Browse regulations

Regulation RR requires securitizers (sponsors issuing asset-backed securities) to retain at least 5% of the credit risk of the securitized assets. Sponsors can satisfy this through eligible vertical interests (5% of each class), eligible horizontal residual interests (5% of total fair value), combinations thereof, or seller's interests for revolving pools. The rule includes extensive disclosure requirements about valuation methodologies, key inputs, assumptions, and ongoing reporting to investors and regulators.

This is government interference in voluntary contracts between sophisticated parties. It imposes substantial compliance costs (estimated billions annually) that get passed to borrowers and investors, distorts market-determined risk allocation, advantages large incumbent firms that can absorb the 5% retention requirement over smaller competitors, and assumes regulators know better than market participants how to structure incentives. The 2008 crisis was caused by government policies (Fannie/Freddie, CRA, Fed monetary policy) - this addresses symptoms, not root causes. Creates regulatory complacency ("we solved it") while adding administrative burden with no demonstrated benefit.

Implements the Volcker Rule (section 13 of the Bank Holding Company Act) which prohibits banking entities from engaging in proprietary trading. Defines terms, establishes what constitutes a 'trading account' and 'financial instrument,' and sets numerous complex exceptions for activities like repurchase agreements, securities lending, liquidity management, clearing activities, and risk-mitigating hedging. Applies to banking entities for which the CFTC is the primary financial regulatory agency, with different compliance requirements based on trading asset thresholds ($1B for limited, $20B for significant).

The Volcker Rule imposes massive compliance costs on banks while fundamentally restricting voluntary, consensual trading activities that provide crucial market liquidity and price discovery. It creates a sprawling 185,000+ page regulatory apparatus that compliance professionals must navigate, costs ultimately borne by customers and shareholders. The rule's underlying premise confuses legitimate proprietary trading (which banks used to manage their own balance sheets and provide market-making services) with the speculative excesses that contributed to 2008. By forcing banks to shrink their trading books and hoard liquid assets, it reduces their ability to intermediate markets, especially during stress periods when liquidity is most needed—exactly the opposite of what a stable financial system requires. The distinction between prohibited proprietary trading and permitted market-making is inherently unobservable, leading to arbitrary enforcement and regulatory capture. This heavy-handed micromanagement of private risk-taking decisions violates the principle that individuals and firms should be free to deploy their capital as they see fit, bearing the full consequences of their choices—not subject to bureaucratic second-guessing about what constitutes 'short-term' trading or 'hedging' versus 'speculation.' The rule should be repealed, allowing banks to engage in any trading activities their private shareholders approve, subject only to standard prudential regulations on leverage and capital adequacy.

Federal regulation mandating that all carriages and strollers comply with ASTM F833-21, a private sector safety standard, through incorporation by reference. The rule requires manufacturers to meet specific design and performance requirements for infant and juvenile products.

Private standards like ASTM already exist voluntarily and are widely adopted by responsible manufacturers. Federal mandate eliminates consumer and producer choice, imposes compliance costs (disproportionately on small businesses), and中央izes decision-making that could be better handled by tort liability, market reputation, and state-level variation. The unseen costs—reduced competition, higher prices, and regulatory capture risk—outweigh marginal safety benefits.

This regulation mandates that soft infant and toddler carriers comply with ASTM F2236-24, a private-sector safety standard, by incorporating the standard by reference.

The regulation imposes compliance costs that burden small manufacturers and consumers while offering no improvement over market-driven safety. Infant carriers are already subject to robust product liability laws; mandated standards reduce competition, increase prices, and create barriers to entry. The "approved" label creates moral hazard, lulling parents into false security, while stifling innovation. The concealed costs—hidden in product prices—violate transparency principles of sound governance.

Establishes mandatory safety standard for bedside sleepers by incorporating ASTM F2906-23, with modifications to cross-reference bassinet regulations.

Infant safety is a legitimate government role because babies cannot consent to risk or evaluate product safety. The regulation uses an existing industry standard, minimizing costs while ensuring uniform protection. Deleting it would expose infants to preventable suffocation and entrapment hazards that market forces alone cannot adequately address.

FTC rule governing mail, Internet, and telephone order sales requiring shipment within 30 days (50 days if credit applied), mandatory delay notifications with cancellation options, and payment-specific refund procedures with strict timelines. Includes detailed record-keeping requirements and creates rebuttable presumptions of violation.

Imposes significant compliance costs on all businesses, disproportionately burdening small sellers, while addressing problems already handled by contract law, market discipline, and state consumer protections. The prescriptive timelines reduce operational flexibility and represent federal overreach into local commercial transactions properly governed by state law under the Tenth Amendment.

FTC guidance interpreting Robinson-Patman Act §§2(d)-(e) requiring sellers to offer promotional allowances/services to all competing resellers on proportionally equal terms, treating such payments as discriminatory if not functionally available to all competitors.

Imposes substantial compliance burdens and administrative complexity on sellers, distorts efficient promotional pricing by mandating uniform terms regardless of customer needs, protects inefficient retailers from competition, and chills innovative distribution arrangements; the guidance enforces a statutory overreach that violates freedom of contract and produces unseen harms exceeding any purported competitive benefits.

FTC Used Auto Parts Guides regulate the marketing, sale, and advertising of used automotive parts to prevent deceptive practices about their condition, origin, and rebuilding status, requiring clear disclosure that parts are not new and specifying standards for terms like "rebuilt" or "remanufactured".

This regulation creates unnecessary compliance costs for small auto parts businesses while duplicating common law fraud protections already available through state courts. The market already provides strong incentives for honest disclosure - businesses with bad reputations lose customers, and third-party verification services exist. Federal micromanagement of how auto parts must be labeled and advertised represents regulatory overreach into a sector where state-level consumer protection laws and market forces provide adequate safeguards.

The regulation implements a certification program restricting access to the Social Security Death Master File for the three years following an individual's death. It requires certified persons to have legitimate fraud prevention or business purposes, implement security safeguards, and undergo third-party audits. The program fees cover administrative costs and violations incur penalties up to $250,000 annually.

Americans would be worse off without this regulation: deceased individuals' Social Security numbers and other identifying information would be freely accessible for three years after death, enabling rampant identity theft that harms estates and surviving family members. The regulation achieves its desired outcome in a way that would be hard to replicate privately because it governs access to a unique, comprehensive federal database—the government must secure its own systems and cannot outsource control. The certification process reasonably balances legitimate business needs (e.g., fraud detection by financial institutions) with protection against misuse, and alternative sources of death information exist for those unwilling to meet these standards.

This regulation establishes a federal certification regime for Regional Coastal Observing Systems (RCOS) to participate in the National Integrated Coastal and Ocean Observation System. It defines certification standards, application procedures, renewal requirements, audit processes, and provides liability protection for certified RCOS employees, requiring extensive documentation of organizational structure, governance, strategic plans, data management, and financial compliance.

This regulation represents unconstitutional federal overreach into what should be state, regional, or private ocean observation activities. The extensive certification requirements, ongoing audits, and threat of decertification create significant compliance costs that distort market competition and protect incumbents. The liability protection provision converting RCOS employees into federal employees distorts risk incentives. This is not a core constitutional function under Article I, Section 8 but rather elective federalization violating Tenth Amendment federalism principles. The private sector and states can and do conduct ocean observation without this bureaucratic layer; the hidden tax of compliance outweighs any marginal coordination benefits.

Establishes procedures for the National Appeals Office to adjudicate appeals of fishery management decisions under the Magnuson-Stevens Act, including filing requirements, hearings, evidence rules, and final decision processes.

Creates unnecessary bureaucratic layer for fishery disputes that could be handled by existing courts. Administrative appeals processes add compliance costs and delay without improving outcomes, while federalizing what should be state/local or private arbitration matters.

NASA regulation enforcing Animal Welfare Act compliance for all vertebrate animal research, testing, teaching, and hardware development activities under NASA jurisdiction, implemented through internal policies NPD 8910.1 and NPR 8910.1.

Extends federal regulatory burden into private research, imposing high compliance costs and administrative delays that stifle innovation and disproportionately harm small contractors; animal welfare is adequately maintained through existing professional standards and market accountability.

NASA FOIA regulations implementing public access to agency records under the Freedom of Information Act, establishing procedures for requests, processing, fees, and exemptions.

This regulation implements a core transparency law that enables public oversight of government agencies. Without it, citizens would lack legal mechanisms to access information about NASA operations, spending, and decision-making, undermining democratic accountability.

This regulation establishes fees for Department of Transportation services including document inspection, copying, certification, transcripts, and filing fees for air carriers and electronic tariffs. It specifies fee amounts (e.g., $8 registration, 5¢ per electronic record), payment methods (primarily pay.gov), waiver processes, interest on unpaid fees, and complex rules for calculating fees when multiple filings are involved.

The regulation imposes unnecessary compliance costs and bureaucratic complexity for a straightforward cost-recovery function. Detailed fee calculations, waiver applications to specific offices, interest penalties, and intricate rules for multi-transaction filings create transaction costs that exceed any efficiency gains. A simpler notice with flat fees would achieve the legitimate goal of preventing free-riding while reducing administrative burden on businesses and the DOT. The complexity itself constitutes a hidden tax on productivity.

Requires electronic airline information systems (global distribution systems, corporate booking tools, internet flight search tools) to disclose any carrier-identity-based bias in display ordering and to present flight options objectively according to user-selected search criteria (e.g., lowest fare). The regulation aims to prevent unfair or deceptive practices in the distribution and sale of air transportation.

Americans would be worse off if this regulation was deleted because dominant airline-owned booking platforms could manipulate display order to favor certain carriers without transparent disclosure, misleading consumers and distorting competition. The rule achieves its desired outcome through clear, enforceable standards that market forces alone cannot ensure due to high switching costs, network effects, and opaque algorithms; it preserves informed consumer choice and fair competition in a concentrated market.