Browse regulations

Federal regulation establishing fitness-for-duty (FFD) programs for nuclear facility personnel with access to sensitive areas or materials, requiring drug/alcohol testing, background checks, and behavioral monitoring to ensure personnel are fit to work in nuclear power plants and facilities handling strategic special nuclear material (SSNM).

Americans would be worse off if this regulation was deleted because nuclear facilities would lack standardized safety protocols to ensure personnel operating critical systems, handling radioactive materials, or maintaining security are not impaired by drugs, alcohol, or other fitness issues that could cause catastrophic accidents affecting public health and safety.

This regulation establishes procedures for determining net weight compliance and allowable variations for meat and poultry products, incorporating NIST Handbook 133 and 44 standards for weighing and measuring devices.

This regulation creates unnecessary compliance costs and bureaucratic oversight for basic weighing operations that private industry already handles through market mechanisms and existing quality control. The NIST standards referenced are voluntary industry guidelines that businesses already follow to maintain customer trust and avoid liability, making federal enforcement redundant. Small processors face disproportionate compliance burdens while large corporations can absorb these costs, creating market barriers. The revolving door between USDA and large meat packers suggests regulatory capture, where rules protect incumbents rather than consumers.

Comprehensive federal agricultural payment limitation regulations governing eligibility, attribution, and compliance across multiple USDA programs including ARC, PLC, CRP, NAP, and disaster assistance programs, with detailed definitions of farming operations, contribution requirements, and administrative procedures.

Creates a complex bureaucratic maze that distorts agricultural markets, enables regulatory capture through complex compliance requirements, and artificially limits farm size and efficiency through arbitrary payment caps that harm both large and small producers while increasing compliance costs for all.

This regulation establishes a Sorghum Promotion, Research, and Information Board under the Commodity Promotion, Research, and Information Act of 1996. It creates a mandatory checkoff program where sorghum producers and importers pay assessments to fund generic promotion, research, and information activities administered by a USDA-appointed Board composed of sorghum producers and potentially importers.

This regulation imposes a mandatory tax on sorghum producers and importers to fund centralized marketing decisions that should be made voluntarily in the marketplace. It violates free association by forcing all industry participants to fund generic promotion regardless of their individual preferences, creates regulatory capture risks where the Board may favor certain producers, and distorts market competition. The $2 trillion+ regulatory burden includes such agricultural checkoffs that protect incumbents while raising barriers to entry. The unseen costs include forcing producers to subsidize competitors' marketing and concentrating economic power in a politically-appointed bureaucracy, contrary to free enterprise principles.

Establishes the National Honey Board, a government-administered checkoff program funded by mandatory assessments (currently $0.015/lb) on honey first handlers and importers to conduct promotion, research, and industry information activities. The Board consists of 10 industry representatives appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture and has authority to spend collected funds on marketing campaigns, research projects, and related programs to benefit the honey industry.

This is a classic agricultural checkoff program that violates core free market principles: it forces compulsory association and taxation on a specific industry without representation, creates a regulatory capture vector where industry insiders control government spending, and distorts market competition by funding collective marketing that benefits incumbents over smaller competitors. The government has no legitimate role in promoting private products—voluntary industry associations can provide these services more efficiently without violating liberty or creating compliance burdens. The program exemplifies the 'seen vs unseen' costs Mises warned of: while benefits to large honey producers are visible, unseen costs include stifled innovation, forced funding of unwanted activities, and unconstitutional expansion of federal power into pure commerce.

This regulation mandates that dairy product manufacturers (cheese, butter, dry whey, nonfat dry milk) submit detailed weekly sales reports and monthly storage reports to USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service. The data is used to establish minimum prices for Class III and IV milk under federal milk marketing orders. Manufacturers processing less than 1 million pounds annually are exempt. Reports must include specific product details (grade, packaging, age) and exclude certain sales. AMS aggregates and publishes the data weekly. Enforcement includes cease and desist orders and civil penalties.

This regulation imposes a compliance burden that acts as a hidden tax on dairy manufacturers, distorts market incentives through government-mandated reporting, and enables price controls that violate the free market price mechanism. The federal milk marketing order system—which this reporting supports—represents a New Deal-era intervention that Hayek would recognize as the fatal conceit: central planners cannot process the dispersed knowledge needed to set milk prices. The regulation also invades business privacy by forcing disclosure of proprietary sales data. Even if repealed, private market reporting services would naturally emerge to provide price transparency where demand exists, without government coercion or attendant distortions.

