Browse regulations

NASA alternative protest procedure for procurement, allowing bidders to protest to contracting officer or request independent review by Assistant Administrator for Procurement. Decisions are final and not subject to internal appeal. Dismisses protests pending in court or already filed with GAO.

Creates unnecessary bureaucratic layer, increasing administrative costs and complexity for both NASA and bidders. Duplicates existing GAO protest mechanism, imposes hidden tax burden, raises barriers for small businesses, and risks inconsistent decisions leading to more litigation.

NASA procurement regulations governing payment terms, progress payments, advance payments, and fund limitations for fixed-price contracts, including specific provisions for small business programs, launch services, and international transactions.

These regulations create unnecessary bureaucratic complexity and compliance costs for contractors while imposing arbitrary payment percentages (85-100%) that distort market incentives and protect large contractors from competition. The rules micromanage commercial payment practices and fund management that should be determined by market forces and contract negotiations, not federal mandates.

Requires contracting officers to include the clause at 1852.231-70, Precontract Costs, in contracts where specific coverage of precontract costs is authorized. This establishes standardized terms for reimbursing costs incurred before contract award.

Americans would be worse off without this because inconsistent treatment of precontract costs would lead to disputes, contract delays, and either overpayment or underpayment, all wasting taxpayer money. The clause achieves its desired outcome—fair and efficient handling of authorized precontract costs—in a way that would be hard to replicate through ad hoc decisions. The rule provides certainty and reduces negotiation costs for both government and contractors.

Federal regulation governing how government contractors calculate and invoice for Facilities Capital Cost of Money (FCCOM) - essentially reimbursement for the time value of money invested in capital assets under construction for government contracts. It specifies detailed accounting methods, interim vs final billing calculations, Treasury rate determinations, and capitalization rules for this imputed financing cost.

This regulation inflates government contract costs through guaranteed reimbursement of opportunity costs that should be embedded in competitive bids. It forces taxpayers to subsidize contractors' capital costs via a Byzantine accounting regime that generates compliance expenses while creating no public benefit. Contractors can and will price their cost of capital into bids without this bureaucratic overlay. The mandated FCCOM calculations add complexity, create opportunities for gaming, and protect contractors from market discipline - classic regulatory capture that taxes the public to benefit a narrow industry segment.

Prescribes when government contracting officers must insert specific insurance and liability clauses in federal contracts, covering third-party liability, aircraft risks, and cross-waivers for space operations, to allocate risk between the government and contractors.

Deletion would risk inconsistent risk allocation, potentially leaving the government uninsured against large third-party liabilities in high-value contracts (aircraft, space) and undermining international space agreements that rely on uniform cross-waivers. The mandatory insertion ensures baseline taxpayer protection and mission continuity in a way that discretionary guidelines alone cannot reliably achieve.

NASA's Privacy Act rule specifies scope: applies to contractors maintaining systems of records for NASA missions; excludes contractors' own employee records and educational records from training contracts that are commingled with other student records.

Deletion would create uncertainty, leading to either over-compliance (imposing unnecessary costs on businesses) or under-compliance (weakening privacy). This rule's clear exceptions target the Privacy Act narrowly to government mission records, preserving normal business/educational functions—a precision that would be costly and unpredictable without explicit regulation.

NASA regulation requiring mandatory drug and alcohol testing for contractor employees in sensitive or mission-critical positions; mandates insertion of specific clauses in contracts over $5M, with compliance tied to contract payments and debarment; includes related safety provisions for work on federally-controlled facilities.

Americans would face unacceptable risks to life and billions in assets from impaired personnel in high-stakes space missions. The regulation achieves safety through narrowly tailored, contractually agreed standards that would be prohibitively costly and inconsistent if negotiated individually; deletion would leave NASA unable to enforce basic fitness-for-duty standards.

The regulation mandates inclusion of FAR clause 52.222-1 in all solicitations and contracts above the simplified acquisition threshold, requiring contractors to notify the government of any labor disputes that may affect contract performance.

