Browse regulations

Defines 'financial product or service' under Dodd-Frank to include certain automobile leases and financial data processing services, expanding CFPB jurisdictional authority.

Expands federal regulatory reach into auto leasing and fintech data services, imposing disproportionate compliance costs on small businesses, stifling innovation, and crowding out state-level regulation. Creates regulatory uncertainty and enables mission creep beyond congressional intent.

Requires credit unions to mandate flood insurance for loans secured by properties in FEMA-designated special flood hazard areas, covering the lesser of loan balance or NFIP maximum. Mandates escrow of premiums for most residential loans, requires flood hazard determinations and borrower notices, allows force-placement if borrowers fail to insure, and imposes fees for monitoring. Accepts NFIP policies or private policies meeting NFIP-equivalent standards, with provisions for mutual aid societies.

Federal mandate imposing heavy compliance costs on credit unions and borrowers through tracking, escrow administration, and notice requirements, passed on as higher fees. Violates free contract by eliminating negotiation between lender and borrower over risk allocation, distorting credit availability in flood zones. Federal intrusion into state-regulated insurance and land use undermines Tenth Amendment federalism. Complex standards create barriers to entry for small insurers and fintech innovators, protecting incumbents. Unseen effects include reduced lending in high-risk areas, mispriced risk, and regulatory capture via gatekeeping of approved policies.

This regulation, issued by the Farm Credit Administration, establishes capital and margin requirements for Farm Credit System institutions that act as swap dealers or major participants. It implements Dodd-Frank Act mandates requiring non-cleared swaps to be backed by collateral, phased in between 2016-2022 based on counterparty size. The rule defines key terms, sets compliance thresholds (ranging from $3 trillion down to $50 billion in swap activity), provides exemptions for certain counterparties, and includes legacy swap protections and portfolio compression allowances.

This regulation imposes significant compliance costs on Farm Credit institutions, which are ultimately borne by rural America through higher borrowing costs and reduced credit availability. Capital and margin requirements for non-cleared swaps distort market incentives—private parties voluntarily negotiate collateral terms based on their own risk assessments; government mandates eliminate this flexibility. The rule creates barriers to entry, disproportionately harming smaller institutions that could otherwise compete on tailored risk management solutions. Moreover, the Farm Credit Administration, an agency created to serve the agricultural sector, is now enforcing Wall Street-style regulations drafted by the CFTC and SEC, representing federal mission creep that exceeds its constitutional charter. The unseen consequence: reduced liquidity in markets where Farm Credit institutions hedge agricultural risks, making it harder and more expensive for farmers and ranchers to manage price volatility.

Federal safety and soundness standards for insured depository institutions covering operational controls, internal audit, loan documentation, credit underwriting, interest rate exposure, asset quality, earnings, compensation practices, and information security requirements including customer data protection and identity theft prevention.

Creates massive regulatory burden on financial institutions with compliance costs exceeding $2 trillion annually, imposes one-size-fits-all standards that stifle innovation and competition, enables regulatory capture through complex rules favoring large incumbents, and represents unconstitutional federal overreach into banking operations that should be governed by market forces and state-level oversight.

The Depository Institution Management Interlocks Act prohibits banking officials from serving simultaneously on the boards of unaffiliated depositories in the same community or metropolitan area (for institutions over $50M), and between institutions over $10B regardless of location, to prevent anticompetitive coordination. It includes exemptions for low market share (<20% deposits), certain minority- and women-owned institutions, new banks, and troubled institutions, with FDIC retaining authority to grant further exemptions.

This preemptive ban on voluntary management contracts imposes significant compliance costs and arbitrary thresholds while duplicating existing antitrust enforcement. It reduces banking efficiency by preventing expertise transfer, disproportionately harms small banks through director availability constraints and regulatory burden, and violates principles of free association and property rights—addressing potential collusion after the fact through FTC/DOJ actions is superior to blanket prohibitions.

This regulation requires insured depository institutions and community groups to publicly disclose and report to banking regulators any written agreements providing over $10,000 in grants or $50,000 in loans made in connection with Community Reinvestment Act compliance, including quarterly filings and annual reports detailing fund disbursement and use.

Imposes significant compliance costs to administer the problematic CRA, which forces banks into non-economic lending. The reporting burden falls disproportionately on small banks with limited compliance resources while adding minimal transparency beyond existing regulatory authority. The unseen cost is legitimizing a system that violates freedom of contract and distorts credit allocation; repeal would reduce barriers to community banking relationships and eliminate wasteful paperwork.

This regulation restricts sales of failed bank assets by the FDIC, prohibiting individuals/entities that profited from wrongdoing, caused substantial losses, or have defaulted on large obligations from purchasing these assets. It aims to prevent wrongdoers from benefiting from their misconduct and requires certifications of eligibility before purchases.

