Browse regulations

Mandates specific contractual clauses for federal ship construction and repair contracts, covering inspection, payment, scheduling, liability, safety, and other operational requirements.

Imposes costly bureaucratic overhead on maritime industry without addressing actual market failures, creating compliance burdens that raise ship repair costs and protect large contractors while disadvantaging smaller firms.

Instruction to contracting officers to include standard contract clauses (period of performance and pre-bid conference provisions) in solicitations when applicable.

This procedural guidance contributes to regulatory bloat without adding substantive protections. The referenced clauses already exist in the FAR; contracting officers can include them based on standard procurement practices. Keeping it adds unnecessary pages to the CFR, increases training complexity, and exemplifies bureaucratic over-documentation that obscures rather than clarifies the rules.

This subpart prescribes Department of Commerce (DOC) forms supplemental to FAR Part 53, stating they may be obtained from DOC contracting offices and will not be illustrated in the CAR.

Purely administrative reference that adds zero substantive value. Increases regulatory complexity without achieving any meaningful outcome that cannot be handled internally by the agency. Trivial regulations like this contribute to the $2 trillion compliance burden and 185,000-page labyrinth, violating the principle that laws must be knowable.

The DOC Acquisition Manual (CAM) prescribes additional solicitation provisions and contract clauses beyond the FAR for Department of Commerce acquisitions. It includes standard clauses on contracting officer authority, payment releases, contracting officer's representative (COR) designation, printing/copying limits, organizational conflicts of interest, Title 13 data protection, best-value evaluations, and detailed proposal formatting requirements. Its purpose is to standardize and govern procurement practices within DOC.

This regulation imposes significant compliance costs on contractors, particularly small businesses, through duplicative and overly prescriptive clauses. The organizational conflict of interest provisions, printing restrictions, and detailed proposal formatting add transaction costs that create barriers to entry and protect incumbent contractors. The FAR already provides a comprehensive framework; agency-specific clauses like these thicken the regulatory swamp without clear justification, raising costs and reducing competition in violation of free enterprise principles.

CAM 1301.70 designates approval authorities for: (a) emergency obligations >$55,000 (non-delegable below secretarial level); (b) contract price-increase amendments without consideration; (c) indemnification for unusually hazardous/nuclear risks, including subcontracts.

Deletion would permit lower-level officials to approve large emergency obligations, price-increasing amendments, and hazardous risk indemnities without senior oversight, increasing waste, fraud, and taxpayer liability. The threshold-based non-delegation ensures proper scrutiny of high-value and high-risk commitments.

Regulation mandates reporting of suspected fraud in terminated contracts to OIG and requires legal review before default termination actions.

Deletion would lead to increased arbitrary terminations, fraud, and litigation costs, undermining rule of law in federal procurement.

Requires contracting activities to review contractor-submitted Value Engineering Change Proposals (VECPs) for technical feasibility, usefulness, and cost savings estimates, with recommendations to contracting officers and designates exemption authority in CAM 1301.70.

Creates bureaucratic overhead without demonstrable benefits - adds layers of review that delay cost-saving innovations, empowers technical personnel to second-guess contractors' engineering expertise, and establishes a regulatory framework where government bureaucrats become gatekeepers of private sector efficiency improvements rather than letting market forces determine value.

A procurement clause requiring contractors to be accountable for government-furnished property and follow DOC procedures for disposing of surplus property.

Without this clause, the government would lack contractual mechanisms to ensure proper stewardship of taxpayer-owned property handed to contractors, increasing risks of loss, misuse, and waste. The clause embeds clear accountability directly into contracts, which would be difficult to achieve through separate negotiations or ad hoc arrangements, especially given the government's massive procurement footprint.

Procedural regulation specifying which agency official can adjust the $25 million threshold for requiring contractor purchasing system reviews, referencing CAM 1301.70.

This bureaucratic minutia adds to the 185,000-page regulatory burden without protecting rights or addressing market failures; the underlying review authority would remain intact, and threshold adjustments occur through existing delegation mechanisms.

This regulation governs audit requirements for federal contract close-out, mandating close-out audits for cost-reimbursement contracts over $500,000 and allowing discretionary audits under specific circumstances. It also establishes delegations for CAO functions, postaward conference provisions, and indirect cost rate certification waivers.

Creates excessive administrative burden and compliance costs for government contractors without clear evidence of fraud prevention benefits. The $500,000 threshold and mandatory audit requirements distort market incentives, discourage small contractors from government work, and create a bureaucratic maze that protects large incumbents while increasing costs for taxpayers. Discretionary audit provisions already exist for fraud detection, making this regulation redundant.

Delegates authority to designees for specific energy savings contract decisions (shared energy savings, cogeneration), referencing internal manual CAM 1301.70 for designated officials.

Non-substantive cross-reference adding to regulatory volume without protecting liberty or property; internal delegations belong in agency manuals, not the Code of Federal Regulations, and contribute to the 185,000-page labyrinth that violates rule-of-law knowability.

This regulation mandates security and risk management procedures for IT procurement and software licensing at the Department of Commerce, requiring checklists, standard clauses, and documented risk assessments based on contractor system access levels.

Deletion would lead to inconsistent security practices, exposing government IT systems and data to avoidable risks. The regulation achieves its security objectives through mandatory standardized clauses, risk-based approaches, and required documentation, creating a uniform, auditable framework that would be difficult to replicate without binding requirements.

Sets security processing procedures for Department of Commerce contractors, requiring specific contractual clauses based on risk level and foreign national access.

Creates unnecessary bureaucratic overhead, duplicates existing security frameworks, and imposes hidden tax through higher contract prices; small businesses bear disproportionate compliance burden without clear security benefit beyond existing authorities.

Regulation governs architect-engineer procurement processes, including evaluation boards, selection authorities, and post-award price disclosure requirements for federal contracts.

Creates bureaucratic overhead with evaluation boards and selection processes that increase costs without clear benefits, while federal procurement of architect-engineer services should be handled through competitive market mechanisms rather than centralized regulatory frameworks.

Defines 'human subject' and 'research' for federally funded studies, requiring Institutional Review Board (IRB) review or exemption determinations. Mandates specific contract clauses (1352.235-70 through -73) based on whether human subjects involvement is anticipated, exempt, or requires IRB approval. Also includes unrelated agency procedural delegations.

Imposes high compliance costs, delays, and overbroad requirements that stifle research—especially by small entities and for low-risk studies. Federal one-size-fits-all mandates preempt state and institutional flexibility, creating unseen barriers to innovation and knowledge production that outweigh marginal ethical benefits.