The clause imposes compliance costs (monitoring, reporting) on contractors and invites government intervention into private labor relations, chilling legitimate negotiations and distorting the free market. The blanket mandate applies regardless of actual risk, increasing transaction costs and extending federal overreach without clear benefit to the public.

Regulation defines phased acquisition and progressive competition procedures for federal procurement and mandates insertion of specific FAR clauses in solicitations and contracts under certain conditions.

Imposes unnecessary rigidity on procurement processes, increasing administrative burden and legal complexity. The mandated clauses contribute to the FAR's labyrinthine nature, raising barriers to entry for small businesses and increasing compliance costs.

NASA-specific procurement provisions for bid invitations, including caution to offerors, grouping for aggregate award, full quantities requirements, pre-bid conference provisions, and prohibition on telephonic bids

These are narrow administrative procedures that create compliance overhead without meaningful consumer protection or market benefits. They micromanage government contracting processes rather than allowing agencies to adapt to modern communication methods and competitive dynamics. The prohibition on telephonic bids is particularly anachronistic in the digital age.

This regulation authorizes NASA to enter into multi-year 'anchor tenancy' contracts with commercial space ventures, where the government guarantees to purchase sufficient quantities to make the venture viable. It requires that the product meets NASA's mission needs, is cost-effective, obtained through competition, has identified non-government customers, has long-term viability without continued government support, and involves private capital at risk. Contracts are limited to 10 years, fixed-price, and allow termination for contractor failure.

This regulation institutionalizes corporate welfare through guaranteed government markets, distorting true market signals and creating dependency. The requirement that 'long-term viability is not dependent upon continued Government market' is contradicted by the entire anchor tenancy premise—the government is explicitly providing the market anchor. This misallocates capital by propping up ventures that cannot attract sufficient private investment on their own merits. The fixed-price, multi-year commitments bind future Congresses and taxpayers, violating fiscal sovereignty. True space commercialization emerges from competitive markets responding to consumer demand, not from guaranteed government purchase commitments that socialize risk while privatizing potential gains.

Regulation governs responsibility determinations for Canadian Commercial Corporation (CCC) subcontractors and debarment/suspension procedures for NASA procurement, including waiver of third-party information protection agreements for administrative services contracts.

This regulation creates unnecessary bureaucratic complexity in government procurement, particularly the waiver allowing NASA to bypass standard information protection agreements. The third-party waiver increases risk of data breaches and intellectual property theft while creating inconsistent standards. The responsibility determination procedures add redundant oversight layers that slow procurement without clear benefit to taxpayers.

Internal procurement regulation requiring contracting officers to include clause 1852.208-81 in contracts with printing/duplicating requirements exceeding a threshold. The clause imposes restrictions on printing activities.

No constitutional necessity; imposes compliance costs on contractors for administrative minutiae that market competition and agency budget discipline would better control. Creates barriers for small printers and duplicators bidding on federal work, violating equal protection under regulatory burden. The restrictions represent micro-management of contract performance that belongs in contract terms, not regulation.

NASA policy requires annual forecasting and semiannual updates of contract opportunities, specifically including those accessible to small businesses and disadvantaged individuals, with public availability via NASA's website. The regulation defines contract opportunities as planned new awards exceeding the simplified acquisition threshold and classes of contracts as groupings by value or nature of supplies/services.

This regulation creates bureaucratic overhead without meaningful benefit. The forecasting requirement adds compliance costs and administrative burden to NASA procurement without evidence that it improves small business participation beyond what competitive bidding already achieves. The information is already publicly available through standard procurement processes, making this redundant regulation an unnecessary constraint on agency operations.

FAR 6.202 provides authority to exclude specific sources from federal procurement contracts, either partially or entirely, to ensure competition or achieve other procurement objectives.

Source exclusion authority creates bureaucratic discretion that enables cronyism and protectionism. It allows agencies to arbitrarily block competitors from government contracts, raising costs and reducing innovation while providing no clear benefit over existing competition laws.