Browse regulations

Establishes a National Sheep Industry Improvement Center (NSIIC) with a Board of Directors to provide grants and financial assistance for sheep and goat industry development, infrastructure, and marketing through a revolving fund.

Creates a federal subsidy program that distorts agricultural markets, picks winners and losers among producers, and uses taxpayer funds to support a specific industry that should operate in free markets without government intervention.

Regulation supplements 5 CFR part 2635 for FHFA employees, prohibiting ownership of securities issued/guaranteed by regulated entities (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Federal Home Loan Banks) with exceptions for diversified funds; restricting outside employment with regulated entities and lobbyists; requiring disqualification/reporting when family members work for regulated entities; imposing post-employment restrictions on senior officials; and banning recommendations on securities and non-arm's-length purchases from regulated entities.

Deleting would remove essential conflict-of-interest safeguards in the oversight of systemically important housing finance entities. Regulators with financial stakes in Fannie/Freddie/FHLBs or future employment prospects could be incentivized to favor those entities over the public interest, increasing the risk of another financial crisis. The regulation achieves its anti-corruption goals through clear, enforceable rules with limited exceptions—a structured approach informal guidelines cannot replicate.

This regulation supplements federal ethics standards for FLRA employees, requiring prior written approval for outside employment and mandating written disqualification notices when conflicts of interest arise.

While it imposes administrative costs, these minimal safeguards prevent actual and perceived conflicts of interest in an agency that adjudicates sensitive labor relations matters affecting millions. Without such rules, employees' outside income could compromise impartial decision-making, undermining public trust and leading to corrupt outcomes that harm both workers and employers. The alternative—enforcing ethics post-hoc through criminal prosecutions—is far more costly to society than these ex-ante notice requirements.

SEC employee ethics regulations governing securities holdings, transactions, and outside employment to prevent conflicts of interest and maintain public trust in market oversight

These regulations prevent SEC employees from exploiting inside information or creating conflicts that could undermine market integrity - a core function that cannot be replaced by market mechanisms alone

This regulation establishes procedural rules for filing exceptions to arbitration awards under federal labor relations law, including timing requirements, service methods, content requirements, and grounds for review by the Federal Labor Relations Authority.

This regulation creates unnecessary bureaucratic complexity for labor arbitration proceedings. The extensive procedural requirements and multiple filing deadlines add compliance costs without providing commensurate benefits. Private sector labor disputes function effectively without such federal oversight, and these rules likely favor large unions and agencies over individual workers. The regulation also violates principles of federalism by federalizing what should be private contractual matters between employers and employees.

Regulation establishes the Reemployment Priority List (RPL) system for federal competitive service employees facing reduction in force (RIF) separation or recovery from work-related injury. It mandates that agencies give these employees hiring priority for most competitive service vacancies before considering external candidates. The rule defines eligibility criteria, registration procedures, selection methods (retention standing, numerical scoring, category rating), registration duration (2 years), and removal conditions.

Creates federal labor market distortion by prioritizing former insiders over potentially more qualified external applicants, including many veterans. Adds significant administrative burden and discourages necessary workforce restructuring. Protects minimally satisfactory performers, contributes to bureaucratic bloat, and violates merit-based hiring principles. Unseen costs include reduced productivity, innovation loss from lack of fresh talent, and demoralization of outside applicants. Benefits could be achieved more efficiently through enhanced severance or outplacement assistance without market distortions.

The EAC adopts OMB's nonprocurement debarment and suspension regulations (2 CFR part 180) to exclude persons from participating in EAC-funded transactions, extends coverage to subcontracts ≥$25,000/30%, and establishes appeals processes. The debarring official is the Contracting Officer (alternate: CFO). Excludes state grants from coverage.

This is bureaucratic overhead that imposes compliance costs on contractors, subcontractors, and grantees for a process that could be eliminated or simplified. The unseen costs include legal/administrative burdens, compliance chilling effect on small businesses, and regulatory capture risks where debarment could be weaponized. The 'benefit' of maintaining this complex federal-wide system is marginal compared to its hidden tax on economic activity. The exclusion of state grants creates inconsistent standards. The entire nonprocurement debarment regime (applied to grants/cooperative agreements) lacks constitutional foundation and represents federal overreach into areas states should manage.

This NEH regulation implements the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988 for NEH grant recipients, requiring them to maintain drug-free workplaces, report drug convictions to NEH, and include specific award terms. It gives regulatory effect to OMB guidance (2 CFR part 182) and establishes NEH-specific procedures.

This represents improper federal overreach into private workplace policies through funding conditions. The compliance burden—reporting requirements, administrative overhead, and conditional grant eligibility—discourages participation, especially by small organizations, while extending federal control into areas properly reserved to states under the Tenth Amendment. The unseen cost is chilling effect on grant applications and bureaucratic bloat added to every humanities project.

Regulation implements the Drug-Free Workplace Act for IMLS grant recipients, requiring drug-free workplace policies, employee drug conviction notifications, and establishing the IMLS CFO as the authorizing official for certain determinations. It incorporates OMB guidance (2 CFR part 182) and requires recipients to include specific drug-free workplace terms in award documents.

Conditional grants to museums and libraries unlawfully federalize workplace drug policy through spending power coercion. This violates Tenth Amendment federalism by imposing nationwide social controls on state and local institutions that could set their own reasonable policies. The unseen cost is reduced institutional autonomy, increased compliance burdens on small entities, and exclusion of rehabilitated individuals from federally supported cultural work—outcomes properly decided at local level, not by federal bureaucrats leveraging taxpayers' money.

Requires SSA grant recipients to maintain drug-free workplaces, notify SSA of employee drug convictions, and include a drug-free workplace clause in awards. It incorporates OMB guidance (2 CFR part 182) implementing the Drug-Free Workplace Act of 1988, applying uniform federal drug policy standards to all SSA grantees and awarding officials.

Imposes compliance costs and administrative burden on SSA grantees—many small nonprofits and state/local entities—distorting incentives and raising barriers to participation. Represents federal overreach into employment practices, a domain properly left to states and private actors under the Tenth Amendment. Creates unseen costs: organizations divert resources from mission-critical activities to satisfy federal drug mandates, and the one-size-fits-all approach may be ineffective or counterproductive for diverse grantees. The conditional spending requirement expands bureaucratic control beyond enumerated powers.

This regulation implements the Drug-Free Workplace Act for grants and cooperative agreements awarded by the Corporation, requiring recipients to maintain drug-free workplaces, notify the Corporation of employee drug convictions, and obtain agreements to comply with OMB guidance at 2 CFR part 182.

Deletion would break the uniform government-wide implementation mandated by law, creating inconsistency and enforcement gaps for federal grant recipients. The regulation ensures the Corporation can reliably prevent federal funds from supporting workplaces where illegal drug use is tolerated—a modest condition attached to voluntary grant acceptance that protects program integrity and public safety. The formal rule provides clear notice and enforceability that informal guidance cannot match.

Regulation adopts OMB nonprocurement debarment/suspension guidance for NRC, establishing procedures to suspend or debar entities from participating in NRC nonprocurement transactions (grants, agreements). It applies to participants, respondents, and NRC officials, requires flow-down to sub-awards, and designates the Director of Office of Administration as the debarring/suspending official.

It serves a necessary anti-fraud function by preventing debarred entities from accessing taxpayer funds; the procedural requirements are minimal and largely flow from existing OMB guidance, representing a reasonable safeguard against waste and abuse in federal spending.

This regulation implements federal drug-free workplace requirements for EPA grants, mandating compliance with OMB guidance and requiring recipients to certify drug-free workplaces as a condition of receiving federal funding.

This regulation imposes significant compliance costs on grant recipients without clear evidence of achieving its stated goal. The administrative burden falls disproportionately on small organizations and creates barriers to federal funding participation, while the effectiveness of drug-free workplace policies in improving grant outcomes remains unproven.

This regulation implements the Drug-Free Workplace Act for Department of Interior grants and cooperative agreements. It requires recipients to publish drug-free workplace statements, maintain awareness programs, notify agencies of employee drug convictions within 10 days, take personnel action or require rehabilitation within 30 days, and identify all workplaces where grant work occurs. Violations can result in suspended payments, terminated awards, or debarment for up to five years.

This regulation imposes significant compliance costs on countless small businesses, nonprofits, educational institutions, and local governments receiving even modest DOI grants—burdens 30% higher per employee for small firms. It federalizes workplace drug policy far from actual federal spending, using attachment conditions to regulate conduct with no nexus to proper federal purposes. The vague 'good faith effort' standard invites arbitrary enforcement, while existing federal/state criminal laws, workers' compensation, and private insurance already address workplace drug issues. The unseen consequences include discouraging hiring of rehabilitated individuals and creating barriers to entry for small competitors—exactly the anti-competitive effects Mises and Hayek warned of.

Regulation implements the Drug-Free Workplace Act for DOE grants, requiring recipients to maintain drug-free workplaces, report drug convictions, and follow OMB guidance.

Imposes compliance costs on all DOE grant recipients, including small businesses and nonprofits, for workplace policies better handled through private contracts and state laws. Adds to the regulatory burden without clear evidence of effectiveness, risks privacy violations, and may deter qualified organizations from seeking DOE funding. Federal overreach into workplace regulation violates federalism principles.