Browse regulations

This regulation establishes ethical standards for employees of the U.S. Election Assistance Commission by cross-referencing existing federal ethics rules from 5 CFR parts 2634, 2635, 2636, 2637, 2638, 2641, 734, and 735.

Federal election administration requires strict ethical standards to maintain public trust in democratic processes. Without these baseline ethical requirements, there would be no guardrails preventing conflicts of interest, financial improprieties, or political manipulation in how elections are administered and certified. The costs of potential election fraud or corruption far exceed the compliance burden of these established ethical standards.

This regulation implements Privacy Act requirements for the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, establishing procedures for individuals to access, correct, and amend their personal records, including identity verification, request processes, appeal mechanisms, and fee structures.

Creates bureaucratic overhead for record access without addressing the core issue that federal election oversight itself represents unconstitutional expansion of federal power into state election administration. The administrative costs and compliance burdens for citizens seeking their own records are unnecessary given the regulation's limited scope to a federal agency that should not exist.

This regulation establishes policies and procedures for responding to demands or requests for official records, information, or testimony from U.S. Election Assistance Commission employees in legal proceedings. It requires prior written approval from the General Counsel before any employee can produce records or provide testimony, and outlines detailed procedures for submitting requests, factors for consideration, conditions on testimony/production, and fee structures.

This regulation creates unnecessary bureaucratic barriers to accessing government information and testimony. The extensive approval requirements and discretionary authority of the General Counsel effectively shield the Commission from public scrutiny and legal accountability. It imposes significant compliance costs on litigants and creates a chilling effect on legitimate discovery requests, while providing no clear public benefit beyond protecting bureaucratic convenience.

This regulation implements the Government in the Sunshine Act for the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, establishing requirements for open meetings, public notice, and transparency in the Commission's decision-making processes. It defines when meetings must be open to public observation, when they can be closed, and procedures for public participation and record-keeping.

This regulation creates a specialized bureaucracy for transparency requirements that could be handled through existing FOIA and general government transparency laws. The Election Assistance Commission's core function is election administration, not conducting meetings that require such elaborate procedural frameworks. These requirements add compliance costs and regulatory overhead without providing benefits that couldn't be achieved through simpler, existing mechanisms.

This regulation implements the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) for the U.S. Election Assistance Commission, establishing procedures for public access to agency records, fee structures, requester categories, response timelines, exemptions, and appeals processes.

Americans would be worse off without standardized FOIA procedures, which ensure transparent access to election administration records essential for democratic accountability. The regulation balances public access with legitimate exemptions in a predictable, knowable manner, reducing arbitrary decision-making and promoting rule of law.

Implements section 148 of the Atomic Energy Act to control dissemination of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI) concerning nuclear facilities, materials, and weapons. Establishes criteria for UCNI designation, marking requirements, access controls, physical protection standards, and penalties for unauthorized dissemination. Applies to persons with authorized/unauthorized access to UCNI. Excludes information already controlled by DoD and exempts basic scientific research, radiation exposure data, and low-level waste transportation info.

Americans would be dramatically worse off without this regulation: it prevents nuclear proliferation and terrorism by controlling sensitive unclassified information that could enable illicit nuclear weapons production or sabotage of nuclear materials. The regulation achieves its vital objective in a way impossible for markets or voluntary measures—nuclear threats impose catastrophic, non-excludable risks that require centralized, enforceable controls. Its narrow tailoring (specific criteria, science exemptions, quarterly transparency reports) minimizes burdens while addressing existential threats beyond the scope of private ordering or state action.

This DOE regulation implements a federal loan program under Section 136 of the Energy Independence and Security Act to provide financing (through the Federal Financing Bank) for manufacturing facilities producing 'advanced technology vehicles' (ATVs) and qualifying components. The program provides loans covering up to 80% of project costs to manufacturers who meet specific fuel economy/emissions standards and demonstrate financial viability. Applications require extensive documentation including environmental reports, business plans, financial statements, and compliance demonstrations. The loans have terms up to 25 years with Treasury-determined interest rates and are secured by government liens on project assets.

This program represents corporate welfare and market-distorting industrial policy. Government has no business picking winners in the auto manufacturing sector through subsidized loans. Private capital markets—not federal bureaucrats—should allocate investment based on market signals. The program creates regulatory capture opportunities, burdens taxpayers with risk while private firms reap upside, and crowds out private lending. Even if some projects are worthwhile, the government lacks the knowledge to distinguish truly innovative ventures from politically connected ones, leading to malinvestment. The hidden costs include higher taxes, distorted capital allocation, and unfair competition advantages for firms receiving government backing over smaller competitors. The program compounds the regulatory burden on manufacturers while violating the principle of limited government.

Federal regulation establishing fitness-for-duty (FFD) programs for nuclear facility personnel with access to sensitive areas or materials, requiring drug/alcohol testing, background checks, and behavioral monitoring to ensure personnel are fit to work in nuclear power plants and facilities handling strategic special nuclear material (SSNM).

Americans would be worse off if this regulation was deleted because nuclear facilities would lack standardized safety protocols to ensure personnel operating critical systems, handling radioactive materials, or maintaining security are not impaired by drugs, alcohol, or other fitness issues that could cause catastrophic accidents affecting public health and safety.