This regulation creates unnecessary compliance costs and bureaucratic hurdles for legitimate buyers while providing minimal actual protection. The restrictions are overly broad, capturing individuals for technical defaults on large obligations even when unrelated to the asset purchase. The certification requirements create additional paperwork and legal liability without meaningfully preventing fraud, as bad actors can easily circumvent these rules through shell entities or intermediaries. Market forces and basic due diligence would naturally prevent the most egregious misconduct this regulation targets.

Requires flood insurance for loans secured by buildings or mobile homes in flood hazard areas, mandates escrow of insurance premiums, and establishes notice requirements for borrowers and FEMA.

Federal overreach into private insurance markets - forces citizens to purchase government-approved insurance for property they own, creating a hidden tax and distorting market incentives for property development in flood-prone areas.

This OCC regulation implements Dodd-Frank Act requirements for capital and margin requirements on non-cleared swaps and security-based swaps entered into by certain banks and financial institutions. It establishes phased compliance deadlines based on counterparties' total swap notional amounts, with requirements scaling from entities with >$3 trillion in swaps (September 2016) down to all remaining covered swap entities (September 2022). The rule includes numerous exemptions for certain counterparties and detailed provisions for legacy swaps, rate transitions (like LIBOR), and portfolio compression.

This regulation imposes massive compliance costs on financial institutions that are inevitably passed to consumers through higher fees and reduced access to hedging products. It violates the principle of freedom of contract by overriding voluntary collateral negotiations between sophisticated parties who already have massive incentives to manage counterparty risk. The complex tiered structure based on notional amounts creates regulatory barriers that favor large institutions over smaller ones, reducing competition. Despite its stated goal of reducing systemic risk, margin mandates actually concentrate risk in fewer, larger firms by making it uneconomical for smaller players to participate. The market itself—through credit spreads, collateral negotiations, and netting agreements—is far better at pricing risk than any bureaucratic formula. This represents yet another example of the post-2008 regulatory overreach that transformed U.S. financial markets while providing no measurable increase in true stability.

This regulation implements flood insurance requirements for federally regulated lenders, mandating that loans secured by buildings in flood-prone areas must have flood insurance coverage equal to the lesser of the loan balance or maximum NFIP coverage limits.

Federal flood insurance mandates represent unconstitutional federal overreach into property rights and local insurance markets. The $2 trillion compliance costs and barriers to entry for small lenders distort housing markets while providing dubious protection against natural disasters that should be managed at state/local level.

Regulations implementing Section 57(b)(2) of the Atomic Energy Act, authorizing U.S. persons to engage in nuclear activities abroad and controlling technology transfers related to special nuclear material development and production outside the United States. Covers activities from uranium enrichment to reactor development, with reporting requirements and civil penalties.

Creates unnecessary federal bureaucracy controlling nuclear technology transfers that could be handled through existing international agreements and Commerce Department export controls. The extensive regulatory framework imposes compliance costs on American businesses while duplicating functions already performed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and State Department, without clear evidence that this multi-agency oversight provides meaningful additional security benefits beyond what current nonproliferation treaties already achieve.

This regulation establishes that FSIS inspection procedures for meat products apply to fish and fish products, and references prosecution procedures from part 335 for violations of the Federal Meat Inspection Act.

Regulatory duplication creates unnecessary compliance costs and bureaucratic overlap. Fish inspection should be handled by agencies specifically authorized for seafood, not by extending meat inspection frameworks. This represents federal overreach into areas better managed by specialized agencies or state/local authorities.

Extends existing federal meat inspection cooperative programs to fish and fish products, authorizing the USDA Administrator to collaborate with states and utilize state employees/facilities for federal inspection functions under the Talmadge-Aiken Act.

Federal regulation of fish inspection violates Tenth Amendment federalism—properly a state or private sector function. Adds $billions in compliance costs to a fragmented industry, benefits incumbent processors through regulatory barriers, and creates capture risks. Interstate commerce concerns can be addressed through state reciprocity or private certification; federal involvement unnecessary expands bureaucracy beyond constitutional limits.

Extends meat inspection provisions from 9 CFR 329.1-329.5 (administrative detention) and 329.6-329.8 (judicial seizure and condemnation) to fish and fish products, and applies criminal provisions of the Act to fish inspection.

Duplicative regulation imposing unnecessary costs. Seafood inspection overlays existing FDA and state frameworks, raising compliance burdens without addressing unique fish safety needs. The criminal provisions are redundant; existing laws already penalize adulterated food. This federal overreach distorts market incentives and raises barriers for small seafood processors.

This regulation governs the importation of fish and fish products into the United States, requiring foreign inspection systems to be deemed equivalent, mandating certificates from foreign governments, and setting reinspection, sampling, and labeling requirements for imported products.

The regulation imposes compliance costs and regulatory burdens that protect domestic producers from competition, raise prices for consumers, and disproportionately harm small importers. Its unseen effects include reduced market dynamism, limited product variety, and barriers to entry. Food safety is better achieved through market mechanisms like private certification and liability.