Browse regulations

Establishes minimum standards of integrity and fitness for contractors, subcontractors, and their employees performing services on behalf of the FDIC. Includes disqualification criteria (felony convictions, removal from banking, pattern of defalcation, substantial losses to Deposit Insurance Fund), conflict of interest rules, ethical responsibilities, confidential information protection, and certification requirements.

The FDIC insures deposits and manages failed banks with taxpayer backing; contractors handle sensitive financial data and influence asset dispositions. These standards protect the Deposit Insurance Fund from fraud, conflicts, and mismanagement. The regulation is narrowly limited to voluntary FDIC contractors, uses clear objective criteria, provides waiver flexibility, and imposes minimal burden that is justified by the critical public interest in safeguarding the financial system.

Establishes FDIC procedures for collecting debts owed to the United States from federal employees, FDIC employees, other persons, and civil money penalty debtors through administrative offset, salary offset, and other collection mechanisms.

This regulation creates a federal debt collection bureaucracy that extends government reach into private finances through administrative wage garnishment and salary offsets, imposing compliance costs on businesses and individuals while eroding due process protections for debtors.

Procedural rulebook for FDIC filing submissions, public notice/comment, hearing processes, and decision-making standards for applications, notices, and requests.

This is not a substantive restriction on liberty or enterprise but a procedural framework ensuring transparency, public participation, and due process in FDIC actions. Without such rules, agency decisions would be arbitrary and unaccountable, violating rule of law principles. The minimal compliance burden is necessary for orderly government and actually protects regulated entities from capricious treatment.

Regulation W implements Sections 23A and 23B of the Federal Reserve Act by defining affiliate relationships and imposing quantitative limits (10% per affiliate, 20% aggregate) and collateral requirements on covered transactions between member banks and their affiliates to prevent the diversion of bank resources and protect depositors.

Deleting this regulation would eliminate critical safeguards against the misuse of bank resources for affiliate benefit, increasing moral hazard and the likelihood of bank failures and systemic crises that harm depositors and taxpayers; the quantitative limits and collateral requirements provide a clear, enforceable framework that market discipline cannot replicate given the government safety net.

This OCC regulation governs debt cancellation contracts (DCCs) and debt suspension agreements (DSAs) offered by national banks, setting federal standards that preempt state law. It defines these products, prohibits tying and misrepresentations, requires specific disclosures (oral short-form, written long-form), mandates refunds for unearned fees, requires offering both lump-sum and payment plan options, and imposes risk management requirements. The regulation includes detailed procedural rules for obtaining customer consent, with special provisions for telephone, mail, and electronic solicitations.

The regulation imposes substantial hidden costs on consumers through compliance burdens that banks pass along, while preempting state contract law and substituting bureaucratic standards for market discipline. Consumer protection is better achieved through state fraud enforcement, competition, and reputation mechanisms. Federal standards stifle innovation, raise barriers to entry, and rest on the fatal conceit that regulators can design superior disclosure and contract terms for diverse market participants. The Tenth Amendment reserves contract law to the states; this federal overreach distorts banking markets and increases costs without offsetting benefits.

This regulation implements the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) by establishing complex rules for political party committees handling federal vs. non-federal election funds. It creates three account types (Federal, Levin, non-Federal), prohibits national committees from using non-federal funds, provides extensive definitions of 'solicitation' and 'agent,' and regulates interactions with tax-exempt organizations to prevent corruption and ensure compliance with campaign finance limits.

This regulation imposes massive compliance costs on political speech, creates a labyrinthine bureaucratic structure that only wealthy incumbents can navigate efficiently, and rests on the flawed premise that spending money on political advocacy is corrupting—a direct assault on First Amendment rights. The complex account segregation requirements, solicitation definitions spanning 2 pages of examples, and agent control tests create prohibitive barriers for grassroots organizations and small party committees while doing nothing to prevent the actual quid pro quo corruption the government claims to address. True reform would be eliminating these restrictions entirely, allowing transparent political spending without federal micromanagement.

This regulation (10 CFR Part 35) establishes a comprehensive federal licensing and oversight regime for the medical use of byproduct material (radioactive materials) in treatments like radiation therapy. It defines detailed personnel qualification requirements (Radiation Safety Officers, authorized medical physicists, nuclear pharmacists, authorized users), mandates specific licensing applications and amendments, imposes extensive record-keeping and reporting obligations, and sets safety protocols for various forms of radiation treatment including teletherapy and brachytherapy. It operates alongside state 'Agreement State' programs but establishes minimum federal standards that licensees must meet.

Constitutionally invalid federalization of medical practice - the Tenth Amendment reserves regulation of medical care and professional licensing to the states. The federal government lacks enumerated authority to license doctors, pharmacists, and medical physicists or to regulate treatment protocols within state borders. The regulation imposes massive hidden compliance costs (likely billions annually) that disproportionately harm small medical practices and reduce access to cutting-edge radiation therapies, while providing minimal marginal safety benefit beyond existing state medical board oversight, tort liability, and professional self-regulation. It exemplifies regulatory mission creep that distorts markets, raises barriers to entry, and undermines federalism—all while creating a complex, incomprehensible bureaucracy that no physician can fully navigate, violating the rule of law principle that rules must be knowable. The unseen costs include suppressed medical innovation, reduced rural healthcare access, and erosion of constitutional boundaries that protect liberty.