This regulation establishes procedures for determining net weight compliance and allowable variations for meat and poultry products, incorporating NIST Handbook 133 and 44 standards for weighing and measuring devices.

This regulation creates unnecessary compliance costs and bureaucratic oversight for basic weighing operations that private industry already handles through market mechanisms and existing quality control. The NIST standards referenced are voluntary industry guidelines that businesses already follow to maintain customer trust and avoid liability, making federal enforcement redundant. Small processors face disproportionate compliance burdens while large corporations can absorb these costs, creating market barriers. The revolving door between USDA and large meat packers suggests regulatory capture, where rules protect incumbents rather than consumers.

Comprehensive federal agricultural payment limitation regulations governing eligibility, attribution, and compliance across multiple USDA programs including ARC, PLC, CRP, NAP, and disaster assistance programs, with detailed definitions of farming operations, contribution requirements, and administrative procedures.

Creates a complex bureaucratic maze that distorts agricultural markets, enables regulatory capture through complex compliance requirements, and artificially limits farm size and efficiency through arbitrary payment caps that harm both large and small producers while increasing compliance costs for all.

This regulation establishes a Sorghum Promotion, Research, and Information Board under the Commodity Promotion, Research, and Information Act of 1996. It creates a mandatory checkoff program where sorghum producers and importers pay assessments to fund generic promotion, research, and information activities administered by a USDA-appointed Board composed of sorghum producers and potentially importers.

This regulation imposes a mandatory tax on sorghum producers and importers to fund centralized marketing decisions that should be made voluntarily in the marketplace. It violates free association by forcing all industry participants to fund generic promotion regardless of their individual preferences, creates regulatory capture risks where the Board may favor certain producers, and distorts market competition. The $2 trillion+ regulatory burden includes such agricultural checkoffs that protect incumbents while raising barriers to entry. The unseen costs include forcing producers to subsidize competitors' marketing and concentrating economic power in a politically-appointed bureaucracy, contrary to free enterprise principles.

Establishes the National Honey Board, a government-administered checkoff program funded by mandatory assessments (currently $0.015/lb) on honey first handlers and importers to conduct promotion, research, and industry information activities. The Board consists of 10 industry representatives appointed by the Secretary of Agriculture and has authority to spend collected funds on marketing campaigns, research projects, and related programs to benefit the honey industry.

This is a classic agricultural checkoff program that violates core free market principles: it forces compulsory association and taxation on a specific industry without representation, creates a regulatory capture vector where industry insiders control government spending, and distorts market competition by funding collective marketing that benefits incumbents over smaller competitors. The government has no legitimate role in promoting private products—voluntary industry associations can provide these services more efficiently without violating liberty or creating compliance burdens. The program exemplifies the 'seen vs unseen' costs Mises warned of: while benefits to large honey producers are visible, unseen costs include stifled innovation, forced funding of unwanted activities, and unconstitutional expansion of federal power into pure commerce.

This regulation mandates that dairy product manufacturers (cheese, butter, dry whey, nonfat dry milk) submit detailed weekly sales reports and monthly storage reports to USDA's Agricultural Marketing Service. The data is used to establish minimum prices for Class III and IV milk under federal milk marketing orders. Manufacturers processing less than 1 million pounds annually are exempt. Reports must include specific product details (grade, packaging, age) and exclude certain sales. AMS aggregates and publishes the data weekly. Enforcement includes cease and desist orders and civil penalties.

This regulation imposes a compliance burden that acts as a hidden tax on dairy manufacturers, distorts market incentives through government-mandated reporting, and enables price controls that violate the free market price mechanism. The federal milk marketing order system—which this reporting supports—represents a New Deal-era intervention that Hayek would recognize as the fatal conceit: central planners cannot process the dispersed knowledge needed to set milk prices. The regulation also invades business privacy by forcing disclosure of proprietary sales data. Even if repealed, private market reporting services would naturally emerge to provide price transparency where demand exists, without government coercion or attendant distortions.

The Dairy Forward Pricing Program allows dairy handlers to enter into forward contracts with producers, exempting contract milk from minimum price requirements under federal milk marketing orders. The program establishes definitions, contract requirements, and protections against coercion, with contracts limited to 2026-2029.

This regulation distorts dairy market pricing by allowing handlers to contract around minimum price requirements, creating two-tiered pricing systems that favor large operations. It undermines the federal milk marketing order system's goal of price stability and fair compensation, while adding regulatory complexity that small producers must navigate. The coercion protections are insufficient against market power imbalances, and the program ultimately reduces price transparency and market efficiency in dairy markets.

Establishes NRCS policy for Plant Materials Centers (PMCs) that assemble, test, release, and distribute plant materials and technology for conservation and environmental purposes across multiple land uses including agriculture, wildlife, urban development, and recreation.

Federal plant materials research and distribution exceeds constitutional authority, duplicates state agricultural research capabilities, and creates unnecessary bureaucratic overhead. State universities, agricultural experiment stations, and private sector nurseries can provide these services more efficiently without federal intervention.