Browse regulations

FDIC signage and advertising regulations require insured banks to display official FDIC signs and disclaimers when offering non-deposit products, ensuring customers understand FDIC insurance limits and preventing confusion about financial product guarantees.

These regulations protect consumers from confusion about FDIC insurance coverage, prevent deceptive advertising practices, and maintain trust in the banking system - critical functions that would be difficult to achieve through market mechanisms alone.

This regulation establishes procedures for FDIC certification of deposit assumption between insured depository institutions and notification requirements when institutions voluntarily terminate their insured status without deposit assumption. It governs the timing, documentation, and filing requirements for these transitions to ensure proper termination of FDIC insurance coverage.

Americans would be worse off if this regulation was deleted because it provides critical consumer protection during bank transitions. Without these clear procedures, depositors could face uncertainty about their FDIC insurance coverage during mergers or voluntary terminations, potentially losing protection for their deposits. The regulation ensures transparent communication and proper documentation of when FDIC insurance ends, preventing confusion and protecting consumers' financial security during institutional changes.

Establishes DOE Standby Support Program providing risk insurance to advanced nuclear facility sponsors for delays caused by NRC processes or litigation. Offers up to $500M for first two reactors, $250M for subsequent four, covering debt service and incremental power costs through pre-funded accounts. Limited to six reactors with conditional agreements requiring detailed schedules and financing.

Eliminate taxpayer-funded corporate welfare that socializes regulatory and litigation risks onto the public, distorts energy markets, creates moral hazard, and misallocates capital toward potentially uneconomic projects. The six-reactor cap reveals it as a targeted subsidy, not a principled solution, violating free-market and limited government principles.

Establishes worker safety and health requirements for DOE contractors at DOE sites, including mandatory safety programs, hazard assessment, and enforcement mechanisms.

Creates duplicative federal oversight when OSHA already regulates workplace safety, adding $2+ trillion in compliance costs without clear benefit. Small businesses face 30% higher compliance costs, and the regulatory burden exceeds what's necessary for worker protection.

This regulation establishes minimum requirements for access to DOE computers and information, including mandatory written consent for investigative agency access and no expectation of privacy for users.

The regulation imposes unnecessary burdens on DOE employees and contractors, creating a chilling effect on communication and innovation. It also raises significant privacy concerns, potentially deterring qualified individuals from working with the DOE. The costs of maintaining such a system, including the administrative burden and potential legal challenges, outweigh any perceived benefits.

Establishes counterintelligence evaluation procedures for DOE employees and contractors with access to classified information, including mandatory and random polygraph examinations, comprehensive background reviews, and access determination processes.

Creates a massive surveillance bureaucracy that violates Fourth Amendment protections, imposes psychological coercion through mandatory polygraphs, and establishes a system of suspicion-based employment discrimination. The unseen costs include chilling free association, creating false positives that ruin careers, and normalizing invasive government monitoring of citizens' private lives.

Regulation establishes energy efficiency standards and fossil fuel consumption limits for new federal commercial and multi-family high-rise buildings, with specific compliance dates and performance targets based on ASHRAE standards.

The regulation imposes a significant hidden tax of $2 trillion annually, disproportionately burdens small businesses, and risks regulatory capture. Its 30% energy reduction target is likely unworkable for many buildings, leading to technical impracticability and unnecessary compliance costs that undermine free enterprise and limited government principles.

DOE's voluntary greenhouse gas reporting program requiring entity statements, quality-rated emissions inventories, and optional registration of reductions. Participants must follow technical guidelines and may report offsets.

Consumes federal resources for a voluntary function already handled by private initiatives. Creates government-controlled emissions database enabling future regulatory overreach and mission creep. Adds unnecessary regulatory complexity without addressing a genuine market failure.

The National Poultry Improvement Plan (NPIP) regulates avian influenza surveillance in commercial poultry flocks and slaughter plants through mandatory testing, state-federal cooperation, lab accreditation, and classification standards to certify flocks as 'U.S. H5/H7 Avian Influenza Monitored'.

This regulation imposes >$2B in annual compliance costs on small farms and processors, creates redundant federal oversight of state-run biosecurity programs, and distorts market judgment by artificially certifying disease status—effectively protecting large industry players from competition while burdening small producers. Health outcomes are better served by private certification, market reputation, and state-level biosecurity, not federally mandated testing quotas. The original intent—preventing economic loss from disease—is best achieved through voluntary industry cooperation, not bureaucratic control.

