Browse regulations

This regulation establishes the FOIA (Freedom of Information Act) procedures for the Office of the Intellectual Property Enforcement Coordinator (IPEC), including request requirements, fee structures for different requester categories (commercial, educational, news media, others), processing timelines, consultation/referral protocols with other agencies, appeal processes, and expedited processing criteria. It implements the statutory mandate for government transparency by providing a standardized mechanism for the public to access IPEC records while recovering direct costs of processing requests.

Americans would be worse off without this regulation because it provides the only clear, standardized mechanism for accessing IPEC records—essential transparency for an office that coordinates national intellectual property policy. Deleting it would create opacity around enforcement decisions that affect innovation and commerce. The regulation implements FOIA with reasonable, cost-based fees and differentiated categories that manage limited resources while preserving public access. The administrative burden is minimal compared to the vital democratic function of government accountability through information access.

FMCS employees must obtain prior written approval from supervisor and Designated Agency Ethics Official before any outside employment or activity, supplementing broader executive branch ethics standards. The rule defines 'outside employment or activity' broadly, requires revised requests for significant changes, and allows DAEO to issue guidance and exemptions.

Without prior approval, FMCS mediators could have financial ties to parties in labor disputes, compromising impartiality and undermining public trust in the mediation process. Pre-vetting ensures conflicts are prevented before they arise—more effective than after-the-fact disclosure or enforcement, which would be insufficient to protect agency integrity.

DoD-specific implementation of 5 CFR part 2635 ethics standards, designating component agencies separately for gifts and outside activities, prescribing limited exceptions, restricting gifts from subordinates, requiring disclaimers for speeches, and mandating approvals for business with prohibited sources.

Duplicate regulation imposing compliance costs and restricting employee freedoms through complex rules that chill speech, outside employment, and post-government work. Marginal benefits of DoD-specific tailoring do not justify bureaucracy overhead when uniform OGE standards suffice; resources better spent on mission than internal ethics compliance.

Implements Privacy Act of 1974 for FLRA, establishing procedures for individuals to request access, amendment, or accounting of personal records; limits disclosures; sets fees; includes OIG exemptions.

Imposes compliance costs and bureaucratic overhead on a small agency and citizens; privacy protections could be more efficiently addressed via state frameworks or private ordering. Reinforces federal overreach into data governance beyond enumerated constitutional powers.

This 'ban the box' regulation prohibits federal agencies from requesting criminal history information from job applicants before extending a conditional offer of employment. It applies to most civil service positions but contains exceptions for positions requiring security clearances, national security-sensitive roles, federal law enforcement, certain military technicians, and political appointments. Agencies must notify applicants of the prohibition and violations are subject to complaints and penalties.

This regulation unnecessarily constrains federal agencies' discretion in managing their own workforce, imposing a one-size-fits-all approach that strips hiring managers of the ability to screen for legitimate safety and security concerns early in the process. While exceptions exist, they create additional bureaucratic complexity as agencies must categorize positions rather than exercise judgment. The federal government should have autonomy to determine its own hiring standards without this centralized mandate, which adds compliance costs and may force agencies to waste resources interviewing candidates they would later exclude based on criminal history. Any social benefits of second-chance hiring can be achieved voluntarily by agencies without removing managerial discretion.

Creates a complaint-driven enforcement apparatus for the Fair Chance Act, which restricts when federal agencies may inquire about criminal history during hiring. Establishes procedures for applicants to file complaints within 30 days of alleged violations; mandates agency investigations within 60 days with factual record development; requires reporting to OPM; vests OPM with authority to impose progressive penalties (written warnings, suspensions up to indefinite duration, civil fines of $250-$1,000) on violating employees; provides due process rights including notice, response, representation, and appeal to Merit Systems Protection Board; requires recordkeeping in Privacy Act systems.

Imposes substantial compliance costs to enforce paternalistic restrictions that undermine employer autonomy and agency-specific personnel discretion. The enforcement regime diverts federal resources from core missions to policing hiring timelines, creating an entire bureaucratic apparatus for complaint processing, investigations, reporting, and adjudication. Progressive penalties create perverse incentives: hiring managers will avoid all criminal history inquiries to escape liability, potentially degrading hiring quality for safety-sensitive positions. Centralized OPM oversight violates constitutional federalism—personnel decisions should be agency-specific based on unique mission requirements, not uniform federal mandates. The adversarial system destroys trust, raises liability risks, and incentivizes litigation over pragmatic hiring. Even accepting the Fair Chance Act's goals, this punitive enforcement mechanism achieves them at unacceptable cost to federal autonomy, efficiency, and the rule of law's principle of knowable regulations.

This regulation implements the Buy America Preference for federal infrastructure project funding, requiring that iron, steel, manufactured products, and construction materials used in such projects be produced in the United States, with detailed definitions, waiver procedures, and applicability rules.

The regulation imposes significant compliance costs and distorts market incentives by favoring domestic producers through protectionist measures, which increases infrastructure project costs, burdens small businesses, and reduces overall economic efficiency, outweighing any potential benefits.

Requires Class I railroads to annually submit tare weight and loss/damage data to the Surface Transportation Board by May 31, either individually or through the Association of American Railroads.

Mandatory data collection imposes compliance costs on railroads and expands federal oversight beyond constitutional limits. The information merely supports regulatory interventions that distort market competition and enable regulatory capture, rather than addressing a genuine market failure.

This regulation creates a registration system for low-volume manufacturers (producing ≤5,000 vehicles worldwide annually) to produce up to 325 replica motor vehicles per year that resemble vehicles at least 25 years old. It exempts these replicas from most Federal motor vehicle safety standards applicable to new vehicles, while still requiring compliance with equipment standards, a prominent warning label, annual reporting, and NHTSA registration.

Deleting this exemption would force small replica manufacturers to comply with full federal safety standards for new vehicles, making their business models economically unviable and eliminating a niche industry that supports small businesses, preserves automotive heritage, and provides consumer choice. The regulation appropriately balances safety (via required equipment standards and warning labels) with regulatory relief for low-volume producers, fostering innovation and competition in the collector vehicle market that would otherwise be crushed by one-size-fits-all regulations designed for mass production.

49 CFR 566 requires all motor vehicle and motor vehicle equipment manufacturers (excluding tires) to submit identifying information and product descriptions to NHTSA. Manufacturers must provide full name, address, state of incorporation if applicable, and details about vehicle/equipment types. Updates required within 30 days of changes. Stated purpose is to facilitate NHTSA regulation and establish a manufacturer numbering system.

The regulation imposes unjustified reporting burdens on all manufacturers, especially small businesses, forcing them to subsidize bureaucratic data collection the agency could obtain voluntarily or through existing business registries. It represents federal overreach into information gathering that could be handled at state level or through industry mechanisms. The hidden compliance costs—borne disproportionately by smaller firms—create barriers to entry while yielding a database that enables further regulatory mission creep rather than directly preventing harm or protecting liberty.

This regulation mandates that automobile manufacturers submit detailed periodic reports to NHTSA containing projected and actual fuel economy data, technical specifications, and compliance information for their vehicle fleets. Reports are required in December (pre-model year), July (mid-model year), and as supplementary updates, using standardized templates with extensive data for each model type.

The regulation imposes significant compliance costs—especially on small manufacturers—for a purely informational benefit that could be achieved through less burdensome means. The detailed reporting requirements create a paperwork labyrinth that diverts resources from productive activity, entrenches large incumbents, and exemplifies regulatory overreach with minimal offsetting public benefit.

Regulation governs the accounting, trading, and transfer of Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) credits - a market-based compliance mechanism allowing manufacturers to exceed or offset fuel economy standards. It establishes credit accounts, defines trading/transfer rules, sets expiration timelines (3-5 years), mandates adjustment factors to preserve oil savings, and outlines compliance procedures including carryback plans and penalties.

The CAFE credit system is a regulatory overlay that entrenches federal micromanagement of the auto industry. It creates a complex compliance market that distorts incentives—manufacturers can buy credits instead of innovating, punishing smaller firms with disproportionate compliance costs. The adjustment factor bureaucracy and mandatory price reporting add hidden administrative burdens. This is federal overreach into what should be state-regulated land-use/transportation policy, violating Tenth Amendment principles. The entire CAFE framework assumes central planners can better allocate resources than the market; the credit trading system merely masks that fundamental flaw while adding unintended consequences like financialization of compliance.

Part 533 establishes Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards for light trucks, requiring manufacturers to meet minimum fleet-wide average fuel economy targets for each model year (1979-2031). The regulation specifies different standards for 2-wheel and 4-wheel drive trucks, includes provisions for captive imports, credit trading, and various compliance flexibilities. The NHTSA Administrator sets targets that become progressively more stringent, with manufacturers facing penalties for non-compliance.

The CAFE standards distort market signals, forcing manufacturers to prioritize fuel efficiency over consumer preferences for capability, safety, and price. This hidden compliance tax increases vehicle costs, reduces product variety, and disproportionately harms low-income buyers who need larger trucks for work. The regulatory complexity creates massive bureaucratic overhead, while the credit trading system enables gaming and penalizes smaller manufacturers unable to achieve economies of scale. Energy conservation should emerge from consumer demand and innovation, not centralized mandates that inevitably produce unintended consequences like lighter cars that offer less crash protection and reduced utility. The mandates also federalize decisions properly left to states and the private sector.

Establishes Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards requiring manufacturers to meet fleet-wide average miles-per-gallon targets for passenger automobiles, with escalating standards from 2011-2031, credit mechanisms for advanced technologies, and special standards for certain manufacturers.

Imposes hidden tax via compliance costs passed to consumers, distorts markets by overriding consumer preferences for size/performance/safety, creates knowledge problem as bureaucrats cannot optimally set standards for diverse needs, incentivizes safety-compromising weight reduction, raises barriers for small manufacturers, and represents unconstitutional federal overreach into state domain. Market competition would drive fuel efficiency far more efficiently.

The Unified Carrier Registration (UCR) Plan requires interstate motor carriers, brokers, and freight forwarders to register annually and pay fees based on fleet size. The regulation sets fee schedules for 2023, 2024, and subsequent years, establishing a federal-state partnership to collect these fees and maintain a national registry of commercial vehicles operating across state lines.

The UCR imposes a burdensome federal registration and fee system on small trucking businesses, raising barriers to entry and protecting large incumbents. Compliance costs represent a hidden tax passed to consumers, while the federal overreach violates Tenth Amendment principles. The unseen consequences include reduced competition, stifled entrepreneurship, and higher shipping costs that harm American households and businesses.