The Dairy Forward Pricing Program allows dairy handlers to enter into forward contracts with producers, exempting contract milk from minimum price requirements under federal milk marketing orders. The program establishes definitions, contract requirements, and protections against coercion, with contracts limited to 2026-2029.

This regulation distorts dairy market pricing by allowing handlers to contract around minimum price requirements, creating two-tiered pricing systems that favor large operations. It undermines the federal milk marketing order system's goal of price stability and fair compensation, while adding regulatory complexity that small producers must navigate. The coercion protections are insufficient against market power imbalances, and the program ultimately reduces price transparency and market efficiency in dairy markets.

Establishes NRCS policy for Plant Materials Centers (PMCs) that assemble, test, release, and distribute plant materials and technology for conservation and environmental purposes across multiple land uses including agriculture, wildlife, urban development, and recreation.

Federal plant materials research and distribution exceeds constitutional authority, duplicates state agricultural research capabilities, and creates unnecessary bureaucratic overhead. State universities, agricultural experiment stations, and private sector nurseries can provide these services more efficiently without federal intervention.

Federal plant health regulations that establish quarantine procedures for fruit flies and other plant pests, including interstate movement restrictions, certification requirements, and special need exceptions for state-level additional restrictions.

Creates unnecessary barriers to agricultural commerce and state sovereignty. The federal quarantine system imposes costly compliance burdens on farmers and shippers while states could effectively manage plant health through their own inspection programs without federal interference.

Mandates large meatpackers report detailed livestock transaction data twice daily to USDA, including prices, quantities, and sale terms. USDA aggregates and publishes data with confidentiality protections and may adjust reported figures to prevent perceived market distortions.

Imposes substantial compliance costs that raise consumer prices, disadvantages small packers, centralizes market information in government hands with dangerous manipulation potential, and overrides voluntary market mechanisms that would provide superior data without coercion.

Establishes standards for REAL ID-compliant driver's licenses and identification cards, including digital certificates, mobile driver's licenses, and verification systems for federal acceptance purposes

Creates unnecessary federal bureaucracy over state ID systems, imposes costly compliance burdens on states, and expands federal surveillance capabilities through digital certificate infrastructure

This regulation governs outside employment for employees of the United States Commission on Civil Rights, requiring advance written approval from the Designated Agency Ethics Official (DAEO) for most non-federal employment activities, with exceptions for volunteer services in certain nonprofit organizations. It establishes standards for approval based on compliance with ethical conduct regulations and requires notification of supervisors and the General Counsel for specific activities.

This regulation creates unnecessary bureaucratic barriers to employment freedom, imposing costly compliance requirements on government employees while providing minimal public benefit. The approval process generates administrative overhead, delays career opportunities, and restricts voluntary exchange between willing parties. Private sector employers and employees can self-regulate through market mechanisms and existing employment law without federal micromanagement of outside work arrangements.

18 U.S.C. 207 restricts former federal employees from representing private parties before the government on matters they personally handled while in office, preventing unfair use of government connections and knowledge. The law creates a permanent cooling-off period on specific matters where the former employee had substantial involvement.

Americans would be worse off if this regulation was deleted because it prevents former government officials from exploiting insider knowledge and connections to benefit private clients, which would erode public trust in government and create unfair advantages for those with access to former officials.

This regulation, 5 CFR Part 894, establishes the Federal Employees Dental and Vision Insurance Program (FEDVIP). It defines eligibility terms (employee, annuitant, dependent, TEI, etc.), outlines enrollment periods and qualifying life events, specifies premium payment methods, and details administrative procedures for this voluntary benefit program covering federal workers, retirees, and certain military-affiliated individuals.

Retaining this regulation sustains a government-sponsored benefit program that imposes unnecessary administrative costs on taxpayers, creates inequitable advantages for federal employees not available to the general public, and distorts private insurance markets. The complex rule set contributes to the regulatory morass that undermines the rule of law and free enterprise, while the program itself could be replaced by private market solutions without government intermediation.

Federal regulation establishing suitability and fitness standards for federal employment, requiring background investigations, continuous vetting, and defining criteria for determining eligibility to work in competitive service, career Senior Executive Service, and excepted service positions.

Creates massive bureaucratic compliance burden exceeding $2 trillion annually, violating constitutional federalism by federalizing personnel decisions that should be state matters, and establishing invasive background check systems that erode privacy rights and due process protections for citizens seeking federal employment.