Browse regulations

Establishes jurisdiction and criminal code for Midway Atoll National Wildlife Refuge, a remote federal territory. Incorporates federal regulations, Hawaii criminal law, and common law. Grants broad executive powers to Regional Director for enforcement, and enumerates specific prohibited behaviors including disorderly conduct, loitering, prostitution, alcohol violations, and traffic violations.

These regulations duplicate and extend criminal law onto a remote federal possession with virtually no permanent population. The costs of maintaining a regulatory enforcement apparatus for a tiny atoll (staff numbering in the dozens) outweigh any marginal safety benefits. Federal criminal law already applies under the special maritime jurisdiction (48 U.S.C. 644a); importing Hawaii's entire criminal code creates unnecessary complexity and enforcement burden. The enumerated offenses (loitering, disorderly conduct, public intoxication) are minor quality-of-life rules inappropriate for a remote wildlife refuge primarily used for conservation and limited research. The Regional Director's sweeping powers—including detention, evacuation, and quarantine authority—are disproportionate to the actual risks on an isolated atoll with minimal human presence. This represents regulatory overreach: creating a miniature legal code where simple federal enforcement and existing maritime criminal jurisdiction would suffice.

This regulation governs the Surface Transportation Board's application process for motor passenger carrier mergers, acquisitions, and transfers of control. It imposes detailed filing requirements, public notice and comment procedures, and a vague 'public interest' standard that must be satisfied before voluntary business transactions can proceed.

This represents unacceptable government control over voluntary business transactions. The 'public interest' standard is a subjective, expansionary loophole that enables regulatory capture and blocks efficiency-enhancing consolidations. The process imposes significant compliance costs and delays while delivering no benefits that market competition and existing antitrust law cannot provide. It protects incumbents from competition—exactly the Hayekian 'fog of incentives' that distorts resource allocation.

This regulation establishes procedures for requesting waivers and exemptions from Federal Motor Carrier Safety Regulations (FMCSRs), including pilot programs to test alternative safety approaches. It covers commercial motor vehicles and allows temporary relief from specific safety requirements for up to 3 months (waivers), up to 5 years (exemptions), or up to 3 years (pilot programs).

This regulation creates bureaucratic overhead and delays for safety-related exemptions that could be handled more efficiently through existing agency discretion. The multi-step application process with 60-180 day review periods adds unnecessary compliance costs and creates uncertainty for businesses. Safety assessments should be handled by FMCSA experts without requiring extensive documentation and public comment periods for routine operational flexibility.

Requires passenger railroads and hosting freight railroads to adopt FRA-approved emergency preparedness plans with detailed training, equipment, simulation, and coordination requirements.

The regulation imposes substantial compliance costs—training, simulations, equipment, record-keeping—that divert resources from actual safety improvements. Railroads already face strong incentives (liability, reputation) to maintain adequate emergency procedures; the prescriptive federal mandate stifles innovation, disproportionately burdens smaller operators, and represents unconstitutional federal overreach into state and private domains, with unseen effects including higher consumer costs and reduced competition.

This FRA regulation prescribes minimum requirements for wireless communications during railroad operations to ensure safety. It applies to railroads on the general system, requiring working radios on locomotives, communication redundancy, testing, standardized radio procedures, and restrictions on personal and railroad-supplied electronic devices to prevent distraction. It also mandates hazard reporting, record-keeping, and training, with civil penalties for violations and a waiver process.

Deletion would raise the risk of catastrophic accidents due to communication failures and distracted operations. Federal standards are essential for ensuring reliable, interoperable communications across interstate railroads, a coordination problem that private markets cannot adequately address due to externalities. The regulation's specific protocols and device restrictions directly mitigate these safety risks, and the societal benefits of prevented disasters far outweigh compliance costs.

This regulation (49 CFR Part 213) establishes minimum federal safety standards for railroad track in the general railroad system, including track classification (Classes 1-5), geometry requirements (gauge, alignment, surface, elevation), crosstie and rail specifications, inspection protocols, qualified personnel requirements, speed limits, and penalty provisions. It excludes plant railroads, tourist operations, and disconnected rapid transit.

The regulation imposes massive compliance costs on railroads—particularly small operators—while duplicate private safety incentives already exist through liability, insurance markets, and customer demand. The hyper-technical specifications (e.g., exact crosstie spacing, cant deficiency calculations) prevent adaptive, context-appropriate maintenance and create barriers to entry that protect incumbent railroads from competition. Federal overreach violates Tenth Amendment principles: track safety is a local concern best governed by states or private contract, not one-size-fits-all federal mandates. The unseen costs include stifled innovation, resource misallocation toward paperwork rather than actual safety, and regulatory capture where incumbents shape rules to exclusionary effect.

NASA procurement regulations governing proposal evaluations, outside evaluator participation, special Government employee appointments, late proposal considerations, clause insertions, certified cost or pricing data waivers, profit policies, make-or-buy programs, and unsolicited proposal handling.

These internal procedural rules create significant compliance burdens, multiple approval layers, and arbitrary thresholds that slow procurement, increase transaction costs, and distort incentives. They attempt to solve problems—corruption, inefficiency, lack of accountability—that arise from government intervention itself. The knowledge problem prevents central planners from designing optimal processes; market discretion and transparency (not bureaucratic checklists) would yield better outcomes. Many provisions, like special employee appointments and multi-tiered disclosure approvals, add red tape without commensurate benefits that cannot be achieved more simply through term limits, post-employment bans, and robust whistleblower protections.