This USDA/APHIS regulation establishes a federal Chronic Wasting Disease (CWD) Herd Certification Program for farmed and captive deer, elk, and moose. It mandates animal identification, movement restrictions, testing, recordkeeping, and herd plans to control CWD spread. The program includes federal indemnity payments for destroyed animals and requires cooperation between federal and state authorities.

The regulation imposes significant compliance costs that disproportionately burden small cervid operations, creates a centralized bureaucratic system that overrides local knowledge and state authority, and federalizes what should be state animal health functions under the Tenth Amendment. Indemnity payments create moral hazard by socializing losses, while complex rules raise barriers to entry and protect established industry players from competition—exactly the regulatory capture von Mises warned about.

Defines terms and delegates enforcement powers to immigration officers under the Immigration and Nationality Act, establishing a 100-mile 'reasonable distance' border zone, arrest/search authority, subpoena power, and other law enforcement capabilities.

Creates an unconstitutional 100-mile border zone covering ~65% of US population, granting immigration officers broad arrest/search powers far from actual borders with minimal oversight. The vague standards invite mission creep, diminish Fourth Amendment protections, and violate Tenth Amendment federalism principles by federalizing vast areas of traditional state/local concern. The unseen costs—constitutional erosion, potential for abuse, and expanded federal power—far outweigh any marginal enforcement benefits.

Procedural regulations governing how the public can request and access records from the Foreign Agricultural Service under the Freedom of Information Act, including contact information, available record systems, request procedures, and appeals process.

This regulation enables transparency and citizen access to government information—the opposite of the regulatory burden problem. Without such procedures, FOIA rights would be meaningless as agencies could ignore requests. Deleting this would make government operations more opaque and reduce accountability, harming Americans who have a legitimate interest in understanding what their government does. The modest administrative cost of maintaining a FOIA office is outweighed by the fundamental importance of an informed citizenry in a free society.

The Noninsured Crop Disaster Assistance Program (NAP) provides government disaster payments to farmers growing crops not eligible for federal crop insurance, covering losses exceeding 50% of yield or value from natural disasters. Farmers pay service fees and optional premiums for buy-up coverage, with the program administered by the Farm Service Agency through local committees, including special rules for native sod, organic crops, and beginning farmers.

NAP forces taxpayers to subsidize private farming risks, distorting agricultural markets and creating moral hazard. This violates limited government principles and Tenth Amendment federalism. The program imposes billions in hidden costs through administrative overhead, compliance burdens, and inefficient resource allocation while protecting uncompetitive producers from market discipline.

This regulation establishes the federal Sugar Program administered by the Farm Service Agency and Commodity Credit Corporation. It provides nonrecourse loans to sugar processors (allowing forfeiture of sugar to the government if prices fall below loan rates), sets marketing allotments (production quotas) for domestic sugar, mandates extensive data collection from processors and importers, and administers inventory disposition. The program effectively guarantees minimum prices for sugar producers while limiting domestic production.

The Sugar Program imposes massive hidden costs on American consumers by artificially raising sugar prices 2-3x above world levels—a regressive tax that harms low-income families and all food manufacturers. It violates constitutional federalism by centrally controlling agricultural production, distorts market signals preventing efficient resource allocation, and exemplifies regulatory capture—concentrated benefits to a few sugarcane/beet producers at the expense of 330 million consumers. The loan forfeiture mechanism and marketing quotas create perverse incentives, misallocate capital, and have spawned costly trade disputes. This is not a legitimate government function but corporate welfare that violates founding principles of liberty and free enterprise.

The Milk Income Loss Contract (MILC) program provided financial assistance to dairy operations when Boston Class I milk prices fell below $16.94 per hundredweight, with payments calculated as a percentage of the price differential and adjusted for feed costs. The program operated from 2007-2012 with production limits of 2.4-2.985 million pounds per fiscal year and required extensive documentation, contracts, and compliance with various eligibility requirements.

This dairy subsidy program distorted market signals by artificially propping up milk prices, creating dependency among producers while imposing significant compliance costs on small operations. The program's complex eligibility requirements and documentation burden disproportionately harmed small dairy farmers while benefiting larger operations that could navigate the bureaucratic maze. Market forces should determine dairy prices rather than federal price supports that ultimately raise consumer costs and reduce supply efficiency.

Federal program providing marketing assistance loans and loan deficiency payments for cotton producers, with eligibility requirements, loan rates, storage conditions, and classification procedures.

This program represents agricultural price supports that distort market signals, create dependency on government subsidies, and artificially prop up cotton prices. It interferes with free market price discovery, benefits large producers disproportionately, and violates principles of limited government by using taxpayer funds to guarantee prices for a specific commodity.

Provides marketing assistance loans and loan deficiency payments for specific agricultural commodities, administered by USDA's Commodity Credit Corporation to support farm income and stabilize commodity prices

Federal price support programs distort market signals, create moral hazard, and transfer taxpayer funds to farmers based on political rather than economic criteria, undermining free market agriculture and constitutional federalism