Browse regulations

Establishes financial responsibility and risk allocation requirements for commercial space launches and reentries, mandating insurance coverage and liability waivers to protect third parties and government property from potential damages caused by licensed space activities.

Creates excessive regulatory burden on commercial space industry with mandatory insurance requirements and complex liability frameworks that raise barriers to entry and increase costs without clear evidence of improved safety outcomes. The regulatory framework distorts market incentives and protects incumbents while making it harder for new entrants to compete in the space launch market.

This regulation governs SBA-sponsored activities including cosponsored events, fee-based activities, and non-fee-based activities, establishing requirements for agreements, budgeting, participant fees, gift acceptance, and conflict of interest determinations to support small business assistance programs.

Creates bureaucratic overhead for small business assistance activities, imposes complex compliance requirements that could deter beneficial partnerships, and establishes redundant approval processes that slow down the delivery of services to small businesses.

Imposes a one-year employment ban on NCUA senior examiners from accepting compensation from credit unions they examined, defines 'senior examiner' criteria, provides narrow exemptions, and establishes penalties

This 'revolving door' restriction violates economic liberty by imposing a government-mandated blackout period on voluntary employment contracts. It assumes guilt, prevents mutually beneficial exchanges, and restricts the efficient allocation of expertise. The unseen costs include: preventing credit unions from accessing experienced talent, creating a regulatory employment blacklist, and expanding federal power over private contracts beyond constitutional bounds. Regulatory integrity would be better maintained through transparency requirements and enhanced conflict rules for active employees—not coercive post-employment restrictions that punish ordinary citizens for potential conflicts.

This regulation establishes procedures for credit union mergers and insurance conversions, covering merger approval processes, member voting requirements, insurance termination/conversion, and disclosure obligations. It governs both federal and state credit unions and includes specific requirements for independent entity voting, financial disclosures, and member notifications.

This regulation represents unnecessary federal micromanagement of credit union operations that should be handled by state authorities or private contracts. The extensive disclosure requirements, voting procedures, and NCUA oversight create compliance costs that burden small credit unions without providing commensurate benefits to members. State credit unions are already subject to state supervision, making federal oversight redundant and an unconstitutional overreach of federal power.

This regulation establishes safety and soundness requirements for Farmer Mac, a government-sponsored enterprise, including board oversight of investment management, interest rate risk, and liquidity reserves, along with detailed definitions and eligibility criteria for non-program investments.

This regulation creates excessive regulatory burden on a GSE that should operate with market discipline rather than federal micromanagement. The extensive compliance costs, detailed reporting requirements, and restrictions on investment activities distort market signals and protect incumbent players while raising barriers to entry. The regulation's complexity serves bureaucratic interests rather than public benefit, and Farmer Mac's special status should not justify such intrusive federal oversight that undermines free market principles.

This FDIC regulation provides detailed restrictions on insured state nonmember banks' foreign investments and branch operations, defining permissible equity holdings, listing 18 specific authorized activities, setting complex capital-based investment limits, and imposing extensive reporting requirements for foreign organizations and branches.

This regulation imposes massive hidden costs through compliance bureaucracy, violates federalism by micromanaging state-chartered banks, creates barriers to entry protecting incumbent large banks, and substitutes central planning for market discipline. Americans would be better off with simpler, outcome-based capital and risk management requirements that allow banks to pursue profitable foreign opportunities while bearing full consequences of their decisions. The FDIC's legitimate interest in protecting the insurance fund does not require this level of prescriptive control over specific activities.

This regulation identifies Federal Reserve officers and employees subject to post-employment restrictions under section 10(k) of the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (FDI Act). It defines 'senior examiners' and imposes a one-year ban on accepting compensation from institutions they supervised, with penalties for violations.

The costs of keeping this regulation include the potential for over-regulation and the burden it places on former Federal Reserve employees, who may face unnecessary restrictions on their future employment. The regulation also adds complexity to the hiring process for financial institutions, potentially deterring qualified candidates from taking on supervisory roles at the Federal Reserve. Additionally, the regulation may not effectively prevent conflicts of interest, as determined by the market and individual ethics, rather than arbitrary government restrictions.

Prohibits creditors from obtaining or using medical information in credit eligibility determinations, with narrow exceptions. Medical information is defined broadly to include any health-related data, and the rule permits use only for specific purposes like verifying debts, compliance with laws, fraud prevention, medical-purpose loans, or consumer-requested accommodations. Even when allowed, medical information must be treated no less favorably than comparable non-medical information, and creditors may not consider the consumer's health condition or prognosis.

This regulation interferes with voluntary contracting between lenders and borrowers, imposing costly compliance burdens while distorting risk assessment. Lenders should be free to evaluate all relevant information—including medical circumstances—when determining creditworthiness. Market competition, not federal mandates, will punish irrational discrimination: any lender rejecting creditworthy applicants based on health status alone would lose business to competitors. The rule's chilling effect actually reduces credit access for those with medical conditions, as lenders fear regulatory scrutiny. Moreover, it exceeds constitutional federalism by imposing a one-size-fits-all federal mandate on traditionally state-regulated lending. The $2 trillion regulatory burden grows unnecessarily with such micro-management of private transactions.

This regulation establishes the U.S. Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board's procedures for handling Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests, including submission requirements, fee structures, exemptions, appeal processes, and business submitter protections.

Deleting this would undermine transparency and accountability in nuclear waste technical reviews, removing standardized procedures that ensure public access to critical safety information while providing clear fee structures and appeal rights. Without it, the Board could arbitrarily deny requests, creating a black box around an area of significant public health and environmental risk.

This regulation implements civil penalty procedures under the Atomic Energy Act for DOE contractors and subcontractors who violate classified information security requirements. It establishes a enforcement framework with severity levels (I-III), investigation procedures, preliminary/final notices of violation, hearing rights before an ALJ, and penalties up to $187,668 per violation. Applies only to entities voluntarily contracting with DOE for nuclear work.

This regulation serves a core, legitimate federal function—protecting nuclear secrets vital to national survival. It applies narrowly to contractors who voluntarily choose to work with DOE, not to the general public or unrelated businesses. The enforcement framework includes procedural safeguards (hearing rights, burden of proof, judicial review) and a nuanced penalty structure that considers culpability, history, and severity. The compliance costs are borne by those who accept federal contracts with full awareness of these requirements. Unlike most regulations that distort markets, this one addresses a catastrophic risk (nuclear terrorism/espionage) where the potential harm dwarfs any administrative burden. The alternative—relying on contract provisions alone—would lack standardized, transparent enforcement mechanisms and uniform security standards across the nuclear complex.

DOE policy for investigating research misconduct (fabrication, falsification, plagiarism) in projects funded by DOE contracts or grants. Requires recipients to implement misconduct policies; DOE refers allegations to OIG or program offices for investigation using preponderance-of-evidence standard.

Americans would be worse off without it: taxpayer-funded research would lack accountability, enabling fraud that wastes billions and erodes public trust in science. The rule achieves its outcome efficiently by leveraging existing institutional compliance frameworks and OIG independence—removing it would create an honor system inadequate for protecting public investments in critical research.

Regulation under the Agricultural Bioterrorism Protection Act governing possession, use, and transfer of high-risk biological agents and toxins (select agents) to prevent bioterrorism and accidental releases, with registration, security, and reporting requirements plus exemptions for diagnostics, nonviable agents, and approved products.

Deleting this would leave the U.S. extremely vulnerable to catastrophic bioterrorist attacks or accidental releases of pathogens that could kill millions and collapse agricultural and public health systems; the compliance costs are trivial compared to the existential risks these agents pose, and the tracking/security framework is irreplaceable by private markets.

Federal loan and grant program providing zero-interest financing for rural economic development and job creation projects through intermediaries who relend to ultimate recipients

Federal intervention in rural economic development distorts market signals, creates dependency, and wastes taxpayer money on politically favored projects that private markets would fund if truly viable

Grants to private nonprofits for rural household water well and septic system loans, with income eligibility limits and revolving fund structure

Federal overreach into local infrastructure that states/localities could handle; creates regulatory complexity and compliance costs without clear constitutional basis for federal involvement in rural water systems

The RUS High Energy Cost Grant Program provides financial assistance (grants/loans) to communities with residential energy costs at least 275% above the national average to improve energy generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure. It defines eligibility, application procedures, use restrictions, and reporting requirements.

The program imposes significant taxpayer costs while distorting energy markets, creating dependency, and overstepping federal authority into state and local matters. It raises compliance burdens and fosters regulatory capture by subsidizing incumbent utilities rather than allowing market-driven solutions.