requirements for DOJ contractors regarding government-furnished property, including annual reports by January 31 and summary reports by March 1 to FASS, JMD.

Imposes administrative compliance costs on contractors and DOJ personnel for routine property tracking that can be accomplished through contractual terms and selective audits. The mandated reporting schedules create unnecessary paperwork burden with minimal accountability benefit, exemplifying process-based regulation that inflates bureaucracy without improving outcomes.

Designates the Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) or designee as the agency head for specific FAR sections (42.602(a) and 42.703-2(b)), clarifying internal authority for contract audit and performance matters.

This internal designation unnecessarily contributes to the CFR's 185,000-page labyrinth, increasing the hidden tax of complexity without improving public accountability; such authority can be delegated through internal agency orders, reducing regulatory bloat.

Designates the Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) or their designee as the agency head for specific contracting authority under FAR 41.201(d)(2)(i) and (d)(3), which pertains to the acquisition of transportation or transportation-related services.

This is a purely internal administrative rule that clarifies lines of authority within federal agencies. It creates no compliance costs for the public, imposes no burdens on businesses or citizens, and does not expand government power. Deleting it would create operational confusion without any corresponding liberty benefit. The regulation is a legitimate exercise of agency self-governance that improves efficiency, not an overreach requiring elimination.

Authorizes DOJ's Chief Information Officer to issue IT acquisition policies and requires contracts involving DOJ information systems to comply with FAR and DOJ security requirements.

Deletion would create security vulnerabilities in DOJ systems, risking exposure of sensitive law enforcement and national security data; uniform standards ensure consistent protection across all contractors, which ad hoc measures cannot reliably achieve given IT security's complexity.

This regulation designates the Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) or designee as the 'agency head' for purposes of specific FAR sections (37.106(b), 37.204, and 37.503), delegating procurement authority normally reserved for the agency head to the HCA for service contracting, interagency acquisitions, and related matters.

Unnecessary CFR clutter that could be handled via internal agency guidance. This supplemental delegation adds complexity without public benefit, contributes to regulatory fragmentation across agencies, and increases compliance burden by expanding the already bloated Code of Federal Regulations. The FAR already defines agency head authority; this layer creates confusion and raises costs for businesses navigating agency-specific rules.

Requires construction projects over $10,000,000 to report project magnitude in specified dollar ranges, and delegates authority to the Head of Contracting Activity (HCA) or designee for specific Federal Acquisition Regulation clauses regarding selection processes.

This regulation imposes purely administrative reporting burdens with no public benefit. The arbitrary dollar ranges add unnecessary complexity and compliance costs for contractors and agencies while creating incentives to manipulate project scopes to fit within brackets. The information could be obtained more efficiently by simply requiring reporting of actual dollar amounts. The delegation of authority is routine and doesn't require separate regulatory codification.

DOJ-specific regulation establishing dollar thresholds to determine when a procurement qualifies as a 'major system' subject to OMB Circular A-109 requirements. Thresholds include: automated information systems >$100M life-cycle cost; real property purchases >$60M assessed value; leases >$1.8M annual rent; transfers >$12M assessed value; R&D >$500k; with discretionary authority to designate other systems as major and an exemption process for routine off-the-shelf acquisitions.

Arbitrary thresholds create cliff effects and unnecessary red tape for procurements just above limits; open-ended 'any system' designation invites mission creep; exemption process adds bureaucratic layers; internal procurement thresholds should be flexible guidance to reduce compliance burdens on DOJ and vendors while allowing oversight of truly large acquisitions.

This DOJ regulation establishes procedures for internal procurement protests, allowing interested parties (actual or prospective offerors) to challenge contract award decisions. It defines roles (Agency Protest Official, Deciding Official), filing requirements, timelines, and decision procedures. The process provides an alternative to external boards and includes provisions for stays of award/suspension during protests, with final decisions not appealable within DOJ.

This internal oversight mechanism ensures accountability in federal contracting without imposing costs on the public or businesses. It prevents waste, fraud, and abuse in government spending by providing a cost-effective, pre-litigation resolution forum that protects taxpayer dollars and maintains fair competition—legitimate functions that reduce overall regulatory burden by catching procurement errors before they escalate to more expensive external forums like the Civilian Board of Contract Appeals or federal courts.

Internal DOJ procedural rules governing contract financing approvals, payment mechanisms, and administrative responsibilities. Assigns authority to various officials (SPE, HCA) for advance payments, interest-free arrangements, unusual financing, payment suspensions, and electronic funds transfer requirements. Establishes reporting requirements for suspected fraud and coordination protocols between contracting officers and finance offices.

These internal procedural requirements impose bureaucratic overhead and delays within the agency without demonstrable public benefit. Each approval layer creates friction, slows legitimate contracting and payments to vendors, and consumes agency resources that could be deployed more productively. The unseen costs include delayed payments to small business contractors, administrative burden on contracting officers, and the general inefficiency of over-regulation even within government operations. No meaningful accountability or fraud prevention is achieved that couldn't be handled more efficiently with streamlined processes and routine audits.

Agency regulation governing the process for granting deviations from federal cost accounting principles (FAR Part 31) and negotiating advance agreements for special/unusual contract costs. Requires multi-level review and approval above contracting officers, with documentation in contract files and distribution to audit offices.

Adds bureaucratic complexity and administrative burden without clear benefit. The multi-layered approval process increases contracting costs and delays, disproportionately harming small businesses. The deviation authority risks higher taxpayer costs by allowing exceptions to standard cost principles, and creates opportunities for regulatory capture through negotiated agreements favoring incumbent contractors.