This regulation establishes simplified acquisition procedures for federal contracts, requiring fixed-pricing (with exceptions) and providing a consolidated certification form for non-commercial acquisitions above the micro-purchase threshold, with special alternates for environmental, research, and data rights provisions.

Americans would be worse off without this regulation because it reduces, not increases, administrative burden by consolidating certifications into a single form and standardizing simplified procedures. Deleting it would create a vacuum likely filled by fragmented, duplicative paperwork requirements across agencies, increasing compliance costs for small businesses and taxpayers. The fixed-price requirement also protects against cost overruns. This exemplifies good regulatory design: streamlining existing processes rather than imposing new burdens.

DOE procurement regulations governing proposal evaluation, disclosure restrictions, and profit/fee determination for construction and non-construction contracts, including weighted guidelines for profit objectives and procedures for using non-Federal evaluators.

Creates excessive bureaucratic overhead for contractor evaluation processes, imposes costly compliance requirements on small businesses, and establishes profit determination procedures that distort market pricing mechanisms and protect incumbent contractors from competition.

This DoD regulation establishes procedures for acquiring utility services (electricity, gas, water, etc.) from regulated and non-regulated suppliers. It defines key terms, outlines applicability, sets rules for connection charges, compliance with independent regulatory bodies, and specifies required contract clauses. It governs how the military purchases utilities, including specific provisions for third-party financed projects and multi-year contracts.

This internal procurement regulation adds to the 185,000-page CFR burden without addressing a clear market failure or protecting fundamental rights. The DoD could use standard commercial contracting practices instead of these micro-management rules. The regulation imposes compliance costs on utility suppliers and contributes to bureaucratic complexity that could be eliminated without harming military readiness, as the agency could procure utilities efficiently using existing general contract frameworks. The rule represents the type of incremental regulatory accretion that cumulatively imposes a $2 trillion hidden tax on Americans.

This regulation establishes limitations and prohibitions on using the lowest price technically acceptable (LPTA) source selection procedures for federal procurement, particularly for defense contracts. It restricts LPTA use based on factors like technical complexity, innovation potential, and product type, while requiring documentation and life-cycle cost analysis when LPTA is permitted.

This regulation creates bureaucratic barriers to cost-effective procurement while failing to achieve its stated goal of protecting quality. The complex restrictions actually increase compliance costs and administrative burden without meaningfully improving outcomes. Market forces and contractor reputation naturally discourage poor quality, making these prescriptive rules unnecessary. The exceptions and limitations create a labyrinth of compliance requirements that waste taxpayer resources while preventing agencies from using the most straightforward procurement method when appropriate.

This MARAD regulation implements cargo preference laws by requiring U.S.-flag vessel operators to submit detailed cost data for government approval of 'fair and reasonable' rates. It establishes complex formulas calculating operating costs, capital costs (depreciation, interest, return on equity), port/cargo handling expenses, and 8.5% overhead. The government essentially sets cost-plus rates for vessels carrying U.S. government cargo, guaranteeing operators cover expenses plus returns.

This regulation is corporate welfare disguised as rate oversight. The 'fair and reasonable' rate calculation eliminates market competition in determining prices for government cargo, guaranteeing U.S.-flag operators cost-plus returns regardless of efficiency. Taxpayers bear inflated shipping costs that would be lower in competitive bidding. The detailed reporting requirements create a significant compliance burden, especially for small operators, while the capital cost formulas encourage overinvestment in U.S.-flag capacity. The 8.5% overhead bonus incentivizes expense inflation. MARAD's rate-setting embodies the knowledge problem Hayek warned of - bureaucrats cannot determine appropriate rates better than market forces. This protectionist subsidy program directly contradicts free enterprise principles and transfers wealth from taxpayers to maritime interests. Eliminating it would reduce costs, bureaucracy, and market distortions.

Establishes the National Commission on Libraries and Information Science (NCLIS), a federal advisory body composed of presidential appointees and ex officio members, tasked with advising government on library services, coordinating implementation, conducting studies, and evaluating library resources and programs.

Federal bureaucracy intruding on local/state domain with no constitutional basis; taxpayer funding for advisory role that markets, charities, and state/local governments can perform more efficiently; represents unnecessary expansion of federal government that increases complexity and costs without adding liberty or prosperity.

Establishes procedures for responding to litigation-related requests for official information from Corporation for National and Community Service employees, including service of process, document production, and testimony restrictions.

Creates unnecessary bureaucratic barriers to legal process that increase litigation costs and delay justice. The restrictions on employee testimony and document production protect agency interests at the expense of due process and transparency, while the complex approval procedures create inefficiencies that harm both plaintiffs and defendants seeking legitimate information.

Implements the Age Discrimination Act for NEA-funded programs, prohibiting age-based exclusion or denial of benefits. Includes exceptions for normal operations, statutory objectives, and factors other than age with substantial relationship to program goals. Requires recipients to conduct self-evaluations, maintain records, and provide access to NEA. Establishes complaint, mediation, investigation, and enforcement procedures including fund termination.

Compliance burdens disproportionately impact small arts nonprofits, raising barriers to entry and chilling legitimate age-based programming (e.g., youth orchestras, senior theater). The enforcement bureaucracy invites frivolous complaints and regulatory capture, while the unseen costs include reduced program diversity and innovation. Age discrimination can be adequately addressed through state laws and market discipline without this expensive federal overlay.