Browse regulations

Prohibits cigarette sales to minors in Treasury Department federal buildings, including vending machine sales and free samples, with exceptions for designated areas that exclude minors.

This regulation represents federal overreach into local property management decisions. Building managers should determine their own smoking policies without federal micromanagement. The costs of compliance and enforcement are non-trivial, and the regulation creates unnecessary bureaucracy while achieving minimal public health benefits that could be handled at state/local level.

Implements Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act by prohibiting federal executive agencies from discriminating against individuals with disabilities in programs, services, facilities, and employment. Requires accessibility, auxiliary aids, effective communication, and establishes complaint procedures.

Americans would be worse off because it ensures disabled citizens can access federal programs and services on equal terms, preventing their unjust exclusion from government benefits and employment. Unlike regulations imposing costs on private parties, this governs only federal operations and is a proper constraint on government itself.

This regulation governs when PBGC employees can testify or produce documents in legal proceedings where PBGC is not a party. It establishes a centralized approval process through the General Counsel, requires employees to decline testimony if not authorized, and provides procedures for authenticated record requests.

This regulation creates unnecessary bureaucratic overhead for a narrow administrative function. The Freedom of Information Act already provides adequate mechanisms for document requests, and employees can be held accountable through existing ethics rules without this specialized approval process. The costs of compliance - time spent on approvals, potential delays in legal proceedings, and administrative burden - outweigh any marginal benefits, especially since similar processes already exist for other federal agencies.

PBGC Privacy Act procedures for individual record access, amendment, and exemption of certain systems from disclosure requirements

Creates bureaucratic infrastructure for government record-keeping on individuals without clear necessity. The exemptions allow PBGC to withhold information about individuals, undermining transparency. The compliance costs and privacy intrusions outweigh any benefit from centralized pension data management. Private sector alternatives exist for retirement security.

PBGC FOIA rules implementing federal Freedom of Information Act requirements, establishing procedures for public access to records, fee schedules, and appeal processes.

FOIA transparency enables public oversight of pension benefit guarantees and prevents regulatory capture by ensuring citizens can access agency records, policies, and proceedings.

Implements ERISA provisions for multiemployer pension plans that terminate by mass withdrawal, requiring annual benefit valuations, potential benefit reductions, and insolvency procedures to protect guaranteed benefits through PBGC assistance.

Creates massive moral hazard by allowing plans to avoid fiscal responsibility through PBGC bailouts, socializing losses while privatizing gains. Forces taxpayers to subsidize union pension failures, distorts labor markets by protecting failing multiemployer plans from competitive pressure, and violates federalism by federalizing what should be state/local pension matters.

Procedures for multiemployer pension plans to apply for financial assistance from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) under section 4261 of ERISA, providing government bailouts to financially troubled pension plans.

Creates moral hazard by bailing out mismanaged pension plans, distorts market discipline, imposes costs on taxpayers and well-run plans, and perpetuates unsustainable practices rather than allowing market corrections. The unseen effects include reduced incentives for prudent management and delayed necessary reforms, ultimately harming the very workers it claims to protect by enabling continued irresponsibility.

This regulation establishes notice requirements and financial assistance procedures for multiemployer pension plans that become insolvent, requiring plan sponsors to notify the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC) and affected parties when plans cannot pay promised benefits, along with filing actuarial valuations and potentially applying for government financial assistance.

This regulation creates a costly federal safety net that distorts pension funding incentives, encourages underfunding by guaranteeing bailouts, and imposes compliance burdens on businesses. It federalizes what should be state/local retirement matters and enables moral hazard where plan sponsors can make unrealistic promises knowing taxpayers will ultimately cover shortfalls.

This regulation establishes procedures for arbitration of withdrawal liability disputes under ERISA, including arbitrator selection, hearing processes, award rendering, and cost allocation.

This regulation creates a complex bureaucratic framework for resolving labor disputes that could be handled through existing contract law and court systems. The elaborate arbitration procedures add unnecessary compliance costs and legal complexity, particularly burdening small businesses with specialized regulatory requirements that don't serve a compelling public interest.

Establishes procedures for multiemployer pension plan sponsors to obtain PBGC approval before adopting certain plan amendments under ERISA sections 4201-4219. Requires submission of detailed information including actuarial valuations and certifications of notice to employers and unions. PBGC has 90 days to act, with suspension allowed for additional information; failure to act within the period results in automatic approval.

This regulatory process imposes significant compliance costs and delays on multiemployer pension plans attempting to adapt to changing economic conditions. The approval requirement creates a federal bottleneck for private contractual modifications, distorting incentives and raising barriers to plan flexibility. The unseen burden falls disproportionately on smaller plans and ultimately on the workers and businesses that rely on these plans. ThePBGC's role as insurer already creates moral hazard; adding a pre-approval process for plan amendments unnecessarily increases administrative overhead without demonstrably improving outcomes, as market discipline and fiduciuciary duties should govern plan changes. This is classic federal overreach into private agreements, violating the principle that laws and regulations must be knowable and not create impenetrable bureaucracies.

