Browse regulations

FSA regulations governing farm program administration, including tobacco allotments, base acres, acreage reporting, and compliance procedures across all FSA-administered programs.

Federal farm programs distort agricultural markets, create dependency on government subsidies, and impose massive regulatory compliance costs on farmers. These regulations exceed constitutional authority by federalizing what should be state/local matters under the Tenth Amendment.

The Federal Crop Insurance Act provides catastrophic risk protection to producers in the event of crop loss due to yield loss or prevented planting, with coverage levels and premiums determined by the FCIC

The regulation imposes significant costs and complexities on producers, with administrative fees, premiums, and paperwork requirements that may outweigh the benefits of the protection, and the program may also distort market incentives and create unintended consequences such as over-reliance on government support

Regulation governing phytosanitary certification for plant exports, detailing roles of agents/inspectors, certification processes, and accreditation of private facilities.

Eliminating this regulation would severely harm American agricultural exporters by removing internationally-recognized certification services essential for market access, while failing to meaningfully reduce regulatory burden or costs borne by small businesses.

This regulation implements the Freedom of Information Act for the Food and Nutrition Service (FNS), establishing procedures for public access to FNS records, organizational information, publications, and appeal processes for denied requests.

Americans would be worse off if this regulation was deleted because it ensures transparency and accountability in FNS operations. Without these FOIA procedures, citizens would lose the ability to access information about food assistance programs, understand how their tax dollars are spent, and appeal denied information requests. The regulation provides essential public oversight of a $100+ billion federal program that affects millions of Americans, making it difficult to achieve this transparency through alternative means.

This regulation establishes USDA laboratory testing services for citrus products (under Florida state standards) and peanuts/agricultural commodities (primarily aflatoxin detection). It defines technical measurement terms, specifies laboratory locations, lists available analyses (acid, Brix, aflatoxin, etc.), sets fee structures via cooperative agreements and memoranda of understanding, and references official analytical methods manuals like AOAC INTERNATIONAL. The program operates on a fee-for-service basis upon request, serving both the Florida citrus industry and the federal Peanut Marketing Agreement program.

Government provision of laboratory testing services crowds out private market competition and represents unnecessary federal overreach. The USDA is competing with private laboratories using taxpayer-funded infrastructure, distorting the market for analytical services. The program also violates constitutional federalism by implementing Florida's citrus standards at the federal level and perpetuates the Peanut Marketing Agreement regime—government intervention in agricultural markets that Mises, Hayek, and Friedman would oppose. Even essential safety testing like aflatoxin detection could be handled more efficiently by private labs operating under liability and market discipline. The hidden tax burden of running this government enterprise exceeds any marginal benefit over private provision.

This regulation (7 CFR Part 12) imposes conservation compliance requirements on farmers receiving USDA benefits. It prohibits production of agricultural commodities on highly erodible land (erodibility index ≥8) or wetlands converted after December 23, 1985, and requires approved conservation plans for highly erodible cropland. Violations trigger ineligibility for numerous USDA programs including crop insurance premium subsidies, farm loans, commodity payments, and EQIP contracts. The rule defines extensive technical terminology (e.g., 'converted wetland', 'farmed wetland', 'conservation system') and contains exemptions for pre-1985 activities, parcels ≤2 acres, good-faith efforts, and minor technical violations.

This regulation represents federal overreach into land use—a core Tenth Amendment power—masked as a condition for receiving subsidies. It creates a vast enforcement bureaucracy (NRCS, FSA, Conservation Districts) imposing $2,000-$5,000 annual compliance costs per farm, disproportionately crushing small operators. The impenetrable technical definitions ('best drained condition', wetland hydrology criteria) generate legal uncertainty, arbitrary enforcement, and regulatory capture by agribusiness. Most perniciously, it perpetuates the very subsidy system that distorts agriculture; eliminating USDA handouts would remove the need for this coercive regime. Environmental goals are better achieved through state-level regulation, strict liability for downstream damages, or voluntary conservation markets—all respecting property rights and federalism while avoiding the unseen cost: erosion of the rule of law through a regulatory labyrinth no citizen can comprehend.

Regulation prohibits Commission employees from having financial interests in mining companies, with exceptions for certain investments and requirements for divestiture if conflicts arise.

Prevents conflicts of interest to ensure impartiality in regulatory decisions affecting mine safety, critical for public trust and operational integrity

Regulation restricts CPSC employees from engaging in outside employment without prior approval to prevent conflicts of interest.

This regulation imposes unnecessary bureaucratic overhead on federal employees, contributing to the $2 trillion compliance cost. It fails to address the core issue of conflicts of interest through more efficient mechanisms. The regulation's scope is overly broad, and its benefits are outweighed by the costs of enforcement and the erosion of free enterprise principles.

This regulation governs outside employment for Tennessee Valley Authority employees, requiring written approval for most non-federal employment to prevent conflicts of interest and ensure compliance with ethical standards.

Without this regulation, TVA employees could engage in outside employment that creates conflicts of interest, undermines public trust in the agency, or violates ethical standards. The approval process ensures transparency and prevents situations where employees might use their government position for private gain or be influenced by outside employers while serving the public.

This regulation requires National Archives and Records Administration (NARA) employees to obtain written approval before engaging in outside employment, ensuring it does not involve conduct prohibited by statute or Federal regulation.

The costs of maintaining this regulation include bureaucratic hurdles, potential discouragement of outside employment, and the risk of arbitrarily restricting employee activities, which may not be directly related to their NARA duties, leading to unseen effects such as reduced employee morale and decreased economic activity.

This regulation establishes ethical standards for EEOC employees regarding outside employment to prevent conflicts of interest. It prohibits employees from engaging in outside employment with parties affected by their official duties, receiving compensation for representing others in equal employment matters, and requires prior written approval for various compensated and uncompensated outside activities. It defines 'employment' broadly but includes exceptions for nonprofit activities unless they involve professional services, compensation, or leadership roles in equal employment organizations.

Americans would be worse off if deleted because it prevents corruption and maintains impartiality in enforcing critical civil rights laws. Without these conflict-of-interest rules, EEOC employees could accept outside work from regulated entities, leading to actual or apparent bias that would undermine equal employment opportunity enforcement and harm workers' rights. The modest administrative burden is justified by the essential need for ethical administration of justice.

Regulations governing conflict of interest for employees of the Federal Reserve System, including prohibited interests, exceptions, and disqualification requirements

Deleting these regulations could lead to unethical behavior and conflicts of interest among Federal Reserve employees, potentially undermining the integrity of the financial system and public trust in the institution

This regulation establishes ethical conduct rules for General Services Administration employees, covering solicitation prohibitions, government property purchase restrictions, real estate acquisition limitations, outside employment approval requirements, and mandatory reporting of waste/fraud/abuse.

These regulations impose unnecessary compliance costs and bureaucratic overhead on federal employees. The core ethical principles they enforce are already covered by existing federal ethics laws and the Standards of Ethical Conduct. The specific GSA rules create redundant layers of approval processes and prohibitions that waste employee time and agency resources without providing meaningful additional protection against corruption.

EPA supplemental ethics regulation prohibiting employees in specific offices (e.g., Mobile Sources, Pesticide Programs, Surface Mining) from holding financial interests or outside employment with companies they regulate. Requires pre-approval for certain outside activities and allows narrow waivers.

Deletion would invite direct financial conflicts among EPA decision-makers, worsening the regulatory capture problem already condemned by Austrian/Chicago economists. The modest restrictions are necessary to preserve impartiality and public trust in enforcement, preventing regulators from personally profiting from the industries they oversee.

This regulation sets ethics rules for DOT employees, including prohibitions on financial interests in regulated industries (railroads for FRA employees, airlines/aircraft manufacturers for FAA employees), with exceptions for diversified investment funds and waiver provisions. It treats various DOT components as separate agencies for gift and teaching rules.

The regulation imposes unjustified restrictions on the property rights and economic liberty of government employees and their families, extending government control to family members' independent financial decisions. It creates a chilling effect that deters qualified professionals with market expertise from public service, reduces regulatory quality through self-selection bias, and achieves its ethical goals through overbroad prior restraint rather than less restrictive means like disclosure and targeted recusal. The costs to individual liberty, talent attraction, and constitutional principles far outweigh the marginal corruption prevention benefits.