Browse regulations

This regulation requires U.S. air carriers with aircraft seating more than 60 passengers to report incidents involving animal loss, injury, or death during air transport, including detailed incident descriptions, causes, corrective actions, and annual statistics on animal transportation safety.

This reporting requirement creates substantial compliance costs for airlines without demonstrable safety benefits. The $2+ trillion annual regulatory compliance burden includes countless such paperwork mandates that primarily benefit bureaucrats while providing minimal public value. Airlines already have strong market incentives to protect animals - negative publicity from animal incidents is devastating to business. This regulation exemplifies regulatory capture where government creates jobs for itself while imposing hidden taxes on consumers through higher fares.

Prohibits mortgage enterprises from passing through costs of housing trust fund allocations to mortgage originators through fees, charges, or reduced premiums.

Creates hidden subsidies and price distortions in mortgage markets. Forces enterprises to absorb costs that should be reflected in pricing, leading to inefficient capital allocation and reduced competition. The regulation masks true costs from market participants, preventing accurate price signals.

This regulation implements the Dodd-Frank Act's Section 15G credit risk retention requirements for securitizers. It mandates that sponsors retain at least 5% of the credit risk in securitization transactions, either through vertical interests, horizontal residual interests, or seller's interests in revolving pool securitizations. The rule includes extensive disclosure requirements, valuation methodologies, measurement calculations, and recordkeeping obligations for entities issuing asset-backed securities.

This represent quintessential regulatory overreach that violates core free market principles. The mandate overrides voluntary contractual arrangements between sophisticated parties, imposing one-size-fits-all requirements that ignore the diversity of securitization structures. The 5% retention floor is arbitrary—market participants, not bureaucrats, should determine appropriate risk alignment through negotiation. The voluminous disclosure and measurement requirements create massive compliance costs that fall hardest on smaller firms, protecting incumbents. The rule embodies the fatal conceit that central planners can design optimal financial engineering, when in reality the unseen costs—reduced liquidity, stifled innovation, and barriers to entry—dwarf any speculative benefits. Such micro-management of private contracts has no constitutional basis and represents exactly the type of federal overreach the Tenth Amendment forbids.

This regulation implements FHFA's supervisory authority over executive compensation at regulated entities (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Federal Home Loan Banks) and the Office of Finance. It establishes a structured process for submitting compensation information and requires FHFA Director approval for incentive awards, employment contracts, and termination benefits for executive officers, with specific advance notice requirements and review periods.

This regulation creates excessive bureaucratic control over private compensation decisions, imposing multi-month advance notice requirements and Director approval for employment contracts and incentive awards. It undermines market-based compensation mechanisms, creates regulatory capture opportunities where FHFA officials can influence executive hiring/firing decisions, and imposes compliance costs on financial institutions that ultimately get passed to consumers through higher mortgage rates and fees.

This regulation establishes procedures for the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) to grant waivers, approvals, non-objection letters, and regulatory interpretations to regulated entities like Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Federal Home Loan Banks. It defines key terms and sets out filing requirements for entities seeking regulatory relief or guidance from FHFA officials.

Creates a complex bureaucratic process for obtaining regulatory exceptions that enables regulatory capture and protects incumbent institutions. The system allows FHFA officials to selectively grant favors, creating an uneven playing field where only well-connected firms can navigate the waiver process. This adds compliance costs and uncertainty while preserving the fundamental problem of federal housing finance regulation itself.

This regulation requires securitizers to retain an economic interest in the credit risk of securitized assets, mandating 5% risk retention through various mechanisms including vertical interests, horizontal residual interests, or cash reserve accounts, to align incentives between originators and investors in asset-backed securities transactions.

This regulation imposes costly compliance burdens on financial institutions, distorts market incentives by forcing artificial risk retention that may not reflect actual economic risk, and represents federal overreach into complex financial markets where private parties are better positioned to assess and price risk. The unseen costs include reduced securitization activity, higher borrowing costs for consumers, and protection of large institutions from competition.

Volcker Rule prohibiting proprietary trading by banking entities and restricting investments in covered funds, with extensive definitions and exemptions.

Creates massive compliance burden on financial institutions, distorts market incentives, and fails to achieve its stated goal of reducing systemic risk while imposing costs on consumers through reduced credit availability and higher fees.

Establishes minimum liquidity and stable funding standards for FDIC-supervised institutions based on asset size, complexity, and systemic importance, requiring high-quality liquid assets and stable funding ratios to prevent bank runs and ensure financial stability.

Creates massive compliance costs and regulatory burden on financial institutions while potentially encouraging moral hazard by creating a false sense of security. The complex tiered system based on asset thresholds and cross-jurisdictional activity distorts market competition and raises barriers to entry for smaller banks. Federal regulation of bank liquidity exceeds constitutional limits under the Tenth Amendment, as banking is traditionally a state-regulated activity.

This regulation implements Section 14 of the Bank Holding Company Act, which limits financial companies from merging or acquiring other companies if the resulting entity's consolidated liabilities would exceed 10% of total financial sector liabilities. It establishes detailed accounting standards, reporting requirements, and exemptions for certain transactions to prevent excessive concentration in the financial sector.

This regulation represents unnecessary federal micromanagement of corporate mergers that distorts market competition and creates artificial barriers to business combinations. The 10% liability threshold is arbitrary and prevents efficient market consolidation, while the complex accounting rules create compliance burdens that disproportionately affect smaller financial institutions. States could handle merger oversight through antitrust laws, and market forces naturally limit excessive concentration through capital requirements and investor scrutiny.

This Federal Reserve regulation (12 CFR Part 249) imposes minimum liquidity coverage ratio (LQR) and net stable funding ratio (NSFR) standards on large bank holding companies, depository institutions, and designated nonbank financial companies. It requires holding high-quality liquid assets (HQLA) and stable funding based on complex formulas, with extensive definitions and discretionary authority for the Board to impose stricter requirements. Applies primarily to institutions with $50B+ in short-term wholesale funding or those designated as systemically important.

This regulation imposes massive hidden costs on the financial system, distorting normal market risk assessment and capital allocation. The complex formulas and discretionary powers create regulatory capture opportunities while raising barriers to entry that protect large banks from competition. The Fed cannot possibly determine optimal liquidity requirements for thousands of diverse institutions; market discipline through clearinghouses, private monitoring, and the threat of failure provides better outcomes. The compliance burden ultimately flows to consumers as higher costs and reduced access to credit, while violating principles of federalism by extending federal control over state-chartered institutions.

Regulation VV implements the Volcker Rule under section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act, prohibiting banking entities from engaging in proprietary trading and restricting investments in covered funds. It defines terms, establishes prohibitions with numerous exceptions, and applies to state member banks, bank holding companies, and other entities controlling insured depository institutions.

This regulation embodies the worst of post-crisis overreach—criminalizing legitimate risk-taking by banks while doing nothing to prevent the next crisis. The compliance burden is enormous, forcing banks to build costly monitoring systems and maintain extensive documentation for every trade. It reduces market liquidity, increases borrowing costs for businesses and consumers, and stifles financial innovation. The rule's complexity (spanning thousands of pages of guidance) makes compliance nearly impossible to guarantee, creating a trap for inadvertent violations. Most perniciously, it treats all proprietary trading as speculative gambling, ignoring that market-making and hedging—functions essential to economic functioning—often involve proprietary capital. The regulation is a solution in search of a problem; the 2008 crisis stemmed primarily from mortgage-backed securities and lax underwriting, not proprietary trading desks. It represents a massive expansion of federal power over private enterprise with no measurable benefit to financial stability.

Regulation RR requires securitizers to retain 5% of the credit risk in asset-backed securities they issue, mandating either an eligible vertical interest, eligible horizontal residual interest, or combination thereof. It includes detailed rules on calculating retention amounts, permissible structures, disclosure requirements to investors, and record maintenance obligations. The rule implements Section 15G of the Securities Exchange Act (Dodd-Frank) and applies to banks, bank holding companies, and other specified financial institutions.

This regulation imposes unnecessary costs on financial institutions and distorts market outcomes by substituting government mandates for private contract terms. Sophisticated investors and securitizers can negotiate appropriate risk retention through voluntary agreements without federal command-and-control. The rule's arbitrary 5% requirement, complex compliance framework, and disclosure burdens increase costs that are ultimately passed to consumers through reduced credit availability and higher borrowing costs. Market discipline—not prescriptive retention ratios—is the proper mechanism for aligning incentives. The regulation also perpetuates the flawed assumption that regulators can optimally design financial market structures, ignoring Hayek's insight about dispersed knowledge and the impossibility of central planning even in narrow domains. Repealing it would reduce regulatory burden while allowing market participants to determine appropriate risk-sharing arrangements based on actual risk profiles and investor demands.

Establishes minimum liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) and net stable funding ratio (NSFR) standards for large national banks and Federal savings associations, requiring them to hold high-quality liquid assets and maintain stable funding sources according to federally mandated formulas. Applies to GSIBs, Category II and III institutions, with OCC retaining discretionary authority to impose stricter requirements.

Imposes top-down central planning on bank balance sheets, distorting market signals and forcing banks to hold low-yield liquid assets (primarily government securities) instead of lending to productive enterprise. The compliance burden disproportionately harms smaller institutions, raising barriers to entry and protecting Too Big to Fail banks. Mandated ratios create moral hazard, making markets falsely confident in bank safety while diverting capital from economic growth. The OCC's blanket authority to override formulas invites regulatory mission creep. Banking liquidity is best determined by market discipline through depositor and creditor scrutiny, not federal fiat.

Prohibits proprietary trading by banking entities to reduce systemic risk, requiring banks to focus on traditional lending rather than speculative trading.

Imposes massive compliance costs on banks while creating artificial separation between trading and lending functions. Reduces market liquidity, increases transaction costs for businesses, and restricts banks' ability to hedge risks. The regulation's unintended consequences include reduced competition in financial markets and higher costs for consumers and businesses that rely on banking services.

This regulation requires securitizers to retain economic interest in credit risk of assets transferred to third parties through asset-backed securities, specifying permissible forms and amounts of retention, with exemptions for assets meeting underwriting standards.

This regulation imposes costly compliance burdens on securitization markets without addressing the fundamental issue of risk assessment. The retention requirements distort market incentives and create artificial costs that ultimately harm consumers through higher borrowing costs and reduced credit availability.