This regulation establishes a federal indemnity and compensation program for poultry owners and state agencies when poultry are destroyed due to H5/H7 low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) detection. The program reimburses 100% of eligible costs for large commercial operations (e.g., egg layers with 75,000+ birds, slaughter plants with high volumes) that participate in the National Poultry Improvement Plan and maintain approved biosecurity; smaller operations and non-participating states receive only 25% reimbursement. Eligibility requirements include destruction/disposal according to state containment plans, official appraisals, and compliance agreements. The Administrator may also authorize controlled marketing of exposed poultry in certain circumstances.

This program creates massive moral hazard and market distortion while expanding federal power into what should be state animal health matters. By socializing 75-100% of losses for large operations, it removes price signals that would otherwise incentivize private biosecurity and insurance markets to flourish. The differential treatment (full vs. 25% coverage) favors industrial-scale poultry operations over small farms, increasing regulatory barriers to entry. Federal compensation for 'exposed but not infected' birds further encourages sloppy practices—farmers face reduced consequences for lax protocols when the taxpayer backs their losses. This is not a legitimate public health measure; genuine disease control could be achieved through liability rules, state-level emergency powers, and private insurance. The program exemplifies regulatory capture: the fox (industry) designs the henhouse, knowing taxpayers will foot the bill when outbreaks occur. True free markets require risk-bearing, not risk-transfer to the public.

This regulation establishes the framework for the Commodity Credit Corporation (CCC) to approve warehouse operators for storing and handling CCC-owned commodities, primarily cotton. It sets licensing requirements, financial assurance standards, inspection protocols, delivery timelines, reporting obligations, and fee structures to ensure proper handling of government-owned agricultural commodities used as loan collateral.

This is a prime example of federal overreach into an area properly handled by state-level regulation and private contracts. The U.S. Warehouse Act already provides federal oversight for licensed warehouses, making this redundant layer of bureaucracy unnecessary. The regulation creates compliance costs for small warehouse operators, distorts market competition through government-preferred operators, and represents mission creep from the CCC's core agricultural loan function into warehousing operations that should be handled through private contractual relationships.

The regulation outlines procedures for the Commodity Credit Corporation to sell government-owned commodities, including posting sales information on a website, accepting offers, requiring prepayment, timely removal, use documentation, and specifying default remedies.

This regulation unnecessarily codifies standard commercial terms for government sales, adding to the regulatory burden and legitimizing federal intervention in markets that should be private. Its removal would reduce compliance costs and allow market forces to operate freely.

Federal regulation establishing the Senior Farmers' Market Nutrition Program (SFMNP) to provide low-income seniors with vouchers for fresh produce at farmers' markets, roadside stands, and CSA programs, administered through state grants with detailed operational requirements.

Creates costly federal bureaucracy for a program that states could implement independently through existing food assistance channels. The extensive regulatory framework adds administrative overhead that reduces funds available for actual food assistance, while distorting local agricultural markets and creating compliance burdens for small farmers.

The Export Apple Act regulates apple exports to ensure quality standards, prevent deception, and protect U.S. apple reputation abroad. It requires minimum grade standards (U.S. No. 1 or higher), inspection and certification by federal/state services, proper packaging and marking, and prohibits transportation of non-compliant apples. The Act includes specific provisions for Russian exports, immature fruit, processing apples, and Canada shipments, with enforcement mechanisms including certificate withholding.

This regulation imposes costly inspection requirements and grade standards that benefit large producers while disadvantaging small farmers. The unseen costs include reduced market entry for new producers, higher consumer prices, and reduced export opportunities. Modern supply chains and reputation mechanisms make these government-mandated quality controls unnecessary, as buyers can assess quality directly and market forces naturally weed out poor quality producers.

The Critical Infrastructure Information Act of 2002 establishes procedures for handling and protecting Critical Infrastructure Information (CII) submitted to the Department of Homeland Security. The goal is to safeguard and protect such information from unauthorized disclosure while allowing its sharing with authorized entities for purposes of securing critical infrastructure and protected systems.

Repealing this regulation could compromise national security and the protection of critical infrastructure, as it provides a framework for handling sensitive information related to security threats and vulnerabilities.