This regulation implements ERISA's withdrawal liability regime for multiemployer pension plans. It calculates employer obligations when exiting such plans, with special 'mass withdrawal' rules when all or substantially all employers leave. It defines terms, sets interest rates, prescribes notice requirements, and allocates unfunded vested benefits among withdrawing employers. The regime forces employers to pay shares of unfunded pension liabilities they didn't necessarily create and removes the 20-year payment cap in mass withdrawal scenarios.

This regulation imposes ruinous, unpredictable liabilities on businesses, especially small ones, creating massive barriers to entry and distorting market competition. The mass withdrawal provisions force financially healthy employers to shoulder unfunded obligations from failed competitors and past bargaining partners—a violation of freedom of contract and individual responsibility. The complex compliance burden acts as a hidden tax, while insulating failing pension arrangements from market discipline, stifling capital reallocation to more productive uses. This central planning of private pension liabilities exceeds proper governmental authority and violates federalist principles by federalizing what should be state contract law matters.

ERISA regulations governing multiemployer pension plan withdrawal liability allocation methods, including statutory methods (presumptive, modified presumptive, rolling-5, direct attribution) and modifications for surcharges, contribution increases, benefit reductions, and plan mergers.

Creates massive regulatory burden on businesses with complex compliance requirements, distorts labor markets through pension fund obligations, and enables union-controlled retirement systems that burden non-union employers. The unseen costs include reduced job creation, higher consumer prices, and distorted capital allocation away from unionized industries.

Regulation establishes complex federal rules governing when and how employers that partially withdraw from multiemployer pension plans can have their withdrawal liability reduced or waived. It defines specific thresholds (e.g., 90% contribution base unit maintenance for two consecutive years), creates a formal application and determination process for plan sponsors, allows posting bonds/escrow in lieu of payments during review, and permits limited plan-specific amendments with PBGC approval.

This regulation imposes substantial compliance costs on businesses—particularly small employers—and pension plan administrators through its labyrinthine formulas, bond/escrow requirements, and mandatory PBGC approval processes for plan amendments. It overrides freedom of contract by dictating withdrawal terms that private parties should negotiate themselves, creates rigid federal standards that ignore localized circumstances, and adds yet another layer of bureaucratic oversight to ERISA's already bloated framework. The market already provides sufficient incentives: withdrawing employers negotiate exit terms with unions/plans or face reputational damage and inability to secure future labor, making federal formulaic mandates unnecessary and economically harmful.

This ERISA regulation governs withdrawal liability for employers who completely withdraw from multiemployer pension plans and later reenter. It provides a mechanism for eligible employers to apply for abatement (waiver) of their withdrawal liability if they resume covered operations with at least 30% of their previous contribution base units. The rule requires a 70% bond/escrow during the abatement determination and prescribes complex formulas for calculating liability on subsequent withdrawals, treating the reentered employer as essentially 'starting fresh' while adjusting others' allocations. It also covers partial withdrawals post-reentry and has provisions for pre-effective-date withdrawals.

This regulation creates a substantial moral hazard by allowing employers to withdraw from underfunded multiemployer pension plans (socializing losses onto remaining employers and the PBGC) and then reenter with abated liability after merely resuming 30% of prior operations. The 70% bond/escrow requirement is insufficient protection given the potentially massive unfunded vested benefits. The complex allocation adjustments distort the economic reality that reentering employers should bear their fair share of existing pension debt. More fundamentally, federal involvement in micromanaging private pension plan withdrawal formulas represents an improper federalization of what should be purely contractual matters between employers, unions, and plan participants. The rule creates compliance costs and litigation incentives while undermining the pay-as-you-go funding discipline that multiemployer plans require. States and the free market should determine the optimal structure for retirement benefits without federal mandates that protect withdrawing employers at the expense of remaining participants.

This regulation establishes the formula for calculating a credit against withdrawal liability when an employer partially withdraws from a multiemployer pension plan more than once, preventing double-charging for the same unfunded vested benefits while protecting remaining employers. The calculation method varies by the plan's allocated unfunded vested benefits method (presumptive, modified presumptive, rolling-5, direct attribution, or alternative), involving unamortized liabilities, fractions based on prior liability, and adjustments for any prior reductions or waivers.

The regulation imposes substantial compliance costs through complex actuarial calculations, distorts employer decisions by creating punitive exit penalties from multiemployer plans, and entrenches federal overreach into private contractual arrangements. The legitimate goal of preventing double-charging can be achieved far more efficiently through simplified default rules or contractual provisions among plan participants, without necessitating a sprawling administrative framework that increases barriers to business flexibility and competition.