Browse regulations

SBA's Surety Bond Guarantee Programs under the Small Business Investment Act of 1958 provide guarantees to sureties for bonds issued to small businesses on federal contracts, with two programs: Prior Approval (requiring SBA pre-approval) and PSB (allowing self-service by approved sureties). The regulations cover bond eligibility, underwriting standards, loss determination, and program administration.

This regulation creates a costly federal subsidy for surety bonds that distorts the private insurance market, protects large contractors from competition, and represents federal overreach into state-level construction and procurement activities. The program's compliance costs and administrative overhead far exceed any benefits to small businesses, who would be better served by free market alternatives.

This regulation establishes procedures for filing monetary claims against the Small Business Administration under the Federal Tort Claims Act, including time limits, claim presentation requirements, documentation standards, investigation processes, and settlement procedures for claims involving SBA employee negligence or wrongful acts.

Americans would be worse off if deleted because this provides a clear, standardized process for citizens to seek compensation when harmed by SBA employee negligence. Without these procedures, victims would face uncertainty about filing deadlines, documentation requirements, and how to navigate government claims processes, potentially leaving many uncompensated for legitimate injuries.

This regulation implements the Small Business Investment Company (SBIC) program, creating a complex framework for SBA-licensed entities to provide financing to small businesses with government guarantees. It includes extensive definitions, capital requirements, investment restrictions, leverage rules, and compliance obligations governing these government-subsidized investment vehicles.

The SBIC program distorts capital allocation through government guarantees, creating moral hazard that encourages risky investments backed by taxpayers. The $2 trillion+ annual regulatory burden includes this complex 185,000-page framework that favors politically-connected firms over genuine market competition. This unconstitutional federal intervention in private capital markets assumes a market failure that doesn't exist—private venture capital and angel investing already efficiently allocate billions to small businesses. The program's unseen costs include crowding out private investment, misallocating resources through bureaucratic criteria, and exposing taxpayers to losses while claiming to help the very small businesses that bear disproportionate compliance burdens.

This regulation outlines the ethical conduct standards for employees of the Small Business Administration (SBA), including rules for avoiding conflicts of interest, reporting malfeasance, and restrictions on providing SBA assistance to certain individuals or entities.

The regulation's complexity and breadth create a significant burden on SBA employees and the public, with potential for unintended consequences and regulatory capture. The costs of maintaining and enforcing this regulation likely outweigh any benefits, and its deletion would simplify the regulatory landscape and promote a more efficient use of resources.

This regulation defines agents who represent applicants and participants in SBA programs, establishes rules for who may conduct business with SBA, outlines prohibited activities and ethical violations that can lead to suspension or revocation of privileges, and sets requirements for compensation agreements between agents and applicants/lenders.

Creates unnecessary bureaucratic overhead for small business assistance programs, imposes complex compliance requirements that disproportionately burden small businesses, and establishes a regulatory framework that could be replaced by simple contractual arrangements and market-based reputation systems without government oversight.

SBA FOIA processing rules covering request submission, component responsibilities, expedited processing, fee structures, and commercial information protections under federal transparency law.

Americans would be worse off without this regulation as it ensures government transparency, enables public oversight of SBA activities, and provides structured access to federal records that would otherwise remain hidden from citizens and businesses.

The SBA is a federal agency that provides financial assistance, counseling, and advocacy to small businesses, including disaster relief. It operates through a hierarchical structure with headquarters, regional, district, and branch offices, and maintains an official seal for authentication purposes. The agency follows federal law for its operations and contracts, uses OMB-approved forms, and coordinates with state and local governments on intergovernmental matters.

The SBA represents federal overreach into areas that should be handled by state and local governments. Small business assistance and disaster relief are not federal responsibilities under the Constitution's enumerated powers. The agency creates regulatory compliance costs, distorts market incentives, and enables crony capitalism through preferential lending programs that crowd out private capital.

This regulation establishes the legal framework for book-entry securities issued by the Resolution Funding Corporation, governing how these securities are issued, transferred, and maintained through the Federal Reserve's automated book-entry system. It defines key terms, establishes transfer procedures, and sets rules for adverse claims, security interests, and payment mechanisms for Funding Corporation securities.

This regulation creates a complex bureaucratic framework for managing federal securities that adds unnecessary compliance costs and legal complexity without providing meaningful public benefits. The book-entry system and associated regulations impose significant administrative burdens on financial institutions while creating a specialized legal framework that could be replaced by simpler, more market-based mechanisms. The extensive definitions and procedural rules add regulatory overhead that ultimately gets passed to taxpayers and investors, while the complex adverse claim and security interest provisions create legal uncertainty that could be handled through standard commercial law.

The Depository Institution Management Interlocks Act prohibits management officials from serving two non-affiliated depository organizations simultaneously if it would have an anticompetitive effect.

The regulation imposes unnecessary barriers to competition by restricting the movement of management officials between institutions. This can hinder the efficient allocation of talent and increase compliance costs, particularly for smaller institutions. The unseen costs include reduced innovation and potential market distortions, as well as the burden of compliance on smaller banks and credit unions. The regulation's stated purpose of fostering competition is better achieved through market forces and antitrust laws.

FDIC regulation establishing procedures for suspending and excluding contractors from FDIC contracts based on misconduct such as felonies, fraud, conflicts of interest, or poor performance, with due process protections including notice, response, hearings, and appeals.

Americans would be worse off without it: FDIC requires a structured, fair mechanism to protect taxpayer-funded contracts from fraud, waste, and conflicts of interest in bank resolution activities. Deletion would lead to arbitrary debarment decisions or, conversely, the inability to remove corrupt or incompetent contractors, increasing risks to the Deposit Insurance Fund. The rule's costs are borne by voluntary government contractors, not households, and provide essential due process absent in ad hoc alternatives.

This FDIC regulation restricts and prohibits certain compensation and indemnification payments to institution-affiliated parties (IAPs) of depository institutions and holding companies. It limits 'golden parachute' payments (contingent termination compensation) for troubled institutions and their affiliates, with narrow exceptions. It broadly prohibits indemnifying IAPs for penalties in enforcement actions but allows advancement of legal expenses with board approval and repayment agreement, and permits purchasing insurance (excluding judgments/penalties). The rule requires regulatory consent for many payments and establishes procedures for waiver requests, while explicitly stating approvals don't bind receivers in failure.

This regulation violates the foundational principle of contractual freedom between private parties—banks and their executives/shareholders—by dictating the terms of compensation and indemnification agreements. The federal government has no constitutional authority to micromanage internal corporate governance and employment contracts, which are properly governed by state corporate law and market discipline. The compliance burden falls disproportionately on smaller institutions, raising barriers to entry and protecting larger incumbents. Supposed benefits—reducing moral hazard and protecting assets—can be achieved through shareholder oversight, state law, and market forces without federal intervention. The rule's complexity creates a compliance drag on the banking sector, ultimately increasing costs for consumers while doing nothing to address the root causes of bank failures or regulatory overreach.

Mandates that FDIC-supervised institutions file Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) with FinCEN for insider abuse, transactions ≥$5,000 with identifiable suspects, transactions ≥$25,000 regardless of suspect, or transactions ≥$5,000 that may involve money laundering or Bank Secrecy Act violations. Reporting required within 30-60 days, with confidentiality and safe harbor provisions.

This regulation creates a vast, mandatory surveillance apparatus that transforms banks into government informants. The SAR regime imposes massive compliance costs on financial institutions—costs ultimately borne by customers—while violating financial privacy and creating arbitrary reporting thresholds that ensnare innocent transactions. Fighting fraud and theft does not require a secret, centralized reporting system; law enforcement can obtain specific information through subpoenas based on probable cause. The regulation's expansion of the Bank Secrecy Act institutionalizes guilt-by-suspicion and violates the principle that citizens are not required to report their neighbors' activities to the state.

This regulation establishes minimum fitness and integrity standards for FDIC employees and contractors, including criminal background checks, financial responsibility requirements, and post-employment restrictions for senior examiners to prevent conflicts of interest with banks they previously supervised.

Americans would be worse off if FDIC employees could have criminal convictions, financial irresponsibility, or immediate post-employment conflicts with banks they regulated. The regulation ensures the agency maintains public trust and prevents regulatory capture by establishing basic integrity standards for those handling taxpayer-backed deposit insurance.

Federal regulation requiring detailed disclosures for consumer leases of personal property (over 4 months). Mandates specific format, timing, and content including payment schedules, cost breakdowns, early termination terms, and advertising rules. Preempts inconsistent state laws unless state provides greater consumer protection.

Federalizes state contract law, imposing heavy compliance costs on small leasing businesses. Complex, prescriptive requirements create barriers to entry and protect incumbents without evidence disclosures improve consumer outcomes. Information asymmetries better addressed through market competition and state-level regulation.

This regulation prohibits management officials from serving on the boards of two nonaffiliated depository institutions if they operate in the same community, same metropolitan area (with asset thresholds), or both have over $10B in assets. It defines key terms, outlines exemptions for small deposit share, minority-owned institutions, or new banks, and provides a 15-month transition period when interlocks become prohibited.

The regulation arbitrarily restricts voluntary business relationships based on location and asset size, reducing managerial flexibility and competition without proving tangible consumer benefits. Compliance imposes administrative burdens on small institutions, distorts market entry, and reflects regulatory capture by shielding incumbent banks from qualified talent mobility. The anticompetitive harm it seeks to prevent is speculative and unquantified, while the unseen costs — reduced talent mobility, higher staffing costs, and diminished governance diversity — harm market efficiency and consumer choice. The same goals could be achieved through transparency, not